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ABSTRACT
The thesis demonstrates that viewing transition as a political process of the complex 
interaction and interplay of different issue policies -  economic, political, and security -  
within the transition state (horizontal) and among three different levels -  domestic, state 
and international (vertical) -  can further explain the dynamics and various outcomes we 
currently witness in the countries of post-communist transition.
The thesis adopts an integrative approach by trying to combine functionalist and genetic 
schools of democratisation theories. The theoretical framework goes beyond existing 
democratisation theories and includes the core approaches of those international relations 
theories that tackle the issues of domestic-foreign policy interaction and explain how 
international norms are transferred and institutionalised in states. It also implies that it is 
not only the economic situation but also the political and security conditions that matter if 
transition is to progress. The thesis proposes a new framework to analyse the transition 
process which takes into account 1) the initial socio-economic, political and security 
conditions and the changes in those conditions that result from government policies and 
their interaction, 2) based on those conditions, elite choices and government policies and 
their interaction, and 3) the initial domestic and external demands and supports, their 
interplay and the change resulting from government policies. This framework allows one 
to follow the developments while they are in process, to trace the direction and dynamics 
of change within each policy area and at each level in the early stages, and their impact on 
the overall transition process, as well as to predict and explain the subsequent foreign and 
domestic policy changes.
The thesis analyses the transition in the twenty-five post-communist countries, with a 
specific focus on Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. The analysis proves that (1) There is a strong 
interconnectedness among economic, political and security policies during transition, and 
success in one dimension often comes at the expense of success in another. It is hard to 
achieve progress in all dimensions, unless there is sufficient external support; (2) There is 
also an essential link and interplay among different levels -  domestic, state and 
international -  within the overall transition process. In order for transition to succeed, it is 
important that the resources and respective costs of transition have been effectively, that is 
reasonably distributed in a timely manner, among those levels; and (3) deriving from the 
first two points, there is a substantial link between the domestic and foreign policy 
dynamics of states in transition.
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INTRODUCTION 
Eighteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we witness different degrees 
of development in the twenty-five post-communist states. At the beginning almost all of 
them embraced democracy and market principles. Some of them can be called full-fledged 
democracies today, while others oscillate between authoritarianism and democracy. Since 
then, a plethora of research has been conducted to understand where these countries are 
transitioning and what causes such a divergence in their paths.
To date, the analysis of post-communist transition is conducted in the framework of 
the existing democratic transition theory that has been built on the democratisation 
experiences of Latin America and Southern Europe. The two schools of thought on 
democratic transition theory, the genetic and the functionalist, emphasise different aspects 
and causalities of the transition process.
The functionalist school focuses on structural and environmental factors and sees 
long-term socio-economic or cultural development as the main determinants for political 
change. The core of the functionalist argument is the link between the economy and 
democracy. Although it may be seen to target longer-term, pre-transition developments 
that bring about change more successfully, it is less equipped to effectively analyse the 
incomparably short subsequent period of early transition. Here the genetic approach is 
more useful since it concentrates on the depth of the transition process, notably on the 
institutions, actors, their choices, and strategies. In other words, it emphasises the political 
determinants of change.
Certainly, past experience, legacies, and historical background play an enormous 
role in causing differences in the progress of states in transition. However, there is little, if 
any, essential difference between Ukraine and Belarus in terms of their Communist past, 
legacies, or level of national identity. In that case, what causes such a difference in the 
transition trajectories of these two countries? In the same way, one cannot explain the 
failures in democratisation in Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Turkmenistan within the concept of 
geographic proximity. In this respect, there is a need for a more comprehensive approach 
to the study of transition phenomena. While the existing theories of democratic transition 
provide some useful insights when explaining post-communist transitions, they are clearly
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unable to explain the reasons for the diverse trajectories and destinations of those 
countries, ranging from heavily authoritarian states to democracies.
Much of the transition literature originally emphasised the role of domestic factors. 
Yet post-communist transition has increasingly demonstrated the significance of the 
international dimension. The limited writings on the impact of external factors on the 
transition process examine to what extent a particular transition is “top-down” or “bottom- 
up” in its dynamics. I suggest that one should look at it as a combination of, and an 
interaction between, the two.
One of the most egregious omissions in existing studies of democratisation is 
analysis of the process of political interaction during transition -  both internal and 
external -  within which each government moves to achieve its foreign and domestic 
policy goals, in this case towards establishing democracy, a market economy and 
international integration.
Neither of the schools of democratic transition theory treats the transition 
process as a dynamic process of interaction across domestic and international levels on 
the one hand, and a trade-off between values and policy priorities within each of those 
levels, on the other. My thesis aims to fill that gap.
Theories of International Relations (IR) also have limited applicability to post­
communist transition. Discussing transition as a dynamic process of political interaction 
within the state and across all three levels -  domestic, state and international -  means 
touching upon one of the core, and yet controversial, topics of IR theory -  domestic- 
foreign policy linkages. There are number of theories and concepts on domestic-foreign 
linkages that are either narrow in their scope or static. The concepts discussed do not say 
much about the dynamics of the changes in a state’s structural position itself. They rather 
describe only in general terms the possible tactical reactions of a statesman or a 
government to this or that situation.
The model I propose in my thesis aims to follow the developments while they are 
in process, to trace the direction and dynamism of the change within each policy area and 
at each level in the early stages and their impact on the overall transition process, so as to 
predict and explain the subsequent foreign and domestic policy changes.
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In general, measuring change is a difficult task, both in terms of methodology and 
in terms of methods. Tracing patterns of political and economic development and change 
or correlation, or revealing the patterns of change and interaction of foreign and domestic 
policy, requires following longer-term developments. On the other hand, the longer the 
time period, the less chance there is to effectively analyse often incommensurate and 
subjectively interpreted political and economic data. This often makes accurate analysis 
difficult, if not impossible, which makes it difficult to come to correct or useful 
conclusions. In this respect, transitional countries suggest themselves as attractive cases for 
empirical study because of the bold shifts in both foreign and domestic policy processes 
that occur within a short and observable period of time. It is not only transition theories 
that may benefit from this approach. IR theories may also benefit, since transitional 
countries may provide valuable empirical input into the area of domestic-foreign policy 
linkage.
The theories and approaches mentioned above explain transition dynamics to some 
extent. However, they do not account for the process of political interaction and interplay 
during the transition -  both internal and external. My approach aims to fill that gap by 
suggesting a more dynamic framework for analysing transition as a multi-faceted and 
multi-level interaction and interplay. I suggest that transition can be better understood if it 
is viewed as a political process of complex interaction and interplay of different issue 
policies within the transition state and among three different levels -  domestic, state and 
international. Based on this, I have constructed three hypotheses that will be tested within 
the suggested framework on twenty-five post-communist countries in transition, and on 
Moldova and Kyrgyzstan in particular.
Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 1 of this thesis reviews the theoretical propositions of the existing 
transition and democratisation theories and their applicability to post-communist transition. 
It reveals the key domestic factors crucial for the survival and consolidation of democracy. 
It also highlights those core issues of transition that are not explained sufficiently within 
the existing theories and substantiates the need for a new approach.
Chapter 2 explores the role of external factors in the overall transition. This chapter 
also discusses theories and approaches in IR that explain how international norms are
11
transferred and institutionalized by domestic actors. It discusses the theories of 
international regimes and complex interdependence. It also examines the international 
dimension of post-communist transition and the role of international institutions, 
socialisation and conditionality.
Chapter 3 reviews the theories that analyse various aspects of the domestic and 
foreign policy relationship and tries to identify the concepts that can be useful in analysing 
the multi-issue and multi-level dynamics of post-communist transition. It also highlights 
the gaps in the current literature. The chapter elaborates a schematic framework to study 
transition as a dynamic process of interaction between domestic (horizontal) and 
international (vertical) levels, sets out the main hypotheses and constructs the core 
arguments.
Chapter 4 is largely empirical and applies some macro-level analysis to explore 
what domestic and international factors impact on the transition paths of the twenty-five 
post-communist countries. The chapter tests empirically the validity of my assumptions 
about the transition phenomenon as a dynamic process of multi-level and multi-issue 
interaction and interplay. It finds that the results generally support my assumptions, with 
only Kyrgyzstan and Moldova looking as if they present a challenge.
Chapters 5 and 6 empirically test my assumptions, based on the framework 
developed in chapter 3, on the transition experience of Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. These 
chapters show that these countries fit the pattern and are not exceptions.
The Conclusion summarises the findings and draws theoretical and practical 
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
Transition To Democracy: Is There a Need For a New Approach?
The domestic transformation and integration of countries in transition into the 
international system is the general or, at least, formal task for those countries. 
Concurrently, that is the goal the international community desires to achieve. However, 
states in transition that have embarked on democratisation and marketisation, state and 
nation-building processes on the one hand, and integration into the international system on 
the other, present a serious challenge for the existing international relations theory and 
practice. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which the existing theories 
of democratic transition explain the multidimensional and complex processes of transition 
in the post-communist space and to examine whether the existing theoretical framework of 
democratic transition is capable of explaining the transition phenomenon as a dynamic 
process of multi-issue and multi-level interaction and interplay.
Theories of Democratisation and Democratic Transition
Democratisation is defined as a “complex historical process, consisting of several
analytically distinct but empirically overlapping stages. Those stages include: (1) decay of
authoritarian rule, (2) transition; (3) consolidation, and (4) the maturing of a democratic
political order.1 Of these four stages, in the literature the transition and consolidation
stages have been subject to the most research. I do not make a sharp distinction between
democratisation studies and studies of transition, although there is a difference in their
substance. Donnell and Philippe Schmitter refer to “transition” as the interval between one
political regime and another:
Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process 
of the aftermath (i.e. dissolution of the authoritarian regime) and, on the 
other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return of some
1 Doh Chull Shin, “Review : On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and 
Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research”, World Politics, Vol.47, No.l, 1994, pp. 135- 
170, p. 143.
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form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.
Our efforts generally stop at the moment that a new regime is installed, 
whatever its nature or type... While we and our collaborations have paid 
some attention to the aftermath (i.e. consolidation).2
As we see, for objective or subjective reasons, transitologists have also been 
engaged in post-installation studies. Therefore, for all their differences, studies of 
democratisation and of democratic transition have much in common.
The transition stage is considered complete when a new constitution is adopted and 
free elections are held. However, even a successful transition to democratic regime does 
not guarantee its stability and sustainability. As Adam Przeworski puts it, the central 
question concerning transitions is whether they lead to consolidated democracy, that is, a 
system in which the politically relevant forces subject their values and interests to the 
uncertain interplay of democratic institutions and comply with the outcomes of the 
democratic process. A democratic regime is consolidated when, under given political and 
economic conditions, a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town; 
that is, when most conflicts are processed through democratic institutions. It becomes self- 
enforcing when all relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interest 
and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions.3
There are several theoretical questions related to this phenomenon. Although there 
is a clear understanding of what it means to move in a democratic direction, there is still 
extensive discussion on why some political regimes move in a democratic direction and 
others do not, or why these processes have different historical trajectories. Why have 
democratisation processes at certain points in time been more successful in certain regions 
and more occasional in others?
Democratisation was a global phenomenon during the twentieth century, especially 
in its last quarter. While in 1975 at least 68 percent of the world’s countries were
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transition from  
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University, 1986, p. 6.
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 96.
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authoritarian, by 1995 only about 26 percent remained as such. This rapid political 
transformation started in Southern Europe in the mid 1970s, then spread to Latin America, 
and, to an extent, to Asia, in the 1980s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, democratisation 
moved on to parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet space.
Samuel Huntington separates three waves of democratisation: First, the long wave 
of 1828-1926; second, the short wave of 1943-1962; and finally, the third wave which 
started in 1974 and continues today.4 The geography of democratisation was different 
during each of these waves. Between 1975 and 1995 there was little regime change in 
North America, Australia, and Western Europe, apart from Spain and Portugal moving to 
liberal democracy. The third wave embraced Latin America, with 68 percent of regimes 
being authoritarian in 1975 and only 10 percent in 1995.5 Some authors, however, consider 
post-communist transition as a distinct, fourth wave. Michael McFaul, for example, argues 
that although they occurred within the same time span, transitions to democracy in 
Southern Europe and Latin America and transitions after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
should not be combined in one wave because the regime changes in Southern Europe and 
Latin America did not trigger or inspire communist regime change. Therefore, “they 
should not be grounded under same rubric.” He argues that “de-communisation triggered a 
fourth wave of regime change- to democracy and dictatorship.”6 I agree with McFaul’s 
argument. The post-communist transitions indeed have sufficient distinctive 
characteristics that one can classify them as a separate fourth wave. It will also create less 
confusion when discussing post-authoritarian and post-communist transitions. However, 
the theoretical framework that is currently applied to explain post-communist transitions is 
mostly built on the experience of, and the lessons derived from, the third wave of
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
5 Paul G Lewis, “Theories of Democratisation and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern 
Europe”, Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics Vol. 13. No. 1, 1997, pp. 
4-26, p. 9.
6 Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative 
Transitions in the Postcommunist World”, World Politics Vol. 54, No. 2, 2002, pp. 212- 
44, p. 213.
15
democratisation. Therefore, regardless where the transition from communist regimes is 
placed, the third wave of democratisation remains a key source for reference and 
comparison.
Several theoretical approaches have been put forward so far to explain patterns of 
democratisation. These approaches can be grouped into two general schools, the 
functionalist and the genetic.1 The functionalist school searches for the necessary 
conditions and prerequisites for the emergence of stable democracy and emphasises the 
importance of socio-economic and cultural factors. It incorporates the modernisation and 
structural approaches, as well as studies that underscore the importance of political culture 
conducive to democratisation. The genetic school emphasises political contingency and the 
role of change agents in explaining how democracy comes into existence. It emphasises 
political processes and elite initiatives and choices, which are necessary for moving from 
an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Although there are many shared views both within 
and among these schools of thought, the difference is that each group emphasises certain 
causal relationships when explaining the process. I will go into the details of each of these 
approaches, to see where I can position myself within the existing research spectrum.
The Functionalist School
The modernisation approach views the level of social and economic development 
as a necessary precondition for successful democratisation. It was initially introduced by 
Seymour Lipset in his book entitled Political Man. Distinguishing among stable 
democracies, unstable democracies, stable dictatorships and unstable dictatorships, Lipset 
tested how regime types are correlated with indices of wealth, industrialization, education, 
urbanization. Conducting comparative analysis, he showed that there are certain 
socioeconomic prerequisites of democracy. He came to the conclusion that “the more well-
Q
to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”
7 Geoffrey Pridham, E. Herring and G. Stanford, Building Democracy: The International 
Dimension in Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
O
Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man. London, Heinemann, 1960, p. 31.
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Lipset’s argument initiated a discussion about the impact of socio-economic 
development on democracy - the “modernisation theory.” His argument was widely 
accepted and developed in 1960s, when new democracies emerged.9 It was, however, 
challenged in the 1970s when democratic regimes started to break down in wealthy Latin 
American countries and Southern Europe. Considered as too “deterministic”, the 
modernization perspective of democracy appeared irrelevant in the 1970s, when the issue 
of democratization became a subject of political agenda of those countries.10 The new 
realities stimulated a new direction of research focusing on political actors and their 
strategies and rational choices.11
At a later stage, however, Lipset himself admitted that the existence of correlation 
does not mean the existence of a causal relationship; socioeconomic development does not 
necessarily bring democracy. Also, it is accepted that the suggested correlations do not 
hold for all countries and for all democratisation waves. 12
The “third wave” of democratization renewed interest in the relationship between 
economic development and democracy. However, again, the research did not reach a clear
9 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages o f  Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960; Phillips Curtright, “National Political 
Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates”, in Nelson W. Polsby et. al. (eds.), 
Politics and Social Life, Boston, Mass. Houghton Mifflin, 1963; Deane E. Neubauer, 
“Some Conditions of Democracy”, American Political Science Review 61, 1967, pp. 1002- 
9; Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Comparative Politics: a Developmental 
Approach, Boston Mass: Little, Brown, 1966; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies, New Haven, Conn: Yale University press, 1966.
10 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, World 
Politics Vol. 49, No. 2, 1997, p. 176.
11 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transition 
from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986; Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 
1986; Shain Y and Juan Linz (eds.), Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic 
Transitions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
19 See Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics revised, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
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consensus on the casual relationship between economic development and democracy.
Some scholars contend that democracy promotes economic development. Democracy is
more conducive to economic growth than even benevolent autocracies. One can attribute
better economic performance of democracies to their commitment to such features of
democracy as the protection of private property rights, the exercise of political rights and 
1 ^civil liberties.
Others argue that there is no systematic relationship between economic
development and democracy for two reasons. First economic development is a necessary
but not sufficient condition of democratic development. As Arat puts it:
Democracy is not a one-way ladder that countries climb as their economy 
and social structures develop... What might be the other conditions of 
democracy or which components of middle range development and what 
other factors might be related to the destabilization of democracy? 14
Second, in the same way, economic development is affected by many factors; a 
democratic government by itself can have only limited impact on economic 
development.15
In the late 1990s, Przeworski and Limongi seriously challenged modernisation 
theory.16 Based on empirical data, the authors tested two key theories, “endogenous” and 
exogenous” about the correlation between economic development and democratization. 
They contended that the “endogenous” or modernization theory, which argues that
13 Uke Heo and Alexander C. Tan, “Research Note: Democracy and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries: A Causal Analysis”, Comparative Politics 33, 2001, pp.463-473.
14 Zehra F. Arat, “Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory 
Revisited”, Comparative Politics 21,1988, pp.21-36, p.34.
15 Arat, 1988; Tatu Vanhanen, The Process o f  Democratization: A Comparative Study o f  
147 States, 1980-88, New York: Crane Russak, 1990; Mancur Olson, “ Dictatorship, 
Democracy, and Development”, American Political Science Review 87, 1993, pp. 567-576.
16 See Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose 
Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political 
Institutions and Well- Being in the World, 1950-1990, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000.
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development increases the likelihood that countries will undergo a transition to democracy, 
has no empirical basis.
In contrast, “exogenous” theory, which assumes that once established, development
makes democracies more sustainable is supported empirically. In other words, economic
development explains why democracy endures, but not why it emerges.
The emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic 
development. Democracy is or is not established by political actors 
pursuing their goals, and can be initiated at any level of development. Only 
once it is established do economic constraints play a role: the chances for 
the survival of democracy are greater when a country is richer. Yet even 
the current wealth of a country is not decisive: democracy is more likely to 
survive in a growing economy with less than $1,000 per capita income than 
in a country with an income between $1,000 and $2,000 that declines 
economically. If they succeed in generating development, democracies can 
survive even in the poorest nations.17
Przeworski’s study also generated a substantial amount of further research 
confirming that indeed, the level of economic development has more impact on the 
sustainability of democracy than any other factor.18 One caveat of Przeworski’s work is 
that the data used in his study end in 1990 and, therefore exclude the new wave of 
democratisation that started in post-socialist countries. However, even at a glance, it is 
visible that Przeworski’s argument linking the sustainability of democracy to economic 
development can only partially pass the test in post-socialist transition. Economic growth 
does not immediately translate into economic development and a more complex approach 
should be adopted in analysing post-communist transitions experiencing such drastic 
reforms in socio-economic, political and state-building spheres at the same time. 
Moreover, I agree with Arat that even if it is necessary, economic development is not a 
sufficient precondition for democratisation to succeed.
In 2003, Charles Boix and Susan Strokes challenged the argument of Przeworski 
and his collaborators both empirically and theoretically. The authors demonstrated that a
17 Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 177.
18 See Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000; J. B. Londgren and K.T. Poole, 
“Does High Income Promote Democracy?”, World Politics Vol.49, pp.56-91.
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more carefully conducted analysis of the same empirical data that Przeworski and others
used yields results that more conform to “endogenous” theory of democratization.
Furthermore, according to them:
... to sustain the conceptual distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
democratization, one would need a theory in which development induces 
actors in democracies to sustain that system but does not induce actors in 
dictatorships to change to democracy. Przeworski and Limongi fail to 
provide a persuasive theory linking development to democracy only under 
the condition of a pre-existing democracy.19
In a relatively recent study that included a wide range of countries and the
empirical data used in the previous studies, Lipset and Lankin reaffirmed the key argument
behind modernization theory: “national wealth is the single most consistent predictor of
democratic success.” This time Lipset also took into consideration Przeworski’s counter
argument that democracy is a rational choice made by elites who prefer democracy to other
types of regimes because it gives sufficient economic opportunities outside the state to
political losers. Lipset and Lankin contend that changes in elites values and attitudes (that
occur in the process of modernization) regarding economic development also include the
idea that “democracy is one, increasingly preferable way to defuse the tensions inherent in
the conflict among opposing groups.”
James Hughes makes an important observation, from the perspective of the
extent to which modernisation theory can explain post-communist transition. He
correctly notes that while modernisation pressures were critical for initiating
transition in Russia,
It is less convincing as a predicative model, however, if one examines the 
transformative impact of transition on social conditions. The functionalist
19 Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization”, World Politics Vol. 
55, 2003, pp.517-49, p.518.
20 See Seymour Lipset, “Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited”, American 
Sociological Review 59, 1994, pp. 1-22; Seymour M. Lipset and Jason M. Lakin, The 
Democratic Century, University of Oklohoma Press, 2004; Cynthia McClintock, “Lipset’s 
Legacy”, Journal o f  Democracy Vol. 16, No. 2, 2005, pp. 164-166.
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model is flawed in not recognizing that a systemic transition can devour the 
modernised social structures from which it is bom. 21
This observation is applicable to all post-communist countries and it is not 
surprising that the unprecedented triple (some even contend- quadruple) transition in those 
countries has brought new adaptations of modernization theory. Some studies started to 
test the immediate impact of economic reforms on democratization. Do economic reforms 
induce democracy or not? According to some analysts, economic reforms predict 
democratization better than any other variable. They argue that those countries that score 
higher on economic reforms (indicators include the private sector share of the economic 
product, trade and price liberalization) also score higher on measures of democratization
99(indicators include Freedom House indices of civil rights and political liberties). In this
regard, as Valerie Bunce notes,
This finding, however, does not detract in any way from the claims about 
economic development and democratic sustainability. Just as the richest 
post-Socialist countries dominate the group of consolidated democracies, 
the poorest post-Socialist countries are overrepresented in those cases of 
either compromised democracy or authoritarian rule. Moreover, at least 
some of the poorest countries in the region that jumped to democracy in the 
first years of post-Socialism - in particular, Albania and Kyrgyzstan - have 
been sliding away from democracy in more recent years.23
How can modernisation theory contribute to the theoretical framework of my 
thesis? The classical version of modernisation or endogenous theory, which argues that 
development increases the likelihood that the countries will undergo a transition to
21 James Hughes, “Transition Models and Democratisation in Russia”, in Mike Bowker and 
Cameron Ross (ed.), Russia After the Cold War, London, Longman, 2000, p.24.
22 See M.S. Fish, “The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-communist World”, 
East European Politics and Societies Vol. 12, 1998, pp. 31-78; J. S. Kopstein and D.A, “ 
Explaining the Why of the Why” On Fish’s “Determinants of Economic Reform in the 
Post-Communist World”, East European Politics and Societies Vol. 13, 1999, pp.613-624.
23 Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations”, 
Comparative Political Studies Vol. 33, No. 6-7, 2000, pp. 703-734.
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democracy, is not applicable to my thesis. On the one hand, while the collapse of the 
Soviet Union can be considered a result of modernisation pressures that Soviet society 
passed through, I think that the decision to transit to democracy after the breakdown of the 
Soviet regime was a choice made by the local ruling or counter elites, induced by certain 
domestic and international pressures. Moreover, my study focuses on countries that are 
already going through transition- that is, I concentrate on the post-instalment period and 
disparities in their starting social and economic conditions may be one among the 
relatively broad range of factors (along with elite choices, institutional constraints or 
political culture) that explain why they fail or succeed in their endeavours. In other words, 
whether the success of the richest post-socialist countries in institutionalising their 
democracies and the failures of the poor ones that Valerie Bunce observes can be attributed 
to their national wealth or to some other factors can be proved only when the research 
includes as many variables as possible.
To some extent, the “exogenous” theory, which assumes that once established, 
economic development makes democracies more sustainable, can be tested in my thesis. 
In the post-communist context, this would mean establishing whether success in economic 
reform would necessarily bring positive changes in democracy as the theory claims. Why 
are achievements in all reform directions sustainable in some cases, but not in others? The 
answer to this question, which is core to my thesis, goes beyond the exogenous argument 
of modernisation theory.
Another distinct approach in the functionalist school is the structural approach, 
which attributes core significance to changing structures of power conducive for 
democratisation. The structural approach was introduced by Barrington Moore and further 
elaborated by Dietrich Rueschemeyer.24 Through all its various interpretations, followers 
of the structural approach are united in the belief that a country’s historical trajectory 
towards any political form — be it liberal democracy or an authoritarian regime -  is 
contingent on changing structures of class, state, and transnational power driven by a
24 See Moore, Barrington, The Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and 
Peasant in the Making o f the Modern World, London: Allen Lane, 1966; Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992.
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particular history of capitalist development, including such structural processes as wars. 
Thus, the structural approach focuses on changing structures of class, state, and 
transnational power and suggests that certain changing structural patterns can lead to 
democratisation, while others cannot. Therefore, they conclude that it is the changing 
structures, not elite choices, which determine the route to democracy.
In the context of the third wave of democratisation, the ‘macrohistorical’ approach 
of the functionalist model was widely criticised and dismissed for being extremely 
deterministic and not leaving room for medium-term or proximate factors. As Przeworski 
describes it: “In this formulation [structuralist], the outcome is uniquely determined by 
conditions, and history goes on without anyone ever doing anything.”25
In search for a more profound explanation of the democratisation process, other 
theories emerged in line with functionalist thinking, focusing on the impact of such 
variables as the political culture and institutions, historical legacies, and international 
factors, in addition to socioeconomic factors.
One of these theories focuses on the importance of political culture. The founders 
of this approach, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, argued that certain sets of values and 
beliefs are more conducive to the emergence of democracy than others. Other proponents 
of the political culture argument are Diamond and Huntington, who explain democracy and
9 7  • • •the lack of democracy by political culture. This approach is also largely deterministic 
since it argues that liberal democracy results from a ‘civic culture,’ a social consensus over 
a certain set of values such as respect for and trust in government. Certainly, the lack of 
historical experience with political pluralism, historically evolved structure of a society and 
cultural peculiarities play some role in the mode and the path of transition, as well as in the 
choice of institutions of market and democracy. However, it is questionable whether the 
political culture is an independent variable itself or a by-product of the functioning
25 Przeworski, 1991, p. 96.
26 Gabriel A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in Five Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
27 See Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999; Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f  
Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order, New York: Touchstone.
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political institutions.
One dimension within the functionalist framework which proves to be more 
applicable to post-communist transition, and which to some extent sees the transition 
process as extending beyond the state and domestic level, stresses the importance of the 
international context in which transition occurs.28 The main argument of this approach is 
that the process of democratisation in a single country in transition is, to a large extent, 
affected by the international/regional context in which it takes place. This dimension will 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
The Genetic Approach
Dankwart Rustow, who introduced the 4transition approach’, answered the 
question of how a democracy comes into being by arguing that a historical approach, 
which would rather focus on the commonalities of a general route that all countries travel 
during democratisation, provides a sounder basis for analysis than looking for 
socioeconomic prerequisites. In contrast to the functionalist approach, the genetic approach 
finds that democracy is produced by the initiatives of human beings. It is believed within 
this approach that certain elite choices, actions, strategies, and their timing are vital for 
democracy to happen.
Rustow argued that no particular level of socio-economic development is necessary 
for transition to democracy. Rather, he underscored the role of elites who make a 
conscious choice to negotiate a political settlement. Subsequently, Rustow identified four 
separate phases through which any country passes on its way to democratisation: the 
Background Phase, the phase of establishing national unity within a given territory; the 
Preparatory Phase, when new elite emerges and is engaged in an inconclusive political 
struggle with the old elite; the Decisional Phase, when the choice of democracy is made. 
This is the phase of what he called a “historical moment,” when struggling parties come to 
the conclusion that they would rather make a compromise, thus establishing and 
maintaining common rules of the game and the Habituation Phase, when democratic
28 Pridham and Lewis, 1996.
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values are appropriated and the rules of democratic governance become enduring.29 This 
stage coincides with democratic consolidation.
The genetic approach has found further development in the works of O’Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead, and Shain and Linz.30 Their comparative study of transition in 
Latin America and Southern Europe came to support Rustow’s argument about the 
importance of the elite’s strategic choices. Analysing the democratisation paths of those 
countries, they concluded that the elite’s political settlements, or pacts, achieved through 
negotiations, are almost the only guarantee for a successful transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.
Elite Centred Approach to Democratization
The elite centred approach to democratization argues that elites play a crucial role 
at all stages of democratisation. Not only does the “crafting” of democracy seem to
i
depend on the interests, values, and actions of political leaders. Elites also play a central 
role in the stability and consolidation of democracy by choosing the rules of the game and 
designing political institutions. Their strategic choices are critical for the very survival of 
democratic regimes. As Valerie Bunce observes, “in the periods of political and economic 
difficulties, they [elites] can use their power to either protect democracy or destroy it.” 
The elite-centred approach to regime change focuses on the interests and values of political 
elites. In particular, it attaches great attention to their views on and attitudes towards 
liberalism vs. authoritarianism, mutual trust, etc.
Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy”, Comparative Politics Vol. 2, 1970, pp. 
337-363.
30 See O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986; Shain and Linz, 1995.
31 See Giovanni DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions, 
Berkley: University of California Press; 1990; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 
1986; John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in 
Latin America and Southern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
32 Bunce, 2000, p. 709.
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The first attempt to incorporate political leaders into a democratic framework was a 
study by J. Schumpeter. He argued that the aim of a democratic regime must be to create a 
procedure for elite competition and not to increase mass participation.
This approach initiated a significant shift from the “power” theories of elite that 
argued that there is an integrated power elite in modem societies. A pluralist approach to 
elites argued that there are many elites and that creates an environment of free competition 
for power and makes them accountable to the masses. The basic argument of the pluralist 
approach posited by Higley is that a competitive elite system, which has a basic consensus 
about the rules of conduct of democracy, is an imperative for transition, democratic 
consolidation and stability of the regime. According to Higley, it is the absence of elite 
consensual unity that distinguishes unconsolidated from consolidated democracies. A 
democratic regime is consolidated when an elite consensus on procedures is coupled with 
extensive mass participation in elections and other institutional processes.
The pluralist approach to elites distinguishes three types of elites: (1) the pluralistic 
or consensually unified elites, where normal political competition through political 
bargaining between elite groups takes place within accepted rules of the game, formalised 
in a constitution and electoral laws; (2) the ideologically unified elite, where ideology or 
common national interests in a situation of national crisis integrate the elites in actions 
resulting in a homogeneity in their attitudes; and (3) the divided or disunited elite, where 
elite legitimacy comes not from common goals or accepted procedures, but from the 
charisma of individual leaders.34
The studies within the elite-centred framework analysing the post-Communist 
transition mainly focus on continuities and changes in the composition, relations, and 
behaviours of elites that may or may not be associated with broad economic and social 
trends.35
33 Higley and Gunther, 1992.
34 Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study o f  Political Elites, Englewood Cliff, NJ Prentice 
Hall, 1976; Higley and Gunther, 1992.
35 David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling 
Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999; John Higley, Jan
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Pluralists, discussing post-Communist transitions, link the mode of transition to the 
question of what type of Communist elite was dominant during the regime breakdown. 
According to these theories, totalitarian states, such as the USSR, usually have
• 'Xf%ideologically unified elites. In addition, some scholars argue that the choice of the 
regime type in post-Communist transition can best be explained by the structure of the old 
regime elites during the breakdown phase. Two major schools of thought concerning the 
role of elites in post-communist transition have developed. David Lane argued that the 
transition involved the wholesale replacement of the old elite. According to Lane, in the 
later Soviet years ‘an incipient bourgeoisie in the form of an “ acquisition class’” arose 
from within the increasingly heterogeneous Soviet elite. Benefiting from the reforms 
introduced by Gorbachev, this new class, drawn particularly from the professional segment 
of the population, gained access to the top bodies of the late Soviet system and promoted 
the dissolution of the Soviet system. In the end stages of state socialism and the early post­
collapse era, members of this group were able to capture state assets and emerged as a 
‘bourgeois property owning class’. Lane and Ross provided qualitative and quantitative
7 0
data in support of their argument. Other theorists, such as Kryshtanovskaya & White, 
argued that there is a high degree of old elite continuity and the new Russian ‘capitalist’ 
elite is largely drawn from the Soviet nomenklatura.40 Further studies criticised
Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, “Introduction: Elite Change and Democratic 
Regimes in Eastern Europe” in John Higley, Jan Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski 
(eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998, pp. 1-34.
36 George L. Field and John Higley, Elitism, London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
37 Gerald Easter, “Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in 
Russia and the NIS”, World Politics Vol. 49, 1997, pp. 184-211.
38 David Lane, The Rise and Fall o f  State Socialism, Industrial Society and the Socialist 
State, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, p. 213.
39 David Lane and Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling 
Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
40 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian 
Elite”, Europe-Asia Studies Vol.48, No.5, 1996, pp. 711-733.
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Kryshtanovskaya’s & White’s continuity hypothesis.41 By attributing such a great role to 
old elite continuity, this approach almost equates post-Communist transition processes to a 
mere elite reproduction and its ability to converge and underestimates other factors. More 
recent studies have tried to overcome that gap by introducing additional characteristics of 
elites to explain their impact on political change.42
For the purposes of my thesis, it is important to understand to what extent the 
successes and failures of post-communist transitions that I am going to analyse can be 
attributed to the ruling elite’s structure, value orientation and policy choices? Are they the 
core predictors of the divergent paths of democratisation that those countries followed?
There is no doubt that the ruling elite plays a significant role in the fourth wave of 
transition which is considered mostly as an elite initiated, “top-down” regime change. The 
role of elites is important in post-communist transition simply because they built the key 
institutions of the new political and economic order from scratch and as such, at least in the 
initial stage of transition to democracy, they had a certain level of freedom in choosing 
among the variations of democracy and market economy institutions. However, I doubt 
that an old/new elite division matters at a later stage of transition. What would matter more 
when democratic institutions are already set up, or in other words at the stage of 
democratic consolidation, is the ruling elite’s behaviour, interests and value orientation. 
The latter may help, along with other factors, to give at least a partial answer to why, for 
instance, a certain policy or an institution that proved successful in other countries, failed 
in that particular country.
As far as old/new divisions are concerned, perhaps at a later stage of transition an 
institutional learning process or the socialisation of new values may have a greater impact 
on the ruling elite’s decision-making than their background in the old system. In sum, I 
think that, while the structure of the ruling elite, its values and orientations can be an
41 See James Hughes, “Sub-National Elites and Post-Communist Transformation in 
Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 49, No. 6, 1997, pp. 1017-36.
42 James Hughes and Peter John, “Notes and Comments: Local Elites and Transition in 
Russia: Adaptation and Competition?”, British Journal o f Political Science 31, 2001, pp. 
673-692.
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important factor in the choice of a political regime, it cannot be the only determining 
factor. First, as Terry Karl asserts, structural and institutional constraints may determine 
the range of values and the range of options available to decision makers and the 
preferences of individual actors may be conditioned by institutional structures.43 In other 
words, elites themselves are subject to certain structural constraints.
Second, as Huntington contends, elites may be the most proximate variable, but 
other variables - such as the level of economic development, institutional configurations, a 
population’s cultural homogeneity or heterogeneity, etc. - must also be taken into 
account44 This conclusion is widely supported by others as well. More recent studies of 
democratisation that analyse comparatively the drastic differences in the degree of 
democracy that each of the ‘third wave’ countries achieved underscore the limits of the 
genetic approach. Thomas Carothers, for instance, argues that in the studies analysing the 
‘third wave’ of transition the complications that different underlying conditions could 
present are underestimated and the power of elections to produce fundamental political 
change alone are overstated. 45 In an attempt to summarise the comparative experience of 
all the three waves of democratisation, Valerie Bunce also notes that there is, nonetheless, 
a recognition that, once established, the course of democracy depends on a complex array 
of factors, only one of which involves elites, their attitudes, and their behaviour.46 One can 
easily conclude that, for all their merits, the approaches described above all fall short of 
capturing the democratisation process in its complexity, its differing geography, scope, 
depth, and dynamics. However, the shortcomings of particular approaches or the absence 
of a comprehensive approach does not remove the necessity of using theoretical 
generalisations from the academic agenda.
43 Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-21, p. 25.
44 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
45 Thomas Carothers, “ The Sequencing Fallacy”, Journal o f Democracy Vol. 18, No. 1, 
2007, pp. 12-27, p. 24.
46 Bunce, 2000 p. 709.
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There is obviously a need for a more comprehensive approach. Of course, while 
accepting the role of elites and leaders in making choices, we understand that those choices 
are limited to the ones made possible by structures. On the other hand, one should not 
underestimate the role of leaders and elites in shaping differing policy responses in similar 
structural circumstances. In addition, elite choices may have bigger impact during the 
transition process on shaping the same structures. To what extent transition developments 
should be attributed to the personality of a leader or to elite behaviour, and to what extent 
to national and international structural constraints and factors, is an issue worthy of 
scholarly discussion. To conduct such a study one needs a model that would combine the 
genetic and functionalists approaches in some way.
In fact, the genetic and functionalist schools of democratisation studies are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. Studies that are more recent take an 
integrated approach, interpreting the two schools as mutually interacting and, in some 
respects, reinforcing.47 Huntington, for instance, suggested that “economic development 
makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real.” Terry Lynn Karl argued 
that while a structuralist approach alone leads to excessively deterministic conclusions 
about the origins and prospects of democracy, and a sole focus on choices that actors make 
produces voluntaristic interpretations, together they can be an efficient model for 
explaining democratisation processes.49
Tatu Vanhanen called this growing body of literature that started to emphasize the 
multivariate nature of the social requisites of democracy as “multivariate models.”50 
Among the authors who adopt this approach are Seymour Lipset, in his latest works (1994; 
2005) and Larry Diamond, who gives a list of facilitating or obstructing factors such as
47 James Hughes, “Transition Models and Democratisation in Russia”, in Mike Bowker 
and Cameron Ross (ed.), Russia After the Cold War, London, Longman, 2000, p.21.
48 Samuel P. Huntington, Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.316.
49 Karl, 1990, pp. 1-21.
50 Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization: A Comparative Analysis o f  170 Countries, Routledge, 
2003.
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socio-economic development, political culture, political leadership, legitimacy and 
performance, institutions, conflicts and international factors.51
Analysing the progress and set backs of democratic transitions in the third wave, 
Thomas Carothers underscores the importance of five factors, which should be thought not 
as preconditions but rather as core facilitators or non-facilitators that make 
democratisation harder or easier. They are the level of economic development, 
concentration of sources of national wealth (countries where national wealth comes mainly 
from highly concentrated sources experience significant difficulties with democratisation), 
identity based divisions, historical experience with political pluralism and non-democratic 
neighbours.52
Summarising the results of studies analysing democratic breakdowns in all three 
waves of democratisation, Valerie Bunce identifies three groups of studies. First are 
studies focusing on long-term factors, such as socio-economic conditions, institutional, and 
cultural legacies of authoritarianism as those undermining democratic regimes and 
contributing to their breakdown. In the second group are those studies that focus on 
medium-term issues critical for the sustainability of democratic regimes. Those factors 
include economic performance, social capital, the strength of civil society, and institutional 
arrangements. The third group of studies underscores the importance of two proximate 
factors - the role of political leaders and international influences.
Institutional Design
Another issue key for understanding post-communist transitions is the issue of 
institutional arrangements. There have been numerous comparative studies demonstrating 
the strong impact of institutional choices on political dynamics. It is argued that the choice
51 Larry Diamond and Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset (eds.) Politics in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy,( 2nd edition), Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995.
52 Carothers, 2007.
53 Bunce, 2000, pp. 709-710.
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of democratic institutions and the process of constitution making are critical for democratic
consolidation. Studies based on comparative research argue that institutional arrangements
such as the choice of political institutions, type of electoral systems, party systems have a
strong impact on political dynamics and further democratic consolidation. While not going
into details of studies analysing institutional design, I will highlight the core arguments
that are particularly relevant in the post-communist context. First, it is argued that a
parliamentary system is preferable to a presidential system. Parliamentary systems are
more flexible and adaptable and offer an institutional framework for mediation of social
conflicts, thus, promoting compromise and reconciliation that are crucial for democratic
stability. In contrast, a presidential system leads to an excessive concentration of power in
the hands of the executive branch and thus fosters authoritarianism. In the same way, a
proportional rather than a majoritarian electoral system is preferable.54 A key issue
concerning the causal relationship between institutional arrangements and the prospects of
democracy in a post-communist context is the factors that made the elites prefer a certain
type of institution and whether those choices were structurally constrained. And, at a later
stage of democratisation, it is important to understand to what extent political institutions
constrain and shape the elites’ decisions regarding the key policy directions. Some authors
who analyse post-communist transitions from the standpoint of the political culture
hypothesis argue that
In the light of history and culture, institutional choices such as 
presidentialism or parliamentarism, are more a consequence than a cause of 
the different levels of receptivity to democracy that we find in various 
countries... The choices of institutions can reinforce certain tendencies, but 
it cannot replace the causal role of historical experience and cultural 
formation, which create a predisposition for certain mechanisms to work or 
not work in this or that particular case.55
54 Alfred Stephen and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic 
Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism”, World Politics 46, 1993, pp. 1-22; 
Mattew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and 
Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 49-150.
55 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Primacy of History and Culture”, Democracy After 
Communism, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Johns Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore and London, 2002, pp. 194-205, p. 197.
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While not disputing that past legacies may have played some role in the 
institutional preferences of the elites, I think that one should not underestimate the role that 
the ‘opening’ to the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demonstration 
effect could have on those preferences. Also, and more important in this context, one 
should note the impact that the established institutions can have on the elite’s values and 
policy choices, thus contributing to the formation of a new political culture that is 
considered key for democratic consolidation.56
Mapping out Post-communist Transitions
In the case of the post-communist transition, very clear democratic goals of 
transition were officially stated as the formal goals of the states’ foreign and domestic 
policy from the very beginning. This is a significant characteristic of post-communist 
transitions and it distinguishes them from transitions during the previous waves. This is not 
the only difference between post-communist and previous transitions and, since I shall 
focus on the post-communist transition for my empirical research, it makes sense to look at 
other features that differentiate it from previous democratisation waves. A depiction of 
these differences is important also for understanding the necessity for new analytical 
approaches.
Sarah Terry suggests five ways that the challenges confronting the post-communist 
countries in transition differ from those faced by post-authoritarian countries of previous 
transition waves.57 Essential distinctions are observed also by Valerie Bunce.58 According 
to Sarah Terry, the first difference is the dual-track character of the transition process in 
the post-communist states, which means that they have had to build democracy and a
56 Larry Diamond (ed.), Political Culture in Developing Countries, Boulder, CO, 1993; 
Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993.
57 Sarah M. Terry “Thinking about Post-communist Transitions: How Different are 
They?”, Slavic Review 52, No.2, 1993, pp. 333-337.
58 Valerie Bunce, “Comparing East and South”, Journal o f Democracy Vol. 6, No. 3, 1995, 
pp. 87-110.
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market economy simultaneously. Not only were these historically unprecedented tasks but 
they were also to some extent incompatible: “While the market and democracy are 
generally seen as mutually supportive in the long term, in their present formative stage 
they are proving to be mutually obstructive.”59
The second factor that Terry highlights is the fact that most of the earlier transitions 
took place in economically and especially industrially less-developed countries, where to 
introduce and implement economic reforms was socially less costly. This is not the case in 
post-communist countries, which have giant industries that are ineffective, if not useless, in 
a market environment. Industries often appeared to be not only economically incapable of 
recovering but also socially costly to abolish. The third element, which adds to the 
distinction of the post-communist transition, is the higher degree of ethnic complexity, 
which has not been the case during previous waves of transition. Apart from being a 
complex problem in itself, the ethnic issue added huge complexity to the overall 
democratic transition process wherever it emerged. The fourth difference between the 
countries of post-authoritarian and post-communist transition was the virtual absence’ of 
civil society in the post-communist countries. However weak, they existed in other 
countries undergoing transition.
The fifth divergence highlighted by Terry is the impact of the international 
environment on the outcomes of the post-communist and post-authoritarian transition. The 
Cold War division of the past served as a serious incentive for integrating post­
authoritarian countries in a speedy manner into western political, economic, and security 
structures. In the case of post-communist transition, there is no such feeling of urgency on 
the side of the international community.60 Valerie Bunce, mainly using the same 
distinctions identified by Sarah Terry, adds another one related to the influence of the 
military. In the Southern European transitions, the military had quite a strong role in 
politics. In contrast, the military in the post-communist countries played no autonomous 
political role, simply because traditionally they had been strongly subordinated to the
59 Terry, 1993, p. 334.
60 Terry, 1993, p. 336
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monopolist of political power -  the Communist Party. Bunce observes another important
distinction with regard to how the transition process was initiated in the two cases:
First, students of the Latin American and Southern European transitions 
seem to agree that, in both regions, political rather than economic and 
domestic rather than international factors were paramount in the collapse of 
authoritarian rule. By contrast, the collapse of state socialism was largely a 
response to the interaction of two factors: economic decline (with its 
attendant impact on domestic politics) and the international consequences 
of Gorbachev’s reforms.61
Thomas Carothers, in his article “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 
conceptualises the differences that the record of the post-communist transition offers.62 The 
title of the article speaks for itself. After going through the observed differences, the author 
concludes that the traditional transition paradigm based on the experience of the third-wave 
democratisation peak is not useful anymore. According to Carothers, there are five core 
assumptions that define the classical transition paradigm. The first core assumption is that 
any country breaking with dictatorial rule should be considered a country in transition 
toward democracy. Throughout the years, this has been the dominant approach in 
transition and democratisation studies. The second assumption is that democratisation 
tends to evolve in a set sequence of stages. First, there occurs the opening, and then 
follows the breakthrough with the collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a 
new, democratic system, with the coming to power of a new nationally elected 
government. The third phase is consolidation, when “the democratic forms are transformed 
into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularisation of 
elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the 
new democratic rules of the game.”
The third assumption is the crucial role ascribed to elections in establishing 
democracy. Elections were almost equated with democracy. There have been very high
61 Bunce, 1995, pp. 89-90.
62 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal o f  Democracy 
Vol. 13, No.l, 2002, pp. 5-21.
63 Carothers, 2002, p. 8.
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expectations that elections will be not only the criterion but also the main generator for 
further democratic reforms.
The fourth assumption put forward within the transition paradigm is that the 
underlying conditions in transitional countries -  their economic development level, 
political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions, or other 
“structural” features -  will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the 
transition process. The entire necessity for starting the democratisation process has been 
ascribed to a country’s political elites, their willingness and ability.
The fifth assumption is that the transition paradigm rests on the premise that third- 
wave transitions are being built on coherent, functioning states. The transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy assumes some improvement, reform and sometimes 
rebuilding, of state institutions. However, this was mainly within the existing state machine 
and it did not go beyond modifying it. Therefore, it did not become a problem for the Latin 
American and Southern European transitions, either in practice or in theory. However, this 
is not the same for post-communist transition.
These are the main assumptions of the transition paradigm described by Carothers. 
In my study, I explore the extent to which these assumptions are true and applicable for 
post-communist transition studies. From this point of view, I am more interested in the 
distinctions observed by Thomas Carothers when comparing the two phenomena: “Taken 
together, the political trajectories of most third-wave countries call into serious doubt the 
transition paradigm.”64 He has serious reservations about each of the above-mentioned 
assumptions. I fully share his disagreement with the first and the core assumption of the 
transition paradigm, which states that all countries breaking with dictatorship automatically 
take a path of democratisation. We already can distinguish at least three groups of 
countries in the post-communist transition with essentially different political trajectories of 
development. Some of them hardly can be called democracies or even countries 
undergoing democratisation.
Another disagreement Carothers has with the transition paradigm is that the 
suggested sequence of stages of democratisation is challenged by many cases of successful
64 Carothers, 2002, p. 14.
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democratisation in the later phases of the third wave. In my opinion, this has been more the 
case in post-communist transition. If we witness such a consolidation in the Central and 
Eastem-European countries, we see stagnation in the western CIS countries and serious 
setbacks in Central Asia. Therefore, this not only does not fit into the transition paradigm, 
but also, in my opinion, needs to be explained. The third disagreement Carothers has is 
about the value that has been attached to the goal of achieving genuine elections. I agree 
with the view that free and fair elections are very important, but “greatly reduced 
expectations are in order as to what elections will accomplish as generators of deep- 
reaching democratic change.”65 Elections reflect the already existing state of affairs in the 
society; thus, Carothers’ view that “the wide gulf between political elites and citizens in 
many of these countries turns out to be rooted in structural conditions, such as the 
concentration of wealth or certain socio-cultural traditions, that elections themselves do not 
overcome” is more than proper for the countries of the post-communist transition, which 
have embarked on a mass privatisation process.66
Another underlying assumption of the transition paradigm that Carothers 
challenges is about the preconditions of democracy. Again, referring to the experience of 
Latin American massive democratisation, many authors insisted that the starting conditions 
do not influence the outcomes of democratisation. The post-communist transition 
experience in many cases supports the opposite argument, that is, that the relative 
economic health of the country, past legacies, and the level of existing political pluralism 
do contribute to a successful outcome. While I agree with this, I further propose that the 
starting conditions do not explain all the differences existing among trajectories of 
transition countries.
The last debate is about the role and the substance of state-building within the 
transition paradigm. I will discuss this argument in more detail because, indeed, post­
communist state-building appears to be a much more problematic, substantive issue than it 
was during the early third-wave democratisation. In this regard, Shin is right that a major 
problem for the third wave of democracies (especially the ones in the socialist camp) is
65 Carothers, 2002, p. 16.
66 Carothers, 2002, p. 17.
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that democratisation takes place backwards. These countries introduced competitive
elections before establishing basic institutions of a modem state such as rule of law,
institutions of civil society and the accountability of governors. 67
If a third wave democracy is to develop into a complete democracy, it must 
do more than hold free and fair elections; it must also become a modem 
state. Here state-building does not refer to creating a common national 
identity among the populace, but to the development of institutions and 
procedures that effectively enforce the rule of law against corrupt public 
officials, promote popular trust by increasing the trustworthiness of 
political institutions and increase the accountability of government to 
ordinary people.68
In contrast with Latin American and Southern European countries — where the 
essence of state-building was all about reform and improvement of the existing state 
machine — in the countries of post-communist transition, especially those countries of the 
former Soviet Union, state institutions, apparatus, cadres, laws, and procedures are often 
built from scratch.
Not only a state but also a nation building process takes place in the post­
communist space. The presence of ethnic conflicts and contested borders make the process 
of democratisation even more complicated in the newly independent states. The 
significant role that nation- and state-building played in post-communist transitions is fully 
in line with Dankwart Rustows argument that establishing national unity within a given 
territory is a ‘background condition’ for successful democratisation.
One should not underestimate the challenge for both the theory and practice 
presented by the simultaneous undertaking of democratisation, marketisation, and state- 
building. In my opinion, the process of reconciling these parallel phenomena is 
undoubtedly a political process that needs further conceptualisation. Scholars started to 
pay attention to the complex relationship between the processes of democratisation, 
marketisation, and state-building in post-communist transitions relatively late, in the mid
67 Richard Rose and Doh Cull Shin, “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third 
-Wave Democracies”, British Journal o f  Political Science Vol. 31, No.2, 2001, pp. 331- 
354, p.331.
68 Rose and Shin, 2001, pp. 348-49.
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1990s. Claus Offe was the first to distinguish three levels of transformation and to identify 
the fact that the issues of nationhood and state-building comprise the third level of post­
communist transition.69 Linz and Stepan stressed that the “stateness” problem (which 
includes state- and nation-building) must increasingly be a central concern of political 
activists and theorists alike and considered it as one of the two macro variables affecting
• • 70transition. The key argument of scholars raising the stateness issue is that the 
concomitance of state and nation building with political and economic reforms generates 
dilemmas that endanger the outcome of democratisation because “history shows few 
successful cases of state-building by democratic means.”71 In the literature on the issue of 
stateness, state-building is often viewed as identical to nation building and, therefore, seen 
as more problematic, predominantly in multiethnic states. With the addition of stateness, 
post-communist transition became a triple transition. The specific feature of post- 
communist transitions is that a state does not have to be nationally heterogeneous to have a 
‘stateness’ problem. A ‘stateness’ problem’ can emerge even in the most nationally 
homogeneous countries.
Taras Kuzio believes that the problem of nation building deserves to be looked at 
as a separate process, a separate dimension in the overall post-communist transition 
process. Thus, he defines transition as a quadruple process by not subsuming stateness and 
nationhood into one category.72 Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz find that more attention 
should be devoted to these two processes that are overlapping, complementary, yet are 
“conceptually and historically different,” as they influence the success rate of democratic 
consolidation.73
69 Claus Offe, Varieties o f Transition: the East European and East German Experience, 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 29-49.
70 Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, Southern America and Post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 366.
71 Bunce, 1995, p. 92.
72 Taras Kuzio, “Transition in Post-communist States: Triple or Quadruple”, Politics Vol. 
21, No. 3, 2001, p. 169.
73 Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 20.
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Indeed, this adds another divergence to existing differences between the post­
communist and the post-authoritarian third-wave transitions. The nation-building process 
is also political and therefore needs political resources. As Kuzio fairly observes, “this 
takes up energy and time which otherwise could have been devoted to political-economic 
reform.”741 would add that in light of democratisation, liberalisation, and the opening up to 
the world in general, there has been a serious need to rethink and reinterpret many national 
norms, traditions, and even values. In other words, in many societies of the early post­
communist transition there has been a type of value vacuum in the early years of the 
transition process. In a sense this is also more typical for post-communist rather than for 
post-authoritarian transition. Authors like John Hall treated the transition as a four­
dimensional process, although grouping it into two broad areas, democratisation / 
marketisation and state / nation- building.75
Another feature of post-communist transition that I would like to add to the above 
mentioned peculiarities is a state’s efforts of self-establishment and self-projection, both 
domestically and internationally. It represents an entire dimension in the transition process 
-  autonomous but also strongly interactive with the other dimensions and it requires 
political resources. Adopting laws or making statements about adherence to international 
norms and principles is only the first stage. A state also needs to establish a pattern of 
implementation of these laws, norms, and principles. For the transition states that have just 
abandoned the socialist camp, and especially for the newly independent states, building 
international relations is not a secondary task at all. All these goals require certain political 
resources to be allocated. They are issues of huge political importance for any post­
communist country and for the success of the transition process.
In sum, the parameters and features differentiating the current democratisation 
wave that have been revealed by the authors cited above are correct and important in my 
view. The distinctions, however, are not limited to domestic and state differences. The 
post-authoritarian and post-communist transition processes began and have occurred in
74 Kuzio, 2001, p. 169.
John A. Hall, “In search of Civil Society”, in John. Hall (ed.), Civil Society. Theory, 
History, Comparison, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, pp. 1-31.
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essentially different international environments. The bipolar international system that 
existed during the early transition phases has been replaced with a new system that has not 
yet taken its final shape and is still in the process of consolidation. In my opinion, what is 
new and essential is that the international system is being affected by the choices and 
policies of the states of the post-communist transition. Meanwhile, the global environment 
is also significantly different. One cannot compare the level of globalisation during the 
post-authoritarian and the post-communist transition. Globalisation today offers both 
greater opportunities and bigger threats and risks for the countries striving to become 
integrated into the world system.
Conclusion
What accounts for successful democratisation and what are the key domestic 
factors, crucial for the survival and sustainability of democracy? The theories of 
democratisation discussed above point to different factors, ranging from social and 
economic prerequisites and political culture, important for the emergence of democracy, to 
elite choices and institutions key for its emergence, survival, and consolidation. It is 
obvious that none of those factors alone can determine the destiny of democracy in a 
particular country and explain all the differences existing among trajectories of transition 
countries.
Also, depending on what stage of democratisation we are talking about, different 
factors surface as critical. While establishing national unity and a strong state within a 
given territory are necessary, but not sufficient, starting conditions for democratisation, the 
decision to democratise and the mode of transition is mostly an elite choice, often made 
under compelling domestic and international pressures. On the other hand, the post- 
communist transition experience shows that starting economic conditions, geographic 
proximity to the West and past legacies do to some degree facilitate or obstruct 
democratisation efforts of a country.
In the later, lengthier process of democratic consolidation, institutional 
arrangements and economic situation prove to be decisive. This is the ‘habituation phase’ 
when the evolving political culture of the elite and the public may facilitate or obstruct the 
further consolidation of democracy. At that stage, structural constraints surface to various
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degrees and influence the democratisation efforts. For instance, the negative side effects of 
liberal economic reforms, i.e. economic decline, increased poverty, and unemployment, 
start having a corrosive impact on the support that the incumbent democratic government 
and democratic and market reforms have, making international support not only more 
crucial but also more difficult to earn. In that situation, often democratic governments 
either are voted out or retreat from democratic commitments. The state-building and nation 
building problems can be translated into various state security issues that can be addressed 
at the expense of democracy or further market reforms.
In this regard, one of the objectives of my thesis is to understand how the 
interaction and interplay among these core policy dimensions and policy levels takes place 
in the process of transition, how the key policy goals and policy choices are reconciled and 
prioritised, and how all these impact the overall transition process.
To summarise, one can identify several key domestic factors that facilitate or 
hamper transition to democracy in post-communist transitions:
• Political actors,
• Initial socio-economic conditions,
• Past legacies/historical/cultural constraints,
• The existence/ severity of the ‘stateness ’ issue,
• Institutions (and the political culture evolving under the influence of those
institutions)
Another key factor is the international/regional context that has proved to be
significant in post-communist transitions.
In propelling the current wave of democratisation, domestic and 
international factors have been closely connected, with the particular mix of 
these two factors varying form country to country. In Eastern Europe, for 
example, international factors played the more influential role. By contrast, 
in the majority of democratic transitions in Latin America, domestic factors 
played the more powerful role. Despite such differences, it is this 
confluence of domestic and international factors that distinguishes the
76current wave from the previous ones.
76 Shin, 1994, p. 153.
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This observation points not only to the importance of the international/regional 
context but also to the issue largely left unexplored by transitologists: how do domestic, 
state and international levels interact to facilitate or to hold back the process of transition? 
The interaction and combination of what core domestic and international variables help 
some countries succeed in all their reform endeavours? How exactly those interactions take 
place?
Overall, the debate in this chapter brings us to the domestic-foreign linkage debate, 
in general, and to a search for an interdisciplinary theory that would incorporate domestic 
and international variables. For that purpose, in the next chapters I shall embark on a 
detailed theoretical debate and a concept-building effort.
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CHAPTER 2
Theories of Transition and International Relations
While in Chapter 1 I discussed the theories that focus on the role of domestic 
factors in democratic transition, in this chapter I aim to discuss theories that can help 
explain the role of external factors in the overall process of democratisation. I shall begin 
by discussing the theories of international regimes and complex interdependence. I will 
also discuss the international dimension of post-communist transition and the role of 
international institutions, socialisation and conditionality.
Although they may not have direct relevance to post-communist transitions, regime 
theories and theories of complex interdependence, two related theories of international 
relations, are pertinent when discussing political processes of change in today’s 
interdependent world. For that reason, I will briefly review those theories, before 
discussing the theories and approaches that are more focused on post-communist 
transition.
Theories of International Regimes
Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen A. Salmore, while talking about internal political 
regimes, argue that the internal political structure of a country is the major determinant of 
its foreign policy. They emphasise the structure and environment of the regime as the 
specific aspect of internal politics on which they concentrate. Regime is defined as that 
role or set of roles in national political systems, which entitle the power to make 
authoritative policy decisions. In examining the role that regime structure plays in 
influencing foreign policy, they adopt a model of rational decision making. The authors 
argue that a regime’s primary goal is to maximise its political support and, hence, power. 
Regime members advocate policies in order to attract and retain support. The leaders of 
nations opt for war or peace, trade relations, detente, and other actions not so much
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because of their intrinsic worth, but largely in terms of how they will affect the regime’s 
political fortunes.77
Keohane and Nye, when discussing international regimes, argue that in world 
politics, rules and procedures are neither so complete nor so well enforced as they are in 
well-ordered domestic political systems, and the institutions are neither so powerful nor so 
autonomous. They point out that “The rules of the game include some national rules, some 
international rules, some private rules -  and large areas of no rules at all.”78 Deeply 
embedded in the concept of regimes is the idea of interdependence among the entities 
constituting the regime. The greater the level and range of interdependence, the more 
extensive will be the shared interest in cooperation or collaboration, and hence the need to 
utilise existing regimes or to create new ones. Moreover, international regimes are likely to 
enhance the prospects for increasing transnational flows, although the international regime 
itself may arise from the prior existence of such flows rather than being itself a
7 0determining factor in their creation.
There are three main approaches to regime analysis outlined in the regime 
literature, each of which gives different but related explanations for regime. The first set of 
regime analysts are those whom Krasner describes as followers of the conventional 
structural view. Writers such as Kenneth Waltz and Susan Strange maintain that the 
distribution of power and the interactions between it and self-interests are all that matter, 
and anything outside this set of relations does not matter. They conclude, therefore, that 
regimes do not matter and have no independent impact on behaviour. Since it discards 
regime analysis altogether, this approach does not offer any insight into utilising regime 
analysis to explain the dynamics of cooperation. However, it does offer a useful critique of 
regime theory.
77 Barbara G. Salmore and Stephen A. Salmore, “Political Regimes and Foreign Policy” in 
Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann (eds.), Why Nations Act: 
Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, Sage Publications, 
Beverly Hills, 1978, p. 103.
78 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, p. 16.
79 Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 19.
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Keohane and Stein maintain the structuralist-realist view. However, unlike the 
structuralists above, they maintain that regimes can have an impact on state behaviour. In 
other words, states’ self interest in maximising power is weighed against customary 
international behaviour, codified within a regime. This is what Krasner calls the modified 
structural view. This approach to regime theory offers some very useful analysis both of
OA
the creation of regimes and their maintenance. The third set of analysts of regime theory 
is those who are described as being of the “Grotian” tradition. They believe that a certain 
order does exist in international relations, even in the absence of a supranational authority. 
Writers such as Oran Young, Raymond Hopkins, and Donald Puchala maintain that 
regimes exist in all areas of international relations.
To understand international regimes that affect patterns of interdependence, 
according to Keohane and Nye, one must look at structure and process in international 
systems, as well as how they affect each other. They define international regimes as 
intermediate factors between the power structure of an international system and the 
political and economic bargaining that takes place within it. The structure of the system -  
the distribution of power resources among states -  profoundly affects the nature of the 
regime, the more-or-less loose set of formal and informal norms, rules, and procedures 
relevant to the system. The regime, in turn, affects and to some extent governs the political
o  1
bargaining and daily decision making that occurs within the system.
According to Krasner, regimes may assume a life of their own, a life independent
OA
of the basic causal factors that led to their creation in the first place. He finds that because 
regimes function as intervening variables, a change in the relative power of states may not 
always be reflected in outcomes. This is to suggest that once regimes have been created, 
they may themselves alter the distribution of power among the entities that originally 
formed them, or changes in the power balance may not immediately be reflected in the 
structure and operation of the regime. Moreover, regimes may contribute to strengthening
80 Stephen D. Krasner “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables”, International Organisation, Vol. 36 No. 2, 1982, pp. 185-205.
81 Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 20-21.
82 Krasner, 1982, pp. 185-205.
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or weakening the capabilities of their members, for example, by transferring resources 
from one state to another.
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger identify and discuss three 
schools of thought, each of which emphasizes a different variable to account for 
international regimes: interest-based neoliberalism, power-based realism, and knowledge- 
based cognitivism.83 These authors find that an important arena for fruitfully advancing 
the further study of international regimes lies in the impact of domestic factors on 
international cooperation in regimes, and in combining rational choice approaches with 
sociological approach:
Such studies would also fill a frequently acknowledged and potentially 
significant gap in existing regime theory. Thus far, both rationalists and 
cognitivists have been rather silent on the role of domestic factors84
Andrew Cortell and James Davis find that:
An investigation of the processes linking domestic and international norms 
may require explorations of the impact of various international regimes on 
states’ domestic politics. This research should also lead to a better 
understanding of the domestic bases of the support for international 
institutions, a significant weakness of existing regime theory.”85
John Pevehouse finds that there has been a serious lack of theoretical attention
given to the international organisations-democratisation link, and that little empirical work
•  • 86investigates the relationship between international organisations and democratisation. 
More importantly, he points out that:
83Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge: 
The Study of International Regimes”, Mershort International Studies Review Vol. 40, No. 
2, 1996, pp. 177-228.
84 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996, p. 221.
85 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of 
International Norms: A Research Agenda”, International Studies Review Vol. 2, No. 1, 
2000, pp. 65-88, p. 87.
86 John C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and 
Democratization”, International Organization Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, pp. 515-549, p. 516.
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Unfortunately, the most well-developed literature on international 
institutions-neoliberal institutionalism largely ignores domestic politics. 
Most neoliberal institutionalist research has focused on international 
outcomes, so it is unclear whether the same causal mechanisms link these 
institutions with the domestic political process. Institutional theorists have 
recently called for more empirical research to outline well-delineated causal 
mechanisms to explain the impact of international institutions, especially 
with reference to domestic politics.87
These weaknesses, of course, limit the effectiveness of applying regime 
theory to the study of the transition process.
Theory of complex interdependence
Without going into the details of the polemics in the literature on this subject, I will 
discuss only one of the best known approaches to the issue, namely the concept of complex
QQ
interdependence formulated by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The observations made
by Keohane and Nye essentially support the complex issue linkage model I suggest.
Keohane and Nye particularly emphasize two points: first, that interdependence exists
among all the members of the international system, the small as well as the powerful; and
second, that currently there is no policy issue hierarchy. As Keohane and Nye write:
...unlike powerful states whose instrument for linkage (military force) is 
often too costly to use, the linkage instrument used by poor, weak states -  
international organisation -  is available and inexpensive. Thus, as the 
utility of force declines, and as issues become of more equal importance, 
the distribution of power within each issue will become more important.
Keohane and Nye pay special attention to agenda formation or to how issues
become linked to other issues in the interdependence era. They attach a special role to
governments in separating and linking issues:
Linkage strategies, and defence against them, will pose critical strategic 
choices for states. Should issues be considered separately or as a package?
If linkages are to be drawn, which issues should be linked, and on which of 
the linked issues should concessions be made? How far can one push a 
linkage before it becomes counterproductive? For instance, should one seek
87 Pevehouse, 2002, p.518.
88 Keohane and Nye, 1977.
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formal agreements or informal, but less politically sensitive, 
understandings?89
These linkages, of course, have a place in world politics. On the other hand, to 
maintain a truly holistic approach one should not ignore the structural side of policy 
making. However, Keohane and Nye admit that “as the complexity of actors and issues in 
world politics increases, the utility of force declines and the line between domestic policy 
and foreign policy becomes blurred: as the conditions of complex interdependence are 
more closely approximated, the politics of agenda formation becomes more subtle and 
differentiated.”90
Keohane and Nye give many useful examples of linkages, which occur in the
policy process across international, transnational, and national boundaries. However, they
concentrate on interstate relations. My task is to show how different levels and different
issue policies at a single level interact through those linkages. My assumption is that
multiplicity is equally applied both horizontally -  among all issue areas -  and vertically -
across all levels -  and among different issue areas at different levels. There are horizontal
and vertical linkages among issues. However, the concrete cases that Keohane and Nye
describe provide good empirical support for my assumptions:
Under complex interdependence we can expect the agenda to be affected by 
the international and domestic problems created by economic growth and 
increasing sensitivity interdependence.... Discontented domestic groups 
will politicise issues and force more issues once considered onto the 
interstate agenda... Domestic groups may become upset enough to raise a 
dormant issue or to interfere with interstate bargaining at high levels.91
Change may also come from governments. As Keohane and Nye write, 
“Governments whose strength is increasing may politicise issues, by linking them to other 
issues. An international regime that is becoming ineffective or is not serving important
89 Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.22
90 Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.32.
91 Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.33.
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issues may cause increasing politicisation, as dissatisfied governments press for change.” 
The authors underscore the role of transnational, global forces, pointing out that states’ 
agendas “may be affected by shifts in the importance of transnational actors” as well.
Keohane and Nye further describe the linkage mechanisms, offering vivid
examples of how multiple or complex interdependence works in reality. They recognize
the existence of multiple players functioning at all levels — domestic, international, state,
and global. In particular, Keohane and Nye write:
Thus, the existence of multiple channels of contact leads us to expect 
limits, beyond those normally found in domestic politics, on the ability of 
statesmen to calculate the manipulation of interdependence or follow a 
consistent strategy of linkage. Statesmen must consider differential as well 
as aggregate effects of interdependence strategies and their likely 
implications for politicisation and agenda control. Transactions among 
societies - economic and social transactions more than security ones -  
affect groups differently. Opportunities and costs from increased 
transnational ties may be greater for certain groups...than for others. Some 
organisations or groups may interact directly with actors in other societies 
or with other governments to increase their benefits from a network of 
interaction. Some actors may therefore be less sensitive to changes 
elsewhere in the network than are others.94
While I appreciate the invention of the concept of complex interdependence by 
Keohane and Nye and their observations, I have a different understanding of complex and 
multi-channel linkages. When speaking about interdependence, Keohane and Nye refer to 
situations “characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries.” They distinguish three main characteristics of complex interdependence: 
multiple channels connecting societies; absence of hierarchy among issues, which also 
means that military security does not permanently dominate the agenda; and military force 
is not used where complex interdependence prevails, though it can be used otherwise.95
92Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.33.
93 Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.33.
94 Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.34.
95Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 25.
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Although these authors admit that multiple channels can be characterized as interstate, 
transgovemmental and transnational, they do not pay much attention to transnational 
relations. Also, in my opinion, the role they ascribe to governments in making linkages 
among policies is exaggerated. One cannot argue against the decisive role governments 
have in making policy choices, but their decision making is done within the existing 
domestic and international structural framework. In other words, the approach here needs 
to be more holistic. Also, the theory o f  interdependence, as suggests James Rosenau, is 
very general and does not necessarily imply direction, purpose, or even across-system 
interactions.96
Kal Holsti finds that Keohane and Nye are not concerned with measuring 
transaction flows. He questions whether they are interested mainly in how inter-
Q7dependence affects bargaining styles and distribution of rewards. Holsti concludes that
Since they examine their subject primarily from a systems perspective, the 
role of domestic politics and personalities is not covered thoroughly. These 
variables, of course, would be essential components of a formal theory.98
In 1987 Keohane and Nye themselves came up with a re-assessment and critique of 
their own work. In particular, they admitted that there are serious shortcomings in their 
work, such us the lack of extensive analysis and conceptualisation of issue linkage. 
“Despite the importance of the subject, we failed to develop any theory of linkage that 
could specify under what conditions linkages would occur.”99 Another shortcoming that 
Keohane and Nye emphasised is the need for more attention to domestic politics and its 
links to international politics. Keohane and Nye admitted that they “have paid too little 
attention to how a combination of domestic and international processes shapes
96 James Rosenau, “Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited”, in Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict, Behaviour and Linkage Politics, NY: David McKay, 1973, pp. 
25-26.
97 Kal J. Holsti, “A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence”, 
International Organisation Vol. 32, No. 2, 1978, pp. 510-530, p. 520.
98 Kal J. Holsti, 1978, p. 523.
99 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited”, 
International Organisation Vol. 41, No. 4, 1987, pp. 725-753, p. 735.
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preferences.”100 And, finally, they recognised the role of the learning process, whether 
individual or group, in explaining changes within regime and state policies.101
For the above mentioned reasons, the extent to which the complex interdependence 
approach can be useful in interpreting the international-domestic dynamics of post­
communist transition is limited, in particular, because it does not sufficiently address the 
role of domestic politics in general, and of leaders/elites in particular.
International Dimension of Transition: International Institutions and
Conditionality
One dimension within the functionalist framework which proves to be more 
applicable to post-communist transition, and which to some extent sees the transition 
process as extending beyond the state and domestic level, stresses the importance of the
i nointernational context in which transition occurs. The main argument of this approach is 
that the process of democratisation in a single country in transition is, to a large extent, 
affected by the international/regional context in which it takes place.
Discussing the forms of influence of international actors on democratisation in the 
context of the Latin American and Southern European transitions, Whitehead distinguished 
three “sub-contexts for the exercise of international influence”: contagion, when 
democracy is promoted through proliferation of one country’s experience into another 
through neutral ways; control, when democracy is promoted through coercive means such 
as sanctions or invasion; and consent, which “involves a complex set of interactions 
between international pressures and domestic groups that generates new democratic norms 
and expectations from below.”103 Philippe Schmitter adds to these three forms of external
100 Keohane and Nye, 1987, p. 753.
101 Keohane and Nye, 1987, p. 752.
102 Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis (eds.), Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing 
New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, New York and London: Routledge, 
1996.
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influence a fourth one: conditionality, which is a more recent form of promoting 
democracy. He defines conditionality as a “deliberate use of coercion -  by attaching 
specific conditions to the distribution of benefits to recipient countries -  on the part of 
multilateral institutions.”104 In most post-communist countries democratisation takes place 
in an environment where elements of both consent and conditionality are present.
The experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union suggests that the 
existence of a favourable international environment has indeed had an obvious effect on 
the democratisation processes in these countries. According to Pridham, the international 
dimension plays a more important role in Eastern Europe than in Southern Europe and 
Latin America partly because of the simultaneity of political and economic reforms.105 By 
analysing and comparing the role of external actors in transition in Southern and East- 
Central Europe, Hyde-Price argues that in theories of regime change, the role of 
international actors should be reconsidered.106 The difference in the trajectories of 
transition in post-communist states can be attributed somewhat to the type of external 
actors that influence democratisation in those countries, and the extent of their influence. 
It is common sense that, due to their geographic and cultural proximity to the West, East 
European countries and the Baltic States were given more political, economic, and security 
incentives to democratise their countries and to comply with international norms than the 
other republics of the former Soviet Union. The further eastward we move, the less 
democratic the countries appear to be, with the Central Asian Republics being the least 
democratic in that list.
103 Laurence Whitehead, “Three International Dimensions of Democratisation”, in 
Lawrence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions o f Democratisation: Europe and 
the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 15.
104 Philippe Schmitter, “The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of 
National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies” in Whitehead, 1996, p. 30.
105Geoffrey Pridham, E. Herring and G. Stanford, Building Democracy: The International 
Dimension in Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
106 Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, “Democratisation in Eastern Europe: the External 
Dimension”, in Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (eds.), Democratisation in Eastern 
Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives, London and New York: Rutledge, 1993.
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However, there was no essential difference between Ukraine and Belarus in terms 
of their communist past, starting conditions or proximity to the west. Moreover, ranking 
Yugoslavia, Belarus and Turkmenistan together in the same progress group cannot be 
explained by geography. In addition, external factors have not necessarily had a positive 
impact on all transition countries. They have often created controversial attitudes not only 
among the population but also among the decision makers because of the deteriorating 
economies and the growing income inequality in the region resulting from radical 
economic reforms. The policy pursued by the IMF and the World Bank has been widely 
criticised because “there is little evidence that it leads to improved economic policy, but it 
does have adverse political effects because countries resent having conditions imposed on 
them”107.
One can agree that compared to earlier transitions, the post-communist transition 
occurs within significantly different domestic, state, international, and global 
environments. While pursuing the same general goal, the tasks and, therefore, the policy 
goals that the states of the post-communist transition have before them, are very different 
from those facing the states of the post-authoritarian transition. Therefore, one can 
conclude that a different approach can and should be applied both in theory and in practice 
for understanding and promoting post-communist transition processes. In the existing 
policy paradigm, the aid -  or support, in the terminology I suggest — of the international 
community is channelled to those countries where it appears to get the maximum return. It 
is not always clear, however, whether the aid is the cause of transition success in these 
countries. The rest of the countries which, for objective reasons, have more difficulties and 
therefore, a slower transition pace, naturally need more support internationally but are not 
in the list of successful transitions. From that point of view, Carothers’s conclusion is to 
the point:
Much of the democracy aid based on this paradigm is exhausted. Where the
paradigm fits well -  in the small number of clearly successful transitions —
107 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalisation and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton & Company: 
New York, London, 2002. p.46
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the aid is not much needed. Where democracy aid is needed most, in many 
gray-zone countries, the paradigm fits poorly.108
The core question when looking at a transition country, according to Carothers,
should be what is happening politically in that particular country, not how its democratic
transition is going. Carothers adds:
A whole generation of democracy aid is based on the transition paradigm, 
above all the typical emphasis on an institutional “checklist” as a basis for 
creating programs, and the creation of nearly standard portfolios of aid 
projects consisting of the same diffuse set of efforts—some judicial reform, 
parliamentary strengthening, civil society assistance, media work, political 
party development, civil education, and electoral programs... Democracy 
promoters need to focus on the key political patterns of each country in 
which they intervene, rather than trying to do little of everything according 
to a template of ideal institutional forms.109
My interest in this statement is not the policy side of the issue but rather the fact 
that such a policy is based on the existing democratic paradigm, which is clearly built on a 
problematical theoretical premise.
Transition costs are naturally higher in some countries than in others, depending on 
their respective starting conditions, historical and cultural differences, and political 
processes, among other things. Therefore, there should be greater international support for 
these countries to integrate them domestically, internationally, and as a state. This is not 
at all to suggest that the poorer the performance of a country in democratisation and market 
reforms, the more foreign aid it deserves. What I mean is that there are countries that have 
been trying to progress with reforms but, as a result of radical reforms advocated by 
international actors and the absence of quick results, have ended up with eroded domestic 
and international support. Meanwhile, the international community has its own 
expectations for a particular state. Therefore, there is a need for setting the right balance 
not only between international support and demand, but also between mutual demands and 
supports along the domestic-state-intemational continuum.
i ns Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal o f  Democracy 
Vol. 13, No.l, 2002, pp. 5-21, p.18.
109 Carothers, 2002, pp. 18-19.
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To what extent is the international dimension of democratization by itself a
sufficient explanation of the progress and regress in post-communist transitions? I think
Jacoby Wade’s observation answers this question. He notes that:
Setting up external influences as a freestanding alternative explanation to 
domestic considerations is not promising, for two reasons. First 
empirically...external influences can almost never have any real purchase 
unless they operate in tandem with domestic influences. Second, 
conceptually, if we cast external influences as an exotic alternative form of 
policy change, we are likely to produce ad hoc theories with no clear 
relationship to the broader literature.110
Valerie Bunce’s observation is also important to consider when discussing the role 
of external factors:
with the positive changes that external assistance has brought, ... it can also 
expand domestic inequalities in power and money; create dependency; be 
fickle and ill-suited to local needs and cultures; generate divisions within 
opposition groups; and construct a fragile civil society that is quickly 
depleted once the pay-off arrives of a democratic turn. Moreover, when 
democracy promoters place too much emphasis on the importance of 
external assistance, they undervalue the role of local activists, their rich 
history of struggle, and the risks that they are taking to promote regime 
change.111
Political conditionality is an instrument for setting a balance between international 
demands and supports, which has been used by the international community to encourage 
democracy, market, and security reforms. Defined as the use of material incentives to bring 
about a desired change in the behavior of a target state, conditionality is the typical
119incentives-based policy.
110 Wade Jacoby, “Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External Influences on 
Postcommunist Transformations”, World Politics Vol. 58, No. 4, 2006, pp. 623-651, p.626.
111 Valerie Bunce, “East European Democratization Global Patterns and Postcommunist 
Dynamics”, Orbis Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp.601-620.
112 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
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Political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or an international 
organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, trade 
concessions, cooperation agreements, or international organisation 
membership) to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the protection of 
human rights and the advancement of democratic principles.113
One of the key defining features of the concept of conditionality is that it operates 
in an environment of power asymmetry between dominant and subordinate actor(s). 114 
However, this feature is often not in harmony with the aim discussed above of 
conditionality to set a balance between international and domestic mutual demands and 
supports.
There has been a steady evolution and expansion of conditionality since the end of 
the Second World War, with an increasing linkage between aid disbursement and 
conditions imposed by donors, and a greater complexity in the nature of the conditionality. 
International conditionality has evolved from “first generation” economic conditionality to 
a “second generation” of combined economic and political conditionality. 115
The post-Soviet transition, as mentioned already, is unique in the sense that 
political and economic systems must be transformed simultaneously. The international 
community has been willing to see countries in transition both successfully building and 
consolidating democracy and building a market economy, without prioritising either of 
these objectives. The full international integration of these states, which requires more 
time, supposes the successful realisation of both tasks.
Although unsystematically, international organisations have started targeting more 
linkages among different issue areas. Based on this, they have further developed their 
conditionalities, spreading them to new policy dimensions, in addition to the core and
113 Karen E. Smith “Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy” in Zielonka, Jan 
and Alex Pravda (eds.),Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Volume 2: 
International and Transnational Factors, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 31-57, p. 37.
114 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, Europeanization and 
Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the Myth of 
Conditionality, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
115 Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004, pp. 14-15.
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original dimensions for which they were initially designed. In other words, there was a 
paradigm shift in Western aid conditionality in the early 1990s to supplement neo-liberal 
economic policies and administrative reform. Policy-makers started placing much greater 
emphasis on the export of Western political norms, in what is often referred to as 
“democracy promotion” or “democracy-building”. In fact, that shift has developed 
gradually since the 1980s and it was not triggered by the fall of communism.116
Recently, there has been more and more involvement by the World Bank and the 
IMF in political, rather than economic, programmes in countries in transition, such as 
programmes of “good governance” or anti-corruption programmes, for example. At the 
same time, international political organisations have begun to condition their relations on 
the transition countries’ economic performance. In recent years, even the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe has started to develop a so called “Economic 
Dimension.” Even NATO, which is a political-military organisation, has developed some 
economic, democratic, and human-rights criteria within the “Membership Action Plan” for 
transition countries aspiring to become NATO members. NATO’s conditions for 
admission require applicants, besides being actively involved in the organisation’s 
Partnership for Peace programme, to spend not less than 2 percent of GNP on defence and 
to upgrade their military equipment, logistics, and weapons systems to make them 
compatible and interoperable with NATO’s forces; to demonstrate that they have a 
functioning democracy and market economy; to institutionalise democratic civilian control 
over the military; and to resolve existing ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes with 
neighbouring states.
The best example of a new generation of conditionality is perhaps that of the EU, 
which successfully blended first generation economic conditionality of market 
liberalization-and administrative reform and second generation political conditionality of 
democracy promotion, rule of law and respect for human rights as part of its accession 
strategy. However, as Hughes and Sasse noted, even the EU’s well-balanced conditionality 
model has its negative side effects. Based on their regional survey, they concluded that 
“the domestication of donor norms through aid conditionality [in the process of EU
116 Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004, p. 16.
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enlargement] has tended to override and marginalize local knowledge and supplant rival
models as they are necessarily presented as “inferior.”117
Given the extent to which East European countries want benefits from the West,
Karen Smith suggests, the use of conditionality could provide a strong push towards
democratisation. However, she makes one simple but important observation: the East
European countries have not all been offered the same benefits. Moreover, in some
countries there is an even greater need for the international community’s support for
promoting democracy and market reforms than in others. In my opinion, applying
conditionality with its current logic — the way it is conceptualised, formed, and measured -
- ends up isolating the so called poor-performing states, grouping all transition countries as
either good and bad reformers. If domestic political processes are not taken into account, if
they are not given higher priority and if normative transition criteria are set artificially,
conclusions can be hasty and superficial. Reforms may proceed slowly in some countries
not because aid is used inefficiently but, for example, because they started the transition
process from farther behind, have had to overcome legacies and cultural, ideological, and
other obstacles, and therefore, have also sunk into complicated domestic politics.
Consistency in applying this kind of conditionality complicates things even further. From
this point of view, Karen Smith’s observation is to the point.
The emphasis which most East European countries have given to joining
European multilateral institutions has provided a powerful imperative for
continuing with democratisation so that they can meet the membership
conditions. While in several countries this imperative has merely• 118supplemented domestic forces, in others, it has had more of an impact.
Bruce Parrot’s statement that “In Eastern Europe, a desire to be admitted to NATO 
and the European Union has tempered the political conduct even of lagging states such us 
Romania” emphasises the importance of the mutual dependence of domestic and
117 Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, p. 14.
118 Smith, 2001, p. 54.
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international forces in the transition process.119 The international community’s ability to 
impact on a particular transition country depends, on the one hand, on the extent to which 
the country is sensitive to international pressure and seeks the rewards offered and, on the 
other hand, on what the international community itself is ready to suggest to or demand 
from the country in order to ensure that country’s transition succeeds. EU and NATO 
membership, as already mentioned, has not been offered to all transition countries. “Where 
there is little or no possibility that countries will be allowed to join the most exclusive 
organisations, the West may not be so influential because it cannot and will not hold all the 
most significant carrots.”120
Alexander Cooley finds a strong link between the type of conditionality and its 
transformative impact on states in transition. He divides five different types of Western 
external actors into three groups, depending on their type of conditionality. Those external 
actors that deserve attention, according to Cooley, are international non-governmental 
organisations, multilateral companies, international financial institutions, the EU, and
191 • •NATO. To what extent this list is complete and exhaustive is arguable. I would 
undoubtedly add to it at least such organisations as the World Trade Organisation, which 
has played an essential role in bringing the trade and economic policies of the transition 
countries up to world standards and integrating them finally into the world trade system. I 
would also include the Council of Europe (CoE), which has also played a significant role 
in building democracy and sustaining and consolidating democratic practices in the states 
and societies in transition. It continues to play a unique role, especially in those countries 
that have not been offered EU membership. The OSCE is another organisation that has had 
a crucial role both in security and in democracy and human rights matters in the post­
119 Bruce Parrot, “Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization” in Karen Dawisha and 
Bruce Parrot (eds.), The Consolidation o f Democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 9.
120 Smith, 2001, p. 55.
Alexander Cooley, “Western Conditions and Domestic Choices: The Influence of 
External Actors on the Post communist Transition”, Nations in Transit, Freedom House, 
2003, p. 25.
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communist transition space. Finally, the role of individual governments, such as that of the 
U.S. government, strongly supporting transition processes, should be mentioned.122
However, what is essential in this debate is not so much the list of external actors as
the type of conditionality each of these organisations applies and their respective
transformative impact on reforms in the transitional countries. Cooley identifies three types
of conditionality and three qualities of transformative impact, respectively, and classifies
the external actors accordingly. The first type is external actors with low conditionality and
with limited transformative impact. The second group of actors has moderate
conditionality and mixed transformative impact. Finally, the third type has high
conditionality and, accordingly, major transformative impact. The record of the
relationship between external actors and countries in transition indicates that international
non-governmental organisations and multinational companies have affected the course of
post-communist transition the least, since they have few instruments to enforce change in
the countries of post-communist transition. International financial institutions constitute
the second category of external actors. Among them, the World Bank and the IMF have
had the most active role in the post-communist transition space. These two organisations
mainly act hand in hand, with the IMF setting the rules of the game. The IMF operates on
the principle of economic conditionality. There is no formal way of enforcing its
conditions except by refusing loans or delaying the release of subsequent loans, in the case
of non-compliance by the borrower country. The problem with this type of organisation, in
general — irrespective of the substantive effectiveness of the enforced prescriptions — is
that the conditions, the criteria for assessment, and the subsequent funding for each country
have been very subjective and therefore widely different for different countries. According
to experts, there seems to be little correlation between the volume of reforms implemented
by borrower countries and the volume of IMF funding they receive. It is difficult to
disagree with Cooley when he points out that:
... of all the external actors, the EU and NATO have exerted the most 
profound impact on the transition process. By making membership in a 
Western international organisation contingent on the adoption of strict and 
detailed conditions, both NATO and the EU have done far more to expedite
122 On the role of US assistance to democracy promotion see Steven E. Finkel, Anibal 
Perez-Linard, and Mitchel A. Seligson, “The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on 
democracy Building 1990-2003”, World Politics 59, Vol. 3, 2007, pp.401-439.
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the transition than the other external actors and their aid packages taken 
together.123
Even the prospect of joining these organisations for the countries in transition often
means more than loans and aid packages designed for, and directed at, economic reforms
of this or that sphere of a transitional country’s economy. Motyl calls ‘losers’ those
countries that do not have the prospect of membership in the EU and NATO:
With respect to prospects for membership, the European Union and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have given preference to the most 
advanced countries and, thereby, have effectively relegated the second and 
third clusters to a single category: the outsiders or, less generously, the 
losers...non-membership in EU and NATO structures is tantamount to 
exclusion from a political-economic space that is undergoing rapid -  even 
if somewhat indeterminate — institutional change.124
It is obvious that the demands presented to a state in transition, which threaten its 
stability and have a disintegrative effect, will not be welcomed by the respective 
government and domestic society. Any conditionality must take into account the political 
realities existing at the international, domestic, and state levels. Conditionality based on 
artificially made links and criteria will themselves produce conflicts or further aggravate 
existing conflicts. From this point of view, particular attention should be given to both the 
horizontal linkages that exist among different policy or issue areas within the state in 
transition and the vertical linkages existing among different levels during the transition 
countries.
123 Cooley, 2003, p. 35.
124 Alexander. J. Motyl, “Ten Years After the Soviet Collapse: Persistence of the Past and 
Prospects for the Future”, Nations in Transit, 2001, p. 41.
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International Socialisation Approach
While the studies of the international dimension in post-communist transition focus 
on the role of conditionality as a foreign policy instrument to promote democracy and 
liberal market reforms, they do not go further to explore how conditionality works and why 
some types of international conditionality are more effective than others. A relatively 
recent effort to explore those issues in the context of the European and transatlantic 
integration of Central and East European countries has used the framework of international 
socialisation.
The international socialisation approach fits into the debates between rationalism 
and constructivism in IR theory and between sociological theories of institutionalism and 
socialisation. Constructivists argue that institutions shape member-state behaviour though 
international socialisation. Rationalist institutionalists explain compliance by the use of 
positive and negative incentives, which constrain and empower states and domestic actors 
by allocating differential costs to alternative courses of action.
The classical definition of socialisation defines it as a process of inducting actors
• 19/%into the norms and rules of a given community. The outcome of socialisation is 
sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. According to 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, the adoption of community rules [by the states] takes 
place through switching from following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness.The logic of consequences assumes “strategic, instrumentally rational 
actors who seek to maximize their own power and welfare.” The logic of appropriateness 
implies that actors are motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms. This 
adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of
177material incentives or sanctions.
125 Iain A. Johnson, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, 
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Observing the dynamics of socialisation in contemporary Europe, Checkel 
distinguishes two types of socialisation/internalisation that derive from the logic of 
appropriateness: Type I socialisation implies that agents know what is socially acceptable 
in a given setting or community. They learn the role and behave in accordance with 
expectations — irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it.
Type II socialisation/internalisation goes beyond role playing and implies that 
agents accept community or organizational norms as “the right thing to do.” It implies that
agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community which they are a
„ . 128 part.
A further, and I think helpful, step to adapt socialisation theory to explain the 
political process of norm internationalisation is to introduce a third mechanism, strategic 
calculation of costs and benefits, alongside role-playing and normative suasion. Although, 
as Checkel notes, such a rational choice approach is alien to a socialisation model, it is 
important for distinguishing between situations in which change results from socialisation
•I <%Q
and situations in which it is induced by a calculation of costs and benefits. I find this 
helpful, first, because no single theory explains the complex process of change in 
transition. Therefore new attempts to integrate diverse analytical traditions are common 
and may prove to be rewarding. Second, and especially in countries that are experiencing a 
long and difficult transition with an indefinite final destination, the state, members of 
society, and different agents do not seem to embrace the change equally, massively and 
irreversibly. What happens before switching from a logic of consequences to one of 
appropriateness? Finally, in the case of post-communist countries that have not been 
offered EU membership, one cannot speak about well-established, agreed and undisputable 
community norms for all. A rational choice approach assumes that agents carefully 
calculate and seek to maximize given interests, adapting their behaviour to the norms and 
rules favoured by the international community.” 130
128 Checkel, 2005, p. 804.
129 Checkel, 2005, p. 805.
130 Checkel, 2005, p. 806.
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Frank Schimmelfennig applied the international socialisation approach to the study 
of the Central and Eastern European transition and the EU enlargement process. He finds 
that the international socialisation of Central and Eastern Europe essentially takes place 
through reinforcement based on strategic calculation. Although the introduction of 
strategic calculations diverts socialisation theory from its classical understanding, 
Schimmelfennig demonstrates in his analysis that the theory becomes better equipped to 
analyse the political changes of post-communist transitions. Socialisation by reinforcement 
implies that actors calculate the consequences of norm conformance rather than reflecting 
on its appropriateness and they adapt their behaviour rather than changing their views, 
interests, or identities.131
Schimmelfennig distinguishes reinforcement mechanisms along three dimensions: 
first, reinforcement can be based on rewards or punishments; second, it can use tangible 
(material or political) or intangible (social or symbolic) rewards and punishments; third, it 
can proceed through an intergovernmental or a transnational channel. In intergovernmental 
reinforcement by tangible rewards, the socialisation agency offers the governments of the 
target states positive incentives, which would improve their security, welfare, or political 
power and autonomy. Those rewards can be aid or membership, on the condition that a 
target government conforms to the community norms and rules. In the case of non- 
compliance, the socialisation agency simply withholds these rewards. This mechanism is 
effective when the target government expects the promised rewards to be higher than the 
costs of adaptation. In contrast, intergovernmental reinforcement by punishment means 
that the socialisation agency threatens to punish the socializees in the case of non- 
compliance. In this case, reinforcement by punishment is effective when the costs of 
external punishment are higher for the target government than the costs of adaptation. The 
rewards and punishments may be social rather than material, such as international 
recognition, public praise, and invitations to intergovernmental meetings; the 
corresponding punishments include exclusion, shaming, and shunning.132 In any case of
131 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: 
Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and 
Eastern Europe”, International Organization 59, No. 4, 2005, pp. 827-860, p. 831.
132 Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 831.
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intergovernmental reinforcement, behavioural adaptation is likely when targeted 
governments expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance.133
In transnational reinforcement, the socialisation agency uses rewards and 
punishments to mobilize domestic groups in the target state to apply pressure on their 
government to change its policy. Here too, the incentives can be material and social, 
positive and negative. As in cases of intergovernmental reinforcement, according to 
Checkel, transnational reinforcement succeeds if the costs of putting pressure on the 
government are lower for the societal actors than the expected community rewards, and if 
they are strong enough to force the government to adapt to the norms and rules.134
Although socialisation by reinforcement means conforming to norms based on 
mere strategic calculations, Schimmelfennig does not exclude “sustained compliance based
1 ' i f
on the internalization of these new norms.” However, behavioural change will typically 
precede internalization, and behavioural conformance will persist for an extended period of 
time without internalization. Nevertheless, no matter how the actors internalise the norms, 
a key question, especially critical in the context of post-communist transition, remains 
under what conditions are incentives and rewards likely to promote behavioural 
adaptation? Among the several possible options Checkel, Schimmelfennig, and others 
especially emphasize the importance of political conditionality in the socialisation
136process.
While I have already discussed political conditionality as a critical part of 
international dimension of transition in the post-communist context both as a concept and 
as a policy instrument, it would be useful to discuss political conditionality as an 
instrument of socialisation from the perspective of Checkel and Schimmelfennig. Viewing 
conditionality as a mean of socialisation gives a fresh perspective to the concept that has 
been largely debated and criticised and still remains one of the key and yet controversial 
policy instruments in the relationship of international regimes and transition states.
133 Checkel, 2005, p. 809
134 Checkel, 2005, p. 809.
135 Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 831.
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Although “Europeanization” is not the focus of my dissertation, the study of 
conditionality in the European Union enlargement process provides rich new data to 
explore the mechanisms and conditions of international institutional effects, the adoption 
of international norms and rules and the application of international socialisation to those 
cases provides a fresh perspective.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier suggest three models of rule adoption. The “social 
learning” model follows a logic of appropriateness and emphasizes identification of a non­
member state with the EU and persuasion of the legitimacy of the EU rules as a key 
condition for rule adoption, rather than the provision of material incentives by the EU. The 
second model suggested by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier is called “lesson-drawing”. It 
differs by focusing on the adoption of EU rules by the non-member states themselves 
irrespective of the EU’s material incentives or persuasion. The third model is the “external 
incentives model”, which “captures the dynamics of underpinning EU conditionality. It 
follows the logic of consequences and is driven by the external rewards and sanctions that
1^ 7the EU adds to the cost-benefit calculations of the rule-adopting state.” Thus, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier also conclude that the process of rule adoption can be 
either EU-driven or domestically driven.
According to the “external incentive” model, the EU can offer two kinds of rewards 
to non-member states for compliance to its conditionality: assistance and institutional ties. 
Conditions work in two ways: intergovernmental bargaining, and differential
empowerment of domestic actors. The former works directly on the target government, for 
which the main criteria for compliance is whether the benefits of EU rewards outweigh the 
domestic adjustment costs of adopting EU rules and the opportunity costs of discarding the 
rules promoted by other international actors. In the latter case, conditionality may change 
the domestic opportunity structure, thus differentially empowering certain domestic actors 
who have incentives to adopt EU rules. If the former case produces “top-down” processes, 
the second case is more “bottom-up”. However, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier recognize
137 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the 
Europeanization of central and Eastern Europe”, in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization o f Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca and 
London: Cornel University Press, 2005, p. 9.
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that it requires the decision of “the target government, which seeks to balance EU, 
domestic, and other international pressures in order to maximize its own political 
benefits.”138
The authors add that the cost-benefit balance depends on four sets of factors: the
determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and
promises, and the size of adoption costs. They formulate a determinacy hypothesis in the
following way: The likelihood of rule adoption increases if the rules are set as conditions
and the more determinate they are.139 The corresponding reward hypothesis assumes that
“the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the size and speed of reward.”140 As for
credibility, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier suggest that:
The likelihood of adoption increases with the credibility of conditional 
threats and promises. (1) The credibility of threats increases and the 
credibility of promises decreases as the benefits of rewarding or the costs of 
withholding the reward decrease: (2) credibility increases with the 
consistency of, and internal consensus about, conditional policy; (3) 
credibility decreases with cross-conditionality and increases with parallel or 
additive conditionality; and (4) credibility decreases with information 
asymmetries in favor of the target government.141
In line with this and based on the existing experience, Schimmelfennig, Engert and
Knobel argue that the likelihood of rule adoption has varied mainly with the size of
adoption costs. Provided that the credibility of EU political conditionality is high both with
regard to the promise of membership and the threat exclusion,
...it is the size of domestic political costs for the target government that 
determines its propensity to meet EU demands. Generally, these costs 
increase the more that EU conditions negatively affect the security and 
integrity of the state, the government’s domestic power base, and its core 
political practices of power preservation.142
138 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 12.
139 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 13.
140 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 15,
141 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 16.
142 Frank. Schimmelfennig, Stefan Eangert and Heiko Knobel, “The Impact of EU 
Conditionality”, in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 29.
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It is hard to disagree with this statement, as well as with the central hypothesis that 
the likelihood of rule adoption increases as the target governments’ domestic political costs 
decrease.
The key finding of the studies presented by these authors is that the influence of the 
EU depends crucially on the context in which the EU uses its incentives. They distinguish 
between the context of democratic conditionality and the context of accession 
conditionality. In the former case, credible conditionality and adoption costs are key 
variables. In the second case, key variables are credible membership perspective and the 
setting of EU rules as requirement for membership.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier find that the importance of adoption costs
contrasts sharply with the context of democratic conditionality.
As acquis conditionality does not concern the political system and the bases 
of political power as such, governments generally do not have fear that the 
costs of rule adoption in individual policy areas will lead to a loss of 
office... Moreover, once a credible membership prospective has been 
established, adoption costs in individual policy areas are discounted against 
the (aggregate) benefits of membership.1 3
According to Schimmelfennig, among the channels and means used by European 
regional organisations to promote their rules and norms, only intergovernmental 
reinforcement offering the high and tangible reward of EU and NATO membership has the 
potential to produce norm-conforming domestic change in norm-violating countries. What 
is more important is that those incentives promoted sustained compliance only when the 
domestic costs of adaptation for the target governments were low. However, this 
observation is true for liberal democratic governments only, or for those that alternate 
between liberal and nationalist-authoritarian governments. The authoritarian systems of 
Eastern Europe have not been positively affected by EU or NATO membership incentives 
at all.
143 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Conclusions: The Impact of the EU on 
the Accession Countries”, in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p 215.
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The international socialisation of Central and Eastern Europe thus provides
evidence for socialisation by reinforcement based on strategic calculation. Compliance
with community norms was set as a condition for reaping the political and material
benefits of membership in the community organizations, and non-member governments
weighed those benefits against the domestic political costs that adaptation would involve.
While the successful compliance by Central and East European countries to EU norms
during the enlargement process demonstrates the effectiveness of socialisation by
reinforcement based on rational choice, it is still questionable whether those states
internalised the norms and whether those international institutions were the relevant
promoters of internalization.144 Schimmelfennig is very cautious about attributing the
internalisation of new rules only to external factors, i.e. international institutions. First, the
study shows that there was sustained compliance with liberal norms (which means an
internalisation of norms) in those Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries where
liberal parties dominated. However, those countries had attained high conformance levels
ahead of EU or NATO accession conditionality, which means that the contribution of
international institutions to internalization could have been small.
At best, they have helped to reinforce and stabilize a pre-existing domestic 
consensus (which may well have formed by diffuse transnational influences 
during the Cold War). It is highly probable that these countries would have 
embarked and continued on the path of democratic consolidation in the 
absence of any norm promotion by international organizations, be it in the 
form of persuasion, social influence, or membership incentives.145
Second, the study found that international institutions were successful promoters of 
norms and rules in response to EU and NATO membership conditionality especially in 
countries with a mixed political constellation.146 In these cases of clear external impact, 
however, the switch to internalization is not sufficiently evident yet. EU and NATO 
membership conditionality was in place until the end of the period of examination (2003).
144Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 856.
145 Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 856.
146 Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 856.
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Thus it cannot be excluded that norm conformance was driven by external incentives rather 
than internalization.
Michael E. Smith and Mark Webber suggest that as membership drew closer, the
alignment with CFSP positions increased and “as such the process could be said to reflect
both a rational logic of membership conditionality as well as a process of social learning.”
However, they are quite pessimistic about the democratic conditionality presented even by
the ENP action plan or any prior EU instruments:
Because ENP, by contrast, lacks the “ultimate reward” of membership, it is 
conducted in a much less intensely institutionalized setting. Consequently, 
while CFSP alignment even among the acceding states had an often 
symbolic and declarative quality, that with the ENP partners may be even 
more hollow, as both the incentives for constructive engagement and the 
barriers to defection are fewer and less substantive.147
While the international socialisation hypothesis seems to fit well in explaining how 
international institutions influence domestic policy in the post-communist context in 
Europe, there are some disagreements with the findings of Checkel, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier. Some studies also based on quantitative tests reported only limited 
socialisation effects even in Europe. Kelley, for instance, showed that traditional rational 
choice mechanisms, such as membership conditionality, motivated most behaviour change 
in the EU enlargement process, while socialisation-based methods rarely changed 
behaviour. The latter were effective only when the domestic opposition was low and the 
effect was only moderate. “As domestic opposition grew, membership conditionality was 
not only increasingly necessary to change behaviour, but it was also surprisingly 
effective.”148 Further studies have tried to follow up on the international socialisation 
debate and to clarify exactly how much change in domestic policy can be explained by the
147 Michael E. Smith and Mark Webber, “Political Dialogue and Security: the CFSP and 
ESDP”, in Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun (eds.), Governing Europe’s 
Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?, Manchester University Press, 2008.
148 Judith Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality 
and Socialization by International Institutions”, International Organization 58, No. 3, 
2004, pp.425-457.
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socialisation effect of international organizations. David Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, for 
instance, tried to collect a larger set of data and to test statistically the constructivists’ 
international socialisation hypothesis. While they were able to provide some evidence to 
support the validity of the international socialisation hypothesis, the study also revealed it 
limits. In particular, they showed that unstructured IGOs have no effect in promoting 
member state interest convergence.149
Conclusion
To sum up, in this chapter I have briefly discussed theories of international regime, 
complex interdependence and socialisation. I have also tackled the international dimension 
of democratisation, the role of international institutions and conditionality in promoting 
post-communist transition.
I concluded that the applicability of complex interdependence theory is restricted. 
The concept of linkage, the role of domestic actors and the learning process are extremely 
important for analysing and explaining the complex process of domestic transformation 
and international integration of transition countries. The lack of attention paid to these 
aspects in the theory of complex interdependence limits its applicability to post-communist 
transition studies. International regime theories also, because of their weaknesses, can have 
only limited application for studying post-communist transition. The value of the 
international dimension of democratisation, as one of the functionalist approaches to 
transition, is that it brings external factors into the explanation of post- communist 
transition in studies that had previously focused solely on domestic factors in the process 
of regime change and democratic consolidation. However, as Jacoby points out on the 
basis of more recent empirical studies of the role of external factors in post-communist
149 The authors refer to unstructured intergovernmental organisations as those lacking 
formal bureaucratic, executive, and judicial organs. David H. Bearce and Stacy 
Bondanella, “Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest 
Convergence”, International Organization 61, No. 4, 2007, pp.703-33, p.703; 725.
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transition, “the focus on external influences is a growth area for good conceptual work 
only if it addresses the union of foreign and domestic influences.”150
As for conditionality, for a large group of transition countries and for the case 
studies in my thesis, the only type of international conditionality that has been available is 
the democratic conditionality. While not excluding the possibility of some socialisation 
effect in this group of transition countries, undoubtedly the changes have been influenced 
mainly by democratic conditionality, since for most of them, accession conditionality was 
not available.
Socialisation theories do, to some extent, fill the gap that exists in explaining how 
international regimes and international organisations transfer international norms to 
domestic societies and domestic actors. However, overall they still tend to be about top- 
down processes of internalisation of international norms rather than about the dynamic 
interaction among domestic, state and international levels. As discussed above, 
socialisation based on a rational choice approach, or socialisation by reinforcement is 
more applicable for post-communist transition studies, than other types of socialisation. In 
my opinion, it also leaves more room for taking into account domestic actors’ strategic 
calculations and consequent actions. Therefore, this concept can be helpful for studying the 
interaction and interplay among domestic, state and international levels, which is an 
important issue in my thesis. For this purpose, in the next chapter I will analyse to what 
extent the existing IR and transition literature covers the interaction and interplay among 
different policy areas and different levels, before developing a new framework of analysis.
150 Jacoby, 2006, p.625.
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CHAPTER 3
Establishing the Framework
Although there are numerous attempts to theorise domestic-foreign linkages, the 
theoretical literature of international relations does not provide a unified approach which 
can incorporate domestic level variables in a systematic and consistent manner. 
Developing such a unified theory is inherently interdisciplinary, inasmuch as it deals with 
both domestic politics and international relations.
In this chapter, first, I review the theories that analyse various aspects of domestic 
and foreign policy relationships and try to identify the concepts that can be useful in 
analysing the multi-issue and multilevel dynamics of post-communist transition. Second, 
based on the relevant theories of International Relations and Political Science that I have 
reviewed in chapters one and two and in the first part of this chapter, I sketch a framework 
and construct the core arguments that I will apply to the group of countries of post­
communist transition.
Methodological Issues of the Domestic-Foreign Policy Relationship
There is wide discussion on the issue of domestic and foreign policy linkages. 
Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Krasner, Thomas Risse-Kappen, James 
Rosenau, Joseph Nye, Andrew Moravscik, Richard Rosecrance, Fareed Zakaria, Robert 
Putnam, Robert Keohane, Hellen Milner, Susan Strange, and others have done extensive 
research on domestic-foreign relations. The concepts and models suggested by these 
authors shed light on many significant aspects and structures of foreign-domestic policy 
linkages. However, the limitations of these suggested concepts are widely criticised in the 
existing international relations literature.
A review of the literature shows how differently various schools of thought at 
different periods have treated the issue. At one point, international outcomes were often 
explained by national and sub-national characteristics; at other times great emphasis was 
placed on systems. Currently, however, there is a growing consensus among theorists that
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systemic and domestic level theorising is mutually complementary. In this respect, both 
neo-liberals and neo-realists acknowledge the necessity of greater efforts to forge 
theoretical links between domestic politics and international relations.
As Zakaria writes, in the literature of international relations it is fast becoming 
commonplace to assert the importance of domestic politics and call for more research on 
the subject:
After over a decade of vigorous debates about realism, structural realism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and hegemonic stability theory, political 
scientists are shifting their attention to the internal sources of foreign 
policy. Some even contend that realism’s dictum about the “primacy of 
foreign policy” is wrong, and that the domestic politics of states are the key 
to understanding world events. Diplomatic history has been under fire for 
over two decades for its focus on elite decision-making, and with the rise of 
the “new history,” younger historians have increasingly written about the 
underlying social, economic, and ideological influences on high politics.
They have not, however, placed their particular explanations within the 
context of international relations theory. Most theories of international 
politics have, quite to the contrary, focused on the nature of international 
system and ignored what goes on behind state doors, treating it as the 
province of comparative politics, a different sub-field of political 
science.151
The renewed focus on anarchy in international politics has led to the creation of a
sharp distinction between domestic and international politics. Politics internationally is
seen as characterised primarily by anarchy, while domestically, centralised authority
prevails. One of the most explicit statements of this position is in Waltz’s Theory o f
International Politics. He makes a strong distinction between the areas:
The parts of domestic political system stand in relations of super- and 
subordination. Some are entitled to command; others are required to obey. 
Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international 
political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally each is the 
equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to152obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic.
151 Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics,” International Security Vol. 17, No. 1, 
1992, pp. 177-198.
152 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley,
1979, p. 88.
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Moreover, Waltz sees international politics as the only true “politics.” He writes:
National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. 
International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of 
accommodation. The international realm is pre-eminently a political one.
The national realm is variously described as being hierarchic, vertical, 
centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived; and the international 
realm, as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, 
undirected, and mutually adaptive.153
It is difficult to agree with the strict division between national and international
politics. For the purposes of this study, this is a starting point. I fully share Milner’s
critique of such a distinction between domestic and international politics:
Disputes among political parties, local and national officials, the executive 
and the legislature, different geographic regions, different races, capital and 
labour, industry and finance, organized and unorganised groups, and so on 
over who gets how much and when occur constantly within the nation. 
...Who is the highest authority in the United States? The people, the states, 
the Constitution, the executive, the Supreme Court, or even Congress. De 
jure, the Constitution, but de facto, it depends upon the issue.154
This observation need not be limited to the United States. Authority in some states
may be fairly centralised, while in others it is highly decentralised, as in the debate over
“strong” and “weak” states.155 On the other hand, the international system may also evince
different levels of centralization and decentralization, depending on time and the issue. As
Milner and others make clear, Waltz’s distinction between domestic and international
arenas based on the role and significance of force is problematic. As Morgenthau writes:
The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic 
counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are struggle for power,
153 Waltz, 1979, p. 113.
Helen V. Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: a Critique” in 
Helen V. Milner, Interest, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations, Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 155-158.
155 Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f Advanced 
Industrial States, University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.
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modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes 
place in the domestic and international spheres. The tendency to dominate, 
in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family 
through fraternal and professional associations and local political 
organisations, to the state... Finally, the whole political life of a nation, 
particularly of a democratic nation, from the local to the national level, is a 
continuous struggle for power.156
Milner refers to other thinkers such as Carr, Claude, Rosenau, and Fox to 
strengthen her point that the sharp distinction between the realms is difficult to maintain 
empirically. More importantly, it is disadvantageous from the theoretical, epistemological 
point of view. The radical dichotomy between international and domestic politics seems to
1 S7represent a conceptual and theoretical step backward.
Rosenau also warns against such an isolationist approach:
One reason for the lack of conceptual links is that most students in the 
international field have not treated their subject as local politics writ large. 
Instead, like advocates of bipartisanship in foreign policy, most students 
tend to view politics as “stopping at the water’s edge” and consider that 
something different, international politics and foreign policy, takes place 
beyond national boundaries. Consequently, so much emphasis has been 
placed on the dissimilarities between international and other types of 
politics that the similarities have been overlooked and the achievement of
* 158conceptual unity has been made much more difficult.
The point that politics is the same in the two arenas and that “domestic and 
international politics are but two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the 
struggle for power” is very important also for epistemology.159 As William Fox adds:
156 Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations the Struggle for  
Power and Peace, (6th edition), New York: Knopf, 1985, pp. 39-40.
157 Milner, 1997, p. 5.
158 Milner, 1997, p. 6.
159 Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations, New York: Random House, 1962, 
p. 231.
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Putting “power” rather than “the state” at the centre of political science
makes it easier to view international relations as one of the political
sciences. So conceived, it is possible for some scholars to move effortlessly 
along the seamless web which connects world politics and politics of such 
less inclusive units as the state or the locality, and to emphasise the political 
process, group behaviour, communications studies, conflict resolution, and 
decision-making.160
Peter Gourevitch’s analysis of the current studies exploring the interaction between 
international relations and domestic politics finds that the traditional distinction between 
the two is dead. But the two branches of political science have, at the very least, differing 
sensibilities. The international relations specialist may, if dissatisfied with pure 
international system explanations, make his or her own exploration into domestic politics, 
still having as an ultimate goal the understanding of international dynamics. This voyage
can frequently bring back discoveries most useful to the comparativists. In the same way,
the international system may itself become an explanatory variable to explain the nature of 
the domestic structure. Instead of being a cause of international politics, domestic structure 
may be a consequence of it. And international systems, too, become causes instead of 
consequences. Gourevitch finds that in using domestic structure as a variable for 
explaining foreign policy, much of the literature is “apolitical.” It stresses structural 
features of domestic regimes which constrain policy, regardless of the content of the 
interests seeking goals through public policy or the political orientation of the persons in 
control of the state machine.161
In the 1970s, the centrality of government itself in the formulation of foreign policy 
was the question. Nye and Keohane, Edward Morse, Karl Kaiser, and others stressed the 
growing role of transnational, international, and multinational actors, and global, non­
military forces. Instead of explaining foreign policy, which is implicitly state-centred, the 
emphasis is on explaining “international regimes” in various issue areas, and not just the
160 William T. R. Fox, American Study o f International Relations: Essays, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1968, p. 20.
161 Peter Gourevitch “The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic 
politics”, International Organisation Vol. 32, Issue 4, 1978, pp. 881-912, p. 882.
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international system, which essentially stresses military power. Countries differ in these
issue areas according to their “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” in various domains. Nye and
Keohane call this model “complex interdependence” and explore the conditions under
which it, rather than another paradigm, is the most applicable.162 In this regard, Morse
makes an interesting observation:
All modem societies in interdependent situations acquire certain common 
political characteristics such as strong welfare pressures, bureaucratisation, 
legitimation problems which increase the relevance of domestic politics in 
foreign policy-making compared to the classic period of diplomacy. Thus 
the international and the domestic spheres become more important while 
the intermediate level, national government, diminishes.163
The existence of some variance in response to changes in the international
environment requires some examination of domestic politics. There are numerous studies
of the importance of domestic politics, stressing different aspects as the more determining
ones: the presence and character of bureaucracy (Kissinger, Allison, Halperin); the strength
and autonomy of the state (Gilpin, Krasner, Katzenstein); the effect of the masses on
policymaking, or the lack of such pressure (Kissinger, Wilson); the perceptions of the
leaders (Jervis, Steinbrunner, Brecher); national style (Hoffmann); the character of
domestic coalitions (Gourevitch, Katzenstein); the level of modernization (Morse); and the
role of transnational actors in the given policy area (Nye and Keohane). After reviewing
the studies conducted on the issue, Gourevitch comes to the conclusion that it is difficult to
draw a strict demarcation line between international and domestic politics. Moreover, if
you focus on one of those levels, you are in danger of missing a whole range of variables
that can be found at the other level. I am fully sympathetic to Gourevitch’s conclusion that:
The international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and 
structures but a cause of them. Economic relations and military pressures 
constrain an entire range of domestic behaviours, from policy decisions to 
political forms. International relations and domestic politics are therefore so
162 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, p. 20.
Edward Morse, Modernization and the Transformation o f  International Relations, New 
York Free Press, 1976.
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interrelated that they should be analysed simultaneously, as wholes... Some 
leeway of response to pressure is always possible, at least conceptually. 
The choice of response therefore requires explanation. Such an explanation 
necessarily entails an examination of politics.164
Harold Muller and Thomas Risse-Kappen write: “We see a growing consensus 
among scholars that a complex model of international politics has to integrate the three 
levels of analysis: society, political system, and international environment.165 Rosenau calls 
this task an Einsteinian one. Rapid advances at several levels have revealed that more 
theorising is needed, that across-systems-level theory has much greater explanatory power 
than within-systems-level theory.166 He emphasises the necessity of conceptualising a 
complex model of international politics. Of course, I agree with Rosenau that to elaborate 
an “across systems” theory is a daunting task. However, what is important is that it should 
not be assumed that one can construct such a model merely by combining domestic and 
international factors in one. A mere juxtaposing of the two sets of variables will be a 
useless exercise.
In this respect, I agree with Moravcsik that in order to explain the foreign policy of 
states “the model should focus on the interaction of the three levels.”167 As Muller and 
Risse-Kappen mention, it is important that “the alternative ‘primacies’ do not emerge as
164 Gourevitch, 1978, p. 911.
165Harold Muller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “From the Outside in and from the Inside 
Out, International Relations, Domestic politics, and Foreign Policy” in David Skidmore 
and Valerie M. Hudson (eds.), The Limits o f  State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign 
Policy Formulation, Westview Press, 1993, p. 26.
166 James Rosenau, “Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited” in Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict, Behaviour and Linkage Politics, NY: David McKay, 1973, pp. 
25-26.
167 Andrew Moravcsik, “Integrating International and Domestic Politics: A Theoretical 
Introduction” (Chapter One) in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam 
(eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1993, p. 18.
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mutually exclusive and generalisable hypotheses, but as two poles of a continuum of 
possible combinations of external and internal factors influencing state actions.”168
Moravcsik divides current domestic theories of foreign policy into three 
subcategories, according to the source of domestic policy posited by the analyst. First, 
“society-centred” theories stress pressure from domestic social groups “through 
legislatures, interest groups, elections, and public opinion.” Second, “state-centred” 
domestic theories locate the sources of foreign policy behaviour within the administrative 
and decision-making apparatus of the executive branch of the state. Third, theories of 
“state-society relations” emphasise the institutions of representation, education, and 
administration that link state and society.169
Among international relations theorists, it is widely recommended that analysts 
stick to a single level of analysis. Some, like David Singer, argue that different levels of 
analysis are mutually exclusive, asserting that “one could not add these two types of 
statements, systemic and domestic cause, together to achieve a cumulative growth of 
empirical generalisations.” However, Singer hints in the same article that a framework 
combining domestic and international explanations is possible.170 Others concede that 
domestic factors may be important, but tend to be empirically intractable. As we shall see, 
a majority of international relations theorists recommend that analysts give priority to 
international explanations and employ theories of domestic politics only as needed to 
explain anomalies.
Moravcsik concludes that all sophisticated theories of international relations, 
domestic and international, tend to concede that domestic actors are active participants in 
foreign policymaking. The question that divides them is whether observed domestic 
behaviour can best be accounted for by using international or domestic theory. Many 
theorists favour the “residual variance” approach because it continues to privilege systemic 
theory while permitting domestic politics to enter the analysis as an independent, but
168 Muller and Risse-Kappen, 1993, p. 32.
169Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 6-7.
170 David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, World 
Politics Vol. 14, No. 1,1961, pp.77-92.
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clearly secondary, influence on policy.171 Moravcsik criticises this approach for three 
reasons:
First, the decision to begin with systemic, as opposed to domestic theory is 
essentially arbitrary. Systemic theories are not inherently more 
parsimonious, nor more powerful, nor more precise than their domestic 
counterparts. Second, by privileging international-level theories and 
bringing in domestic factors only as needed this approach tends to 
encourage ad hoc interpretations rather than explicit theories about the 
interaction between domestic and international politics. Rather than 
calculating domestic and international interests simultaneously, such 
theories often make inconsistent assumptions about the rationality or 
preferences of statesmen, who are assumed to respond sometimes to 
external incentive, and sometimes to internal incentives. Third, the 
sequential use of domestic theories of interest and international theories of 
bargaining, even where domestic factors are treated as prior to systemic 
ones, is at best incomplete, since, with only a few contemporary exceptions, 
such explanations have ignored the influence of domestic factors on 
international bargaining. The effects of domestic factors are not limited to 
the process of interest formation, but affect strategy and bargaining 
outcomes as well172
Theories of across-level (vertical) interaction
Numerous theories have been put forward to analyse and explain across-level 
linkages -  for example, interdependence theory, theories of integration, adaptation, 
intervention theory, and the “linkage” concept. Some of these theories have the potential 
to explain across-level interaction and others do not. Some of them have more potential to 
capture the dynamic nature of across-level interaction, while others are handicapped by 
their choice of units of analysis or variables.173 The theory o f  interdependence, for 
instance, is very general and does not necessarily imply direction, purpose, or even across- 
level interactions. In sum, the existing concept of interdependence does not hold much 
promise as a framework for across-level analyses. Unlike interdependence, scholars find
171 Moravcsik, 1993, p. 7.
172 Moravcsik, 1993, p. 14.
173 A detailed analysis about the pros and cons of the existing across-system theories is 
provided by James Rosenau in Wilkenfeld,1973, 25-26.
82
the theory of integration to be more precise in specifying the kind of phenomena at the 
national and international level which have either been conceived or found to be 
systematically associated with each other. According to James Rosenau, the theory o f  
integration, relative to the other concepts, provides an impressive array of hypotheses and 
findings pertinent to a wide variety of across-level phenomena. However, the concept can 
never make more than a limited contribution to an across-level analysis. Because of the 
normative basis of the theory, its scope is restricted to the creation of “new types of human 
communities at a very high level of organisation.”174 The attributes and dynamics of 
national actors are crucial to integration theorists’ research, but only as independent 
variables.175 Meanwhile, I especially agree that the lack of clarity and consensus on the 
main definitions and dependent variables embraced by the concept indicates that the 
concept can be further developed.
The theory o f  adaptation, according to Rosenau, is more comprehensive. To the 
extent that it has been developed for the analysis of phenomena aggregated at the national 
level, adaptation refers to the efforts and processes whereby national societies keep their 
essential social, economic, and political structures within acceptable limits. It posits 
fluctuations in the essential structures as stemming from changes and demands that arise 
both within and external to the adapting society. It facilitates analysis across three levels 
of aggregation: the sub-national level, at which internal demands arise; the international 
level, from which external demands emanate; and the national level, at which the demands 
are or are not reconciled.176 Notwithstanding its potential, this concept has centred 
exclusively on the nation-state, and the concept’s contribution is currently limited to a 
narrow set of phenomena. Also, the adaptive phenomena are often viewed in a normative 
context, and the concept is used as a guide to efforts to maintain the status quo at any 
moment in time. The concept o f  intervention is narrower in scope than either adaptation or 
integration. In its most common usage it refers to an action and not a process. Even with its
174 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950- 
1957, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968, p. 608.
175 Rosenau, 1973, p. 27.
176 Rosenau, 1973, p.66.
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widest interpretation as one actor’s intentional efforts through military or non-military 
means to affect another’s internal affairs, the concept of intervention cannot in itself 
provide the basis for major theoretical breakthroughs in across-level analysis. The fact that 
the concept is exclusively concerned with coercive phenomena restricts efforts towards 
across level theorizing.
Rosenau proposes a linkage concept that, in his opinion, is more generic and free of 
the deficiencies of other concepts.177 Rosenau suggests a linkage concept as the basic unit 
of analysis, defining it as any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one level 
and is reacted to in another.178 According to Rosenau, all foreign policy behaviour can be 
explained in terms of the relative influence of five sets of variables -  idiosyncratic, role, 
governmental, societal, and systemic. The proposed concept has been widely criticised on 
a number of grounds, such as the static nature of his model, the ambiguity of the 
categories, and the subjective nature of his choice of categories.
The approach, put forward by Ikenberry in his paper, “The State and Strategies of 
International Adjustment,” is based on two analytical assumptions and one central 
question. Ikenberry finds that the problem of adjustment is a fundamental dynamic that 
bears on domestic and international political economy. All states are continuously in the 
process of adjusting to changes at the international and domestic levels. The problems 
inherent in a country’s political and economic position within the larger international 
system are a basic source of national behaviour and international conflict.179
Ikenberry’s second assumption is that the state or the state elite is the crucial actor 
within the adjustment process. As such, the central question is why states see international 
or domestic systems as alternatives for a solution to adjustment problems. He proposes a 
model of adjustment politics with an adjustment preference function for states and suggests 
that the domestic and international structural circumstances of states determine the strategy 
actually chosen. He finds that “of the many international and domestic forces that set
1 77 James Rosenau, Linkage Politics, NY: Free Press, 1969.
178 Rosenau, 1969.
1 7QJohn G. Ikenberry, “The State and Strategies of International Adjustment”, World 
Politics Vol. 39 No. 1, 1986, pp. 53-77.
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states in motion, none is more important than the constant pressure for national adjustment 
to international change produced by constant differential change between national and 
international systems.”180
This is the key methodological proposition on which the author builds his model.
Ikenberry refers also to Gilpin’s note that:
in every international system there are continual occurrences of political, 
economic, and technological changes that promise gains and losses for one 
or another actor. In every system, therefore, a process of disequilibrium and 
adjustment is constantly taking place. It will either generate new 
opportunities for aggressive domestic response to international change, or it 
will generate pressure for defensive action to preserve existing domestic 
arrangements.181
Notwithstanding its value, Ikenberry’s model is not developed sufficiently to reflect 
the interplay of different levels. Ikenberry sees the primary cause of change in the 
international system. This is one-sided and views the international system only as an 
independent variable. Also, the main assumption of this adaptive model (that societies 
strive to keep their domestic structures within acceptable limits) is not a sufficient 
explanation of the cause of change. In my view, keeping the structures within acceptable 
limits is a minimalist approach and is the minimum task any government would and should 
pursue. A society’s efforts to enhance and develop those very structures are more often the 
case, and that is the goal that elites pursue nationally. Therefore, the democratic system is 
not always a reactive but, often, a proactive agent of change.
If we try to create a working national-international cross-levels model, then (at least 
theoretically) changes at one level need to be explained by changes at the other. In other 
words, both the international and domestic levels can serve as independent and dependent 
variables. At the very least, a cross-levels model must be capable of revealing and studying 
such linkages.
It is instructive to revisit Ikenberry’s assumptions and conclusions. He finds, first, 
that “states seek to minimize the costs of governance and to maximize national
180 Ikenberry, 1986, p. 54.
181 Ikenberry, 1986, p. 56.
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competitiveness: when there are conflicts, they will prefer the former over the latter.” 
Second, Ikenberry assumes that “international policies have lower costs of governance than 
domestic policies.” His third assumption claims that “offensive policies have higher 
competitive gains than defensive policies.”182 While not going into detail about each of the 
assumptions, I think that overall they have limited application and are not applicable 
universally. One can conclude without great difficulty that despite the innovative value of 
these kinds of attempts to conceptualise linkage, they are generalizations. For example, the 
model does not explain conflict or change which becomes the cause for adjustment at 
another level. Although it offers a set of preferences and priorities of state strategies, it 
does not help to explain why a state chooses the international or domestic arena for 
adjustment each time. Also, there is a problem of the degree of adjustment required each 
time to restore the equilibrium, which the model fails to deal with. Any dynamic model 
should be designed to address these shortcomings as far as possible.
Ian Clark makes the valuable statement that a unified approach which can 
incorporate domestic level variables in a systematic and consistent manner requires 
collapsing the distinction between the systemic and the reductionist: the domestic is as 
much a part of the fabric of the international system as any abstracted structure of the 
relations between states. He suggests that no understanding of the international order is 
possible without an appreciation of the domestic orders on which it is based: the two are 
functionally integrated in a way that defies analytical separation. According to Clark, states 
are, to that degree, nested in the international order and essential to its viability. In turn, the
•  •  •  # 1 S'!international order develops qualities of those polities nested within it.
I fully agree with Clark who, based on this conclusion, advocates what he calls a 
more fluid, dynamic, and interactive conception of politics that is not captured by a solely 
structural or systemic account. Continuing and developing this line of thinking, Clark 
arrives at the concept of the brokerage state. He finds that, while within the traditional 
model the state generates separation between the domestic and the international, as a 
political broker the state conjoins them. It is the medium through which political costs are
182 Ikenberry, 1986, p. 57.
183 Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relation Theory, Oxford University Press, 
1999, pp.62-63.
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transferred either inwards or outwards. “Only by a direct political interplay between the 
domestic and the international,” Clark concludes, “bringing them into the same field of 
forces, where the outcome depends upon the pressure both bring to bear on the state - can 
this basic tension be demonstrated.”184 However, the concept of a brokerage state and a 
periodically disturbed international equilibrium resulting in a spillover of political costs 
and their transfer to national systems does not provide sufficient explanation. The initial 
cause of the periodic disturbance on which the concept of the brokerage state is built is not 
explained.
While there are political costs in the shape of political tensions, which are dealt 
with by the system or unit, there are also benefits. Political costs and benefits, their 
balance, is the criterion for the support of system equilibrium, its disturbance, and the 
formation of a new equilibrium, both for a national and the international system. 
Approaching the issue from a cost-benefit perspective, in my opinion, helps to explain the 
dynamics of a system's equilibrium, both domestic and international, and their interplay.
I agree with Clark’s point that what is fundamental is how political costs are
distributed between the two realms through the state which operates in both realms.
However, Clark goes further, stating that:
The state has been the broker, a key player in determining whether the 
costs of international disciplines should be borne domestically, or whether 
domestic disturbance will be allowed to overthrow international 
regulation.185
John Ikenberry suggests:
Metaphorically, one might think of the state as a bi-directional valve, 
responding to whichever pressure is greater, sometimes releasing pressure 
from the domestic into the international, at other times releasing it from the 
international into the domestic.186
184 Ian Clark, “Beyond the Great Divide: Globalization and the Theory of International 
Relations”, Review o f  International Studies Vol. 24, No. 4, 1998, pp. 479-498, p. 496, fig. 
3.
185 Clark, 1999, p. 65.
186 Ikenberry, 1986, p.76.
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In my opinion, Clark’s ideas set out above are very valuable. Generalisations about 
states’ brokerage role and the insertion of the category of political cost are already an 
innovative approach for explaining the national-international interplay. However, while 
analysing and setting the task, Clark does not provide answers to questions such as why 
and when costs are transferred inwards or outwards. Also, I do not fully share his 
proposition that the state has been the key player in determining whether the costs of 
international disciplines should be borne domestically or internationally.
In my opinion, states are often implementers of that kind of a transfer, not the 
decision makers. In other words, states often do not have much choice and are forced by 
the domestic-international process to adopt a particular option. Also, I presume that 
Ikenberry’s statement that one can think of the state as a bi-directional valve, responding to 
whichever pressure is greater, does not always reflect reality and is too mechanical. The 
state can resist domestic pressures not because there is more counter pressure from the 
international system, but because of a lack of alternative options to the policy a state 
conducts in the particular issue area. Or a state can change its policy not because of the 
pressures on it, but based on calculations and prognosis for the future. In sum, the state 
does not always surrender to the greatest pressure. Therefore, a state may opt to resist a 
particular pressure, counting, for instance, on some future reward. Here I am sympathetic 
to Hobson's statement that “states are not mirrors of external processes, nor are they merely 
filter mechanisms” but instead “states actively process and channel international influences 
to bolster their domestic position.”187
Although Clark criticises the sharp distinctions made between the national and 
international and criticises other authors’ attempts to see them as contradictory, he is not 
immune to the same criticism. His statement that competing pressures emanate from the 
two fields -  national and international - is evidence of that kind of approach. I would 
suggest that while there are pressures, they are not always competing or conflicting. In 
fact, they can be complementary. In other words, there are not only demands but also
187 John Atkinson Hobson, The Wealth o f  States: A Comparative Study o f  International 
Economic and Political Change, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 247.
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supports, as I develop in the following chapters. This is what is missing in the concepts 
analysed above and this is what prevents them from being more comprehensive. This is not 
a matter simply of cosmetic significance but can have methodologically innovative 
implications.
As Clark states, to grasp the behaviour of states, one needs to see them as 
repositories of a given international order. To make sense of the international structure, one 
must look at the identities of the states that help to compose it.
Here Putnam’s two-level game is suggested as a remedy to the above-mentioned 
shortcomings by comprehensively combining all three levels’ concepts. It essentially 
differs from previous approaches in the way that domestic factors take part in the 
international bargaining; in this concept, the statesman is the strategic actor, and most 
importantly, the statesman simultaneously plays “double-edged” diplomacy.189 Indeed, the 
innovative feature of the two-level games approach overall is that it accepts that domestic 
politics affects international bargaining and that international moves can pursue domestic 
aims. It is also a dynamic model since it offers a framework that attempts to address not 
only the impact of one on the other, but also the interplay between domestic and 
international factors.
Another similar concept is suggested by Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry.
According to these authors:
All states seeking to survive possess the international goals of power and 
wealth, from which the need for internal mobilisation and extraction 
follow, and the domestic goals of control over resources and the 
preservation of legitimacy, which suggest the international strategies of 
external extraction and validation. This inventory of state goals and 
strategies provides systematic reasons why states, seeking to advance their 
own interests, will move across the domestic-international divide.190
188 Clark, 1998, p. 482.
189 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games”, 
International Organisation 1988, 42, No. 3, pp. 427-460.
190 Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action”, 
International Studies Quarterly 33, 1989, pp. 457-474, p. 465.
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To develop the concept, they suggest a framework for integrating the two faces of 
state action: domestic and international. What is innovative here is that the authors take 
into account the domestic structural position of a state in making its strategies and choices. 
While the international structural position of the state in terms of strong state-weak state 
distinction was developed by Katzenstein, Krasner, and others, the structural position of 
the state in relation to its society was developed by Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry. 
Because of the differences existing in the capacities of states for influencing and shaping 
the society, a distinction between “soft” and “hard” states is made for reasons of analytic 
convenience. By taking into account both domestic and international constraints on the 
state, derived from its external and internal position, and by articulating both the domestic 
and international choices available to the state, the authors make assumptions about the 
strategies of extraction, mobilisation, and validation that states will pursue in each case.
Notwithstanding the fact that both this concept and Putnam’s concept move 
beyond existing realist theories, they largely remain theories of a state’s or rather of a 
statesman’s behaviour under given circumstances. Mastanduno and others mention that: 
“The model presented here is potentially useful in anticipating the broad shifts in foreign 
policy that accompany changes in the structural position of a state.”191 The models 
discussed, however, do not say much about the dynamics of the changes in a state’s 
structural position itself. They rather describe only in general terms the possible tactical 
reactions of a statesman or a government to this or that situation.
Based on the above discussion, I would suggest a different approach, which intends 
to overcome the shortcomings mentioned above. Certainly, there is a need for a model, 
which would allow us to follow the developments while there are in the process, to trace 
the direction and dynamics of the change within each policy issue area and at each level in 
early stages, and to predict and explain the subsequent foreign and domestic policy 
changes.
191 Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989, p. 472.
90
Theories of Horizontal Interaction
By the mid-1970s a substantial body of literature existed which elaborated on the 
importance of growth, equity, democracy, stability, and autonomy for developing societies 
and analyzed the ways in which those societies might best make progress toward those 
goals. In Understanding Political Development, authors Myron Weiner and Samuel 
Huntington provide a comprehensive analysis of the views and approaches of the leaders 
of the developing countries and scholars concerned with development.192
Different authors stress different goals such as national integration, governmental 
effectiveness and penetration of society, and military power. Implicit in the widespread 
acceptance of these goals is also the acceptance of an image of the “good society”: 
wealthy, just, democratic, orderly, and in full control of its own affairs; a society, in short, 
very much like those found in Western Europe and North America. A backward society 
was poor, inequitable, repressive, violent, and dependent. Development was the process of 
moving from the latter to the former. In my opinion, one could easily call the good society 
an integrated society. Individual scholars, of course, have valued these individual goals 
differently and devoted their research to analysing and promoting different goals. 
However, almost all scholars have touched upon the existing relations among these goals 
and the extent to which progress towards one goal helped or hindered progress towards 
another. And they reached different conclusions.
Weiner and Huntington generally separate three broad approaches which 
dominated the thinking about these relations. The first approach assumes the inherent 
compatibility among the goals. The second approach emphasises the intractable conflicts 
among the goals. The third approach stresses the need for policies to reconcile those 
contradictions. The compatibility viewpoint was based on the Western experience, where 
the progress of these societies toward wealth, equity, stability, democracy, and autonomy 
had been generally harmonious and complementary. However, the assumption that all 
good things come together is not universal. The compatibility viewpoint clearly does not 
describe developments during recent decades in the Third World. There are also countries 
that have failed to make progress towards any of the goals of development. “A much
192 See Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, Understanding Political Development, 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1987, p. 6.
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smaller number of countries, less than a handful, recorded significant progress toward 
achievement with respect to all five goals.”193
The limits of the compatibility assumption, which provided clear evidence that 
good things often did not and could not come together, gave birth to a new body of 
literature emphasizing that conflict among goals is the normal state of affairs. Economic 
growth, for example, was seen as often bringing inequity and undermining stability.
Another such link that has been observed between political stability and the absence of
autonomy resulted from the fact that “foreign investment and manifestations of
dependency blossom under conditions of political stability.”194
The assumption of compatibility was undermined by the perceived incidence of 
conflicts. Subsequently, emphasis was put on the urgent need for reconciliation of policies 
directed to achieve different development goals. The third, so-called reconciliation, 
approach emerged.
The issue became this: through what policies can developing societies 
expect to make progress toward two or more developmental goals? In 
varying ways, attention seemed to focus on policies concerning sequences 
in the choice of development goals, institutional structures for reconciling 
development goals, and governmental strategies to promote the
simultaneous achievement of development goals.195
A variety of different experiences, however, presented serious counterfactual 
evidence and challenged all existing explanations. While looking for explanations, some 
scholars turned to the culture of development. Huntington fairly raises the following 
question:
How can these and other differences in progress, achievement, and 
reconciliation be explained? Why were Korea and Taiwan but so few other 
countries able to make simultaneous progress toward growth, equity, and 
stability? Why was Japan able to achieve not only these goals but 
democracy and autonomy also? Why did Brazil do well first at growth and
193 Weiner and Huntington, 1987, pp. 5-7
194 Weiner and Huntington, 1987, p. 15.
195 Weiner and Huntington, 1987, p. 18.
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then at democratisation but not so well in terms of equity, stability, and 
economy?196
Huntington tends to explain the existence of these differences by culture. However, 
he admits that there are obvious differences among countries within the same cultural 
grouping. To explain these divergences Huntington concludes that one may have to go 
back to details unique to particular countries. These include natural resources, geographical 
location, character of the population, and, of course, historical experience. At the same 
time, he stresses that scholars of comparative politics would gain nothing by going back to
107  ♦ •the extreme parochialism of the traditional era specialists. I share this view simply
because the explanatory power of any theory is based on generalization.
While by no means underestimating the role of culture, I think that it alone does not
explain the existence of differences. Culture is about the domestic environment for the
development process, no matter to what extent it may also impact foreign policy. Along
with culture, the overall domestic context, the international and global environments, and
the interaction among them are other contexts to look at for explanations.
Not just the linkage across the levels but also the importance of links between the
values or goal sets of domestic and foreign policy is emphasised and further elaborated by
Wolfram Hanrieder, who suggests that:
there are two concepts that permit the correlation of important external and 
internal dimensions of foreign policy aims, and that allow the analyst to 
view foreign policy as a continuous process bridging the analytical barriers 
between the international and the domestic political system. The first is the 
concept of compatibility, which is intended to assess the degrees of 
feasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the structures and 
opportunities of the international system; the second is the concept of 
consensus, which assesses the measure of agreement on the ends and means
1 Qftof foreign policy on the domestic political scene.
196 Weiner and Huntington, 1987, p. 22.
197 Weiner and Huntington, 1987, p. 27.
198 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus: A proposal for the Conceptual 
Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy”, The American Political 
Science Review Vol. 61, No. 4, 1967, pp. 971-982, p. 979.
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Although the model suggested by Hanrieder is not, in my view, comprehensive, it 
is progressive in the sense that, by suggesting the concepts of compatibility and consensus, 
the author recognises the links among the foreign policy goals of the state and the fact that 
these goals are linked on one side with the domestic, and on the other side with the 
international level.
Time, sequencing and context
The problem of interaction among development goals that are discussed by
Huntington and others is pertinent to the post-communist context as well. For the states of
post-communist transition, the above-mentioned policy goals have concrete meanings.
Charles Gati notes that:
Irrespective of the difficulties societies have faced throughout the transition 
world, it would be misleading to deny that the three basic goals of 
transition -  independence, political pluralism, and free market economics — 
have been pursued vigorously and successfully in some countries. The first 
goal was sovereign existence, which is to say independence from Russia, 
liberation from decades of foreign domination... The second goal of 
transition was political pluralism in an environment of open societies that 
observe human rights and follow democratic processes and 
procedures...The third goal of transition was to transform the planned, 
highly centralized, so-called command economies of the communist era by 
decentralization and privatisation into modem, Westem-style market
199economies.
As discussed in chapter one, many authors, comparing different waves of 
democratisation, noted one of the most salient differences of the post-communist transition 
-  the simultaneous undertaking of democratisation, marketisation, and state-building. The 
implications of interaction between the economic and political reform policies has been 
one of the most debated issues of post-communist transition. The debate ranges from
199 Charles Gati, “If Not Democracy, What? Leaders, Laggards, and Losers in the 
Postcommunist World” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), Post-Communism: Four 
Perspectives, Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1996, p. 168-198.
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going back to theoretical foundations of how compatible capitalism and democracy are and 
what should come first, to a more practical and policy-oriented approach about better 
timing, sequencing and context of reforms in each of the spheres. The opinions vary and 
sometimes even contradict one another.
Authors like Claus Offe, Adam Przeworski, Stefan Haggard, and Susan 
Nello, for example, suggest that there is conflict between democratisation and 
marketisation processes As Susan Nello stated, “economic transition inevitably gives 
rise to economic and social costs. This is true of the three main elements of economic 
transition: macroeconomic stabilisation, structural adjustment and privatisation, and 
systemic change.”200 Nello also indicates four elements of the influence of economic 
transformation on democratic consolidation. They are the impact of changes in 
overall macroeconomic variables such us growth, unemployment, and inflation; 
increases in income disparities and individual uncertainty; corruption, in particular 
perceived injustices in the privatisation process and scandals arising from incomplete 
transformation of the financial sector; and mistakes in policies.201
According to Przeworski, the issues of economic and political transition cannot be
separated from one other because “increasingly, mounting tensions in the economy are
posing a direct threat to the process of political transition.” Therefore, economic and
political transition can be really understood when analysed together:
Can structural economic transformation be sustained under democratic 
conditions, or must either reforms or democracy be sacrificed? This is a 
threefold question: (1) What are the economic costs of such
transformation? (2) Under what political conditions are such costs likely to
200 Susan Senior Nello, “The Impact of External Economic Factors: The Role of the IMF” 
in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern 
EuropeVolume2: International and Transnational Factors, Oxford University Press, 2001, 
pp.76-111, p. 89.
201 Susan Senior Nello, “The Impact of External Economic Factors: The Role of the IMF” 
in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern 
EuropeVolume2: International and Transnational Factors, Oxford University Press, 2001, 
pp.76-111, p. 89-91.
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be tolerated? (3) What is the effect of transformation on democratic 
institutions? 202
Przeworski separates four outcomes that may occur when economic transition and
democratisation go in parallel:
(1) Reforms may advance under democratic conditions, (2) reforms may be 
forced through by a dictatorship, (3) democracy may survive by 
abandoning reforms, and (4) both reforms and democracy may be 
undermined...
In turn, under democratic conditions, where the discontent can find political 
expression at the polls, even the most promising reform strategies may be 
abandoned. Either politicians are concerned about electoral support and 
reverse policies that will cause them to lose election, or they lose to 
competitors more attuned to the political consequences of structural 
transformation. And in some cases, egalitarian ideologies with strong 
populist and nationalistic overtones can be mobilized against both 
democracy and reforms. ”203
In sum, the simultaneity of market and democratic reforms creates a dilemma that 
can endanger either the future of economic reform or the democratic nature of the new 
regime:
Once democracy is weakened, pursuit of reforms may become politically 
destabilizing. At some point, the alternative may become either to abandon 
reforms or to discard the representative institutions altogether. 
Authoritarian temptations are inevitable. ...And, on the other side, as 
suffering persists, confidence erodes, and the government seems less and 
less competent, temptations are bom to defend one’s interests at any cost, 
even at the cost of democracy.204
At a very early stage of post-communist transition, Adam Przeworski warned that 
economic transition is socially costly and politically risky. On the one hand,
202 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 139.
203 Przeworski, 1991, p. 138.
204 Przeworski, 1991, p. 187.
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The durability of the new democracies will depend, not only on their 
institutional structure and the ideology of the major political forces, but to a 
large extent on their economic performance. And since many among them 
emerged in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis, economic 
factors work against their survival. 05
On the other hand,
Whatever their long-term consequences, in the short run reforms are likely 
to cause inflation, unemployment, and resource misallocation as well as to 
generate volatile changes in relative incomes. These are not politically 
popular consequences anywhere. And under such conditions, democracy in 
the political realm works against economic reforms.206
Przeworski rightly adds, “Both political reactions to reform and their eventual 
success or failure depend not only on their economic effects but also on political
0CY7conditions”. These statements are not contradictory. What is not underscored is that 
political conditions are also mainly the result of economic performance, as economic 
policies depend on political conditions, political forces in power.
Offe suggests the seven more likely scenarios of interaction of democratization and 
market reforms:
...democratic politics may block or distort the road to privatisation and 
hence marketisation;...privatisation may succeed, but lead to the 
obstruction of democratic politics through powerful interferences 
originating from domestic or international owners;...marketistion may 
succeed, but fail to generate the reality of (or even the widely perceived 
prospect of ) an equitable distribution of its benefits; accumulated 
disappointments and frustrations with these failures may give rise to 
demands for a type of “democracy” that is based on an institutional 
structure other than civil liberties and representative government, such us 
populist presidential dictatorship; conversely, frustrations with economic 
performance and distribution may also lead to demands for marketistion 
without private property, for example, a return to state ownership of 
productive assets.208
205 Przeworski, 1991, p.189.
206 Przeworski, 1991, p.161.
207 Przeworski, 1991, p. 162.
Clause Offe, Varieties o f  Transition, The East European and East German Experience, 
Polity Press, 1996, p. 45.
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Whether or not the scenarios offered by Offe are the most probable ones, what is 
important is that he stresses the critical role of linkages, and causalities between 
democratic and economic reforms in the transition process. I fully agree that there can be a 
conflict between the two. The framework that I suggest aims not just to detect the 
consequences of economic reform on democratisation or visa versa but also to identify and 
explain the logic of their interaction, to illustrate why and how it happens and what the 
implications can be of such interactions for the dynamics (progress or regress) of the entire 
transition process.
It is noticeable that the opinions of different practitioners and theorists of post­
communist transition diverge. Leszek Balcerowicz, for instance, while admitting that the 
most important and distinctive characteristic of the post-communist cases is the imperative 
to proceed with both political and economic reform, suggests that it is misleading to speak 
of “simultaneous transitions,” explaining it with complex problems of timing and 
sequencing that beset post-communist twofold transitions.209 Based on the Estonian 
experience, Mart Laar stresses the primacy of politics. Laar finds, that “politics has to be 
dealt with first, because to initiate and sustain radical reforms, there must first be a
9 1 filegitimately formed consensus for change.”
As a result of the policies of radical reform of the first democratically elected
Estonian government, standards of living bottomed out in 1992-1993. Although they began
to rise in 1994 and 1995, this did not save the reform government from being voted out of
office in 1995. Laar, an advocate of radical reforms, did not see this as being a tragedy, as
long as the new government and its successors did not reverse the reforms. However, he
was counting only on international support.
For now, the most critical concern for the countries in the region is 
preserving positive international conditions for their own normal 
development. This is the only effective guarantee against negative 
development in the region. If favourable trends continue, with democrats in
209 Leszek Balcerowicz, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Democracy After 
Communism, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002,p. 64.
210 Mart Laar, “Estonia’s Success Story”, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), 
Democracy After Communism, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 79.
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Central and Eastern Europe pressing through thick and thin for economic 
reforms and the consolidation of democracy, and with Western 
democracies opening doors for them, the region’s pro-reform parties may 
be set to stage a comeback of their own.211
Along the same lines, Gerald Roland suggests that “the case for big bang or
gradualism or a particular reform sequencing may also depend on whether the probability
of re-election of the incumbent government is exogenous or endogenous.”212 Analysing an
early stage of transition in Eastern Europe, Clause Offe also argues that:
The only circumstance under which the market economy and democracy 
can be simultaneously implanted and prosper is that one in which both are 
forced upon a society from outside and guaranteed by international 
relations of dependency and supervision for a long period of time. This, at 
least, is arguably the lesson offered by the war ruined post-war democracies 
of Japan, and with qualification, of the Federal Republic of Germany... For 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there is no obvious “patron 
power” that would be a natural candidate for the task of supervising and
1 'Xenforcing the peaceful nature of the transition process.
Conducting drastic reforms in different spheres in parallel is a daunting task and 
several strategies have been suggested to cope with it with maximum gains and minimum 
social costs. Przeworski offers some arguments for rapid versus gradual transformation. 
According to Przeworski, voters’ confidence about the future is the main variable for their 
preference in reform strategies. If voters are highly confident about the future after 
reforms, they choose the radical strategy, although it entails higher social costs than the 
gradual one. If they are not confident about the success of the reforms, they prefer gradual
2ULaar, 2002, p.83.
212 Gerard Roland, Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms, Cambridge, 
London, MIT Press, 2000, p.48.
213 Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple 
Transition in East Central Europe”, Social Research Vol. 58, No. 4,1991, pp. 865- 892.
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or slow reform strategies. And, if voters have no confidence at all, they opt for the status
Confidence does play a crucial role in shaping popular reactions. 
Confidence is a stock: It can be depleted, it can be accumulated. If 
confidence is eroded, radical programs cannot be undertaken again under
c
democratic conditions. Government must first rebuild the confidence.
This is where the stabilization funds and programs are important, continues 
Przeworski. “The role of foreign aid thus seems crucial. The open question is whether the
71 Aamounts are sufficient.”
The equivalent of what Przeworski calls confidence that I use in my thesis is the 
category of legitimacy, the political resource, which I believe is a more comprehensive and 
substantive category than confidence for explaining the policy processes. After all, 
confidence is translated into legitimacy within the political process, into the legitimacy of 
the government, the reform policies and the regime.
Referring to the existing literature, Przeworski suggests that a long period of 
moderate gradual reforms, while causing fewer social tensions, entails the danger that both 
reformers and the population will become tired of reforms. Meanwhile the anti-reform
*717opposition groups may mobilize and derail the reform process. The most likely path, 
concludes Przeworski, “is one of radical programs that are eventually slowed or partly 
reversed, initiated again in a more gradual form with less popular confidence, and again 
slowed or reversed, until a new government comes in and promises a clean break, and the 
cycle starts again.”218
Analysing time, phasing, and pace of economic reforms, Balcerowicz also argues 
for the advantages of radical reforms over gradual reform. He speaks about rare reform
214 Przeworski, 1991, p. 164.
215 Przeworski, 1991, pp. 168-169.
2,6 Przeworski, 1991, p. 150.
217 Przeworski, 1991, p. 165.
218Przeworski, 1991, p. 179.
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opportunities of “extraordinary politics,” which is the phase right after the political change.
9 1 Q •Here Joseph Stiglitz takes the opposite view. He thinks that with the quick privatization
advocated by the IMF, “there is a danger that once a vested interest has been created, it has
an incentive, and the money, to maintain its monopoly position, squelching regulation and
competition, and distorting the political process along the way.”
In Globalization and Its Discontents Stiglitz argues that timing, sequencing and
the social and political context of reform are the factors that matter most when conducting
reforms, and it is the ignorance of such factors by international financial institutions that
led to reform failures and economic crisis in some transition and developing countries. He
argues against rapid liberalization, which is socially costly and destructive:
Perhaps of all the IMF’s blunders, it is the mistakes in sequencing and 
pacing, and the failure to be sensitive to the broader social context, that 
have received the most attention -  forcing liberalization before safety nets 
were put in place, before there was an adequate regulatory framework, 
before the countries could withstand the adverse consequences of the 
sudden changes in the market sentiment that are part and parcel of modem 
capitalism; forcing policies that led to job destruction before the essentials 
for job creation were in place; forcing privatization before there were 
adequate competition and regulatory frameworks. Many of the sequencing 
mistakes reflected fundamental misunderstandings of both economic and
991political processes.
In sum, Stiglitz argues that:
Timing (and sequencing) is everything. These are not just issues of 
pragmatics, of “implementation”: these are issues of principle. Proper 
sequencing and pacing might have enabled one to gradually achieve the 
efficiency gains without these costs. In some cases, reforms in one area, 
without accompanying reforms in others, may actually make matters
219 Leszek Balcerowicz, “Understanding Postcommunist Transitions” in Larry Diamond 
and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Democracy After Communism, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002, p. 64.
220 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
New York, 2002, p.54.
221 Stiglitz, 2002, p. 73.
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worse...Economic theory and history show how disastrous it can be to 
ignore sequencing.” 222
The role of sequencing is to build political support for further reforms, as Roland 
indicates:
Three things are important to get a “correct” sequencing of reforms: (1) The 
unbundling of a reform package in given sequences should not lead to 
losing the property of informativeness discussed earlier. (2)The sequencing 
should be done so as to make the reform process ex ante acceptable. (3) 
Sequencing should aim at building constituencies and momentum for 
further reform and satisfy ex post political constrains.
This debate indicates the importance of pace, timing and sequencing of reform 
goals and their implementation. It is clear that one needs to understand the logic of 
economic and political processes and the interaction between them during the transition. In 
fact, that is the main purpose of my thesis. The only prior observation I want to make is 
that the strategies chosen by different countries were not just the subjective choices of their 
governments but also a reflection of the objective structural and political circumstances 
existing in and around these countries. Thomas Carothers is correct in noting that 
regardless of the validity of the sequencing argument, its value is in the fact that it 
highlights the need to pay more attention to the effect that a country’s underlying 
economic, social, and political conditions, structures, and historical legacies will have on 
the chances that a democratic transition can succeed there. In that sense, Balcerowicz’s 
observations are particularly helpful and, in a way, direct the way I have developed my 
study. “The economic and political transition can be said to depend on: 1) initial economic 
and socio-political conditions; 2) external developments; 3) government policies.” The first
222 Stiglitz, pp.74-76.
223 Roland, 2000, p.42.
224Thomas Carothers, “ The Sequencing Fallacy”, Journal o f  Democracy Vol. 18, No. 1, 
2007, pp. 12-27, p. 23.
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two, Balcerowicz suggests, determine the initial policies, and shape the first phase of the
economic transition, its outcome.
This transition is also shaped by political developments, which are partly 
determined by the initial socio-political conditions. Finally, economic 
developments determined in part by earlier policies may in turn influence 
future political developments, and so on. We are dealing with complex 
interactions, which should be analysed in a dynamic framework.225
That is exactly the purpose of my thesis, since I am trying to explore the dynamics 
of interaction among policy areas, and between them and domestic and international 
factors during the transition process.
A similar interaction’is very much true also for other dimensions—political and 
security. The relationship between security policy and economic policy seems to be more 
observable and mutually reinforcing. As far as the interrelation between security and 
democratisation is concerned, it is the area that has been least discussed. If there has been a 
conviction that economic and political development may reinforce each other and should 
go hand in hand in the post-communist transition, the link between security and democracy 
has been viewed as more complex and less direct. The existing common wisdom is that the 
interrelation between democracy and security is that of mutual conditioning rather than a 
direct causal link. Reimund Seldelmann, for example, separates some key aspects in the 
interaction between the two policy areas and characterises the relations between security 
and democracy as mutual conditionality: security is a precondition for any democratic 
development, and democratisation creates specific conditions for a state’s security and 
foreign policy.226 According to Seldelman, the interrelation between democracy and 
security has foreign and domestic dimensions. The foreign dimension of the link between 
the two derives from the premise that the state, by definition, must respond to security 
threats. While the use of force to provide national security is a natural reaction under some 
circumstances, it leads to the emergence of additional dilemmas. The huge human and 
economic costs of such security policies may create further insecurity and politically
225 Balcerowicz, 2002, p. 68.
226 Reimund Seldelmann, “International Security and Democracy Building” in in Zielonka, 
Jan and Alex Pravda (eds.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Volume 2: 
International and Transnational Factors, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 112-138.
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unacceptable risks, and thus threaten the stability of the political system and the credibility 
and legitimacy of a government or regime. The domestic dimension of the link between 
security and democracy is related to the fact that security policymaking, often even in 
established democracies, remains within the realm of the executive and essentially out of 
public control or even public participation. This exclusive policymaking, which has 
continued to play a role especially in transition states, thus creates a challenge to 
democratisation processes.
Another key aspect that Seldelmann underscores is that specific problems such as 
escalating threat perceptions, and military intervention in domestic affairs constitute a 
permanent problem for the democratic agenda often leading to the necessity to compromise 
between the democratic ideal and the necessities of state security and thus, adding a further
997double conditionality to the relationship between security and the democratic process. 
One can add problems emerging during state and nation building processes in post­
communist space to this list of specific security issues, seriously hampering the normal 
development and consolidation of democratic institutions.
Thus, Seldelmann acknowledges the existence of a trade-off and interplay between 
the two policy dimensions and stresses the importance of political resources in managing 
the democracy-security interrelation. Again, this supports my view that the relationship 
between these two policy spheres is a political process.
As already stated, the focus of my thesis is on how the interaction among different 
issue-areas and across different levels affects transition. I agree that the pace, timing and 
sequencing of economic and political reforms are important for the success of the overall 
transition, in the sense that they make the politics of reforms more effective, which means 
making the reform process socially less costly and requiring the investment of less 
government resources. In other words, they are important for saving the political resource 
of the government, its effectiveness and legitimacy. My thesis will focus on the post­
instalment period of transition. One should note that if the government had more freedom 
in designing its reform programs at the outset, it has less freedom in the later stages, when 
it has to act in an environment that bears the consequences of previous policy steps. And at
227 Seldelmann, 2001, pp. 115-116.
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this stage, what we can talk about is how the government changes/modifies the pace, 
timing and sequencing of reforms based on the results of previously implemented reform 
steps and subsequent changes in domestic and international support and demand.
What I intend to discuss is not the technicalities and the tactical side of timing and 
sequencing, but rather the political side of the issue.228 In particular, I intend to discuss the 
political interaction among economic, political and security policy areas and different 
policy levels during the transition and the impact it has on the overall transition outcomes.
Introducing the Framework
Each of the schools in democratic transition theory, discussed in Chapter 1, explain 
the post-communist transition to some extent. While relying on those theories, my 
approach, however, differs in three key aspects. First, none of those theories treats the 
transition as a dynamic process of interaction across domestic, state, and international 
levels on the one hand, and a trade-off between values and policy goals, priorities within 
the transition states, on the other. This is what I do, and this takes my argument beyond 
the framework of the existing democratisation theories and makes the task of analysis an 
interdisciplinary one. Second, I adopt a more holistic and integrative approach. In my 
suggested framework, I do not oppose structural (i.e. modernization theory) theories to the 
genetic approach. In other words, I assume that the role of agents is important in 
democratic transition; however, their choices are structurally constrained by economic 
development and the economic situation, which is important but not sufficient for the 
existence and consolidation of a democratic regime. Third, I suggest that not only the 
economic situation but also political and security conditions matter if democratisation and 
marketisation are to make progress.
Tackling the issue of transition as a dynamic process of political interaction within 
the state and across all three levels -  domestic, state and international -  means touching
228 There can be timing and sequencing issues within one dimension. For example, there is 
an extensive literature on timing and sequencing of different economic reform steps, such 
us privatization and competition policy, emergence of a small private sector and price 
liberalization, reforms in the state sector and the small private sector, reforms in light and 
heavy industry, etc. Of course, timing and sequencing of those issues also do not have 
solely economic consequences.
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upon one of the core, and yet controversial, topics of international relations (IR) theory -- 
domestic-foreign policy linkages which I discussed in Chapter Two and in the first part of 
this chapter.
In sum, the theories and approaches mentioned above have their legitimate place in 
explaining transition dynamics. However, they do not account for the process of political 
interaction and interplay during the transition -  both internal and external, within which 
each government is moving towards its transition goals — domestic transformation and 
international integration. My approach aims to fill that gap by suggesting a more dynamic 
framework for analysing transition as a multifaceted and multilevel interaction and 
interplay. Thus, I suggest that transition can be better understood if viewed as a political 
process of complex interaction and interplay of different issue policies within the transition 
state and among three different levels -  domestic, state and international.
Before introducing my hypotheses, it is important to introduce the categories that I 
will use for elaborating my model. I have discussed the policy goals and the links existing 
among them within political systems. Transition towards these goals and interrelations 
among policies pursing these goals are essential to my study. As mentioned above, 
different authors have focused on different goals of transition, and the interrelation and 
interaction among them. Based on the above discussion, I identify three goals, or three 
dimensions, that are, in general, essential for any level. In order to analyse the problem, I 
thus suggest singling out three issue policies from the wide spectrum of national and 
international politics -  economic (E), security (S), and political (P). Depending on the 
country, context, and the time, different goals can be prioritised. However, for theorising I 
will include all of them in my framework since achieving them is a key to successful 
transition in any country. Such a division can be helpful for analytical purposes, especially 
when applying this framework to post-communist transition. In the post-communist 
context often, the most challenging security problems are related to state- and nation- 
building processes, in the transition literature referred to as the “stateness” problem, and 
ethnic conflicts.229 However, I do not want to narrow down the security dimension to these
229 See Chapter 1 for details on this issue.
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problems only, since there can be other types of security threats, such us external security 
threats.
I separate two kinds of linkages -  vertical and horizontal. The vertical linkages are 
the ones along the domestic-state-intemational continuum. The vertical linkages 
themselves can be one-issue linkages and multi-issue linkages. The former is the case 
when across-levels interaction occurs along one policy issue-area only, say only economic, 
or only security. The multi-issue linkage assumes that across-levels interaction occurs 
along different issues-areas at different levels. For example, there may be a linkage 
between domestic political and international economic issues. Of course, I will provide 
many examples in the following empirical chapters. Horizontal linkages are those among 
different issue-areas within the state. Any domestic issue, regardless of its links to 
international issues, is first linked to other domestic issues. In other words, there is a more 
or less essential linkage among economic, security and political issue areas within the 
state.
As mentioned earlier, another category that I use to construct my arguments is 
legitimacy, the political resource which is somewhat similar to what Przeworski called 
“confidence”, but broader and more comprehensive. I shall discuss the category of 
legitimacy in some detail, as it is very important for exploring and defining the linkage 
mechanism existing among different policies and different levels. Legitimacy is a political 
category, which does not necessarily coincide with legality.
Max Weber distinguished three ideal types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, 
and legal/rational. However, Weber does not suggest a causal theory of government.
232There is an important point at which writers such as Lipset diverge sharply from Weber. 
Lipset identifies effectiveness and legitimacy as the two pillars on which any system of 
government rests. Lipset finds that legitimacy is a pillar composed of selected citizens’ 
opinion or values, derived from consumer satisfaction with state activity rather than a
230 This theme is well elaborated by Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
231 Elsenstadt, Samuel N. (ed.), On Charisma and Institution building: selected papers [by 
Max Weber], Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1968.
232 Lipset, Political Man. London, Heinemann, 1960.
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citizens’ accord with the authority of public institutions. Lipset’s effectiveness, on the 
other hand, is a concept, which, amongst many other meanings, could be interpreted in 
terms of substantive policy. Talking of effectiveness opens the possibility of assessing 
government in terms of its efficiency at meeting demands placed on it by the society which 
it could then be seen to serve.
One can argue that the legitimacy of a democratic regime is not limited only to the 
actions of a government. However, we should keep in mind that in post-communist 
transitions the democratic regimes are new and, in the presence of only fragile 
representative institutions, often the legitimacy of a democratic regime is closely 
associated with and, in some cases even is indistinguishable from, its government’s values 
and deeds. From this point of view, Juan Linz makes a valuable distinction between two 
dimensions characterizing a political system -  its efficacy and its effectiveness. In the 
course of time, Linz asserts, both can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or weaken the belief 
in legitimacy. He suggests, of course, that the relationships between variables are far from 
being fully transitive and linear, since the perception of the efficacy and effectiveness of a 
regime tends to be biased by the initial commitment to its legitimacy.234
However, Linz ties the level of legitimacy to the level of public support. In turn, the
support of the public is based on the actions of the regime or government, or, more
concretely, the results of those actions. “Legitimacy is granted or withdrawn by each
member of the society day in and day out,” continues Linz.
It does not exist outside the actions and attitudes of individuals. Regimes, 
therefore, enjoy more or less legitimacy just by existing. Gains and losses 
of support for governments, leaders, parties, and policies in a democracy 
are likely to fluctuate rapidly, while the belief in the legitimacy of the 
system persists. There is clearly an interaction between the support for the 
regime and that for the governing parties, which, in the absence of other 
indicators, leads to the use of electoral returns and public opinion responses 
as indirect evidence of the legitimacy of the system. Consequently, the loss
233 Lipset, 1960, pp. 74-75.
234 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f  Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and 
Reequilibration, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, p. 18.
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of support for all political actors in a democratic regime is likely to lead to 
an erosion of legitimacy.235
I share this kind of result-oriented or result-based approach to the degree of 
legitimacy. I think that it is more typical for democratic politics, particularly during the 
transition process.
Now that I have introduced the main categories of my model, I can introduce my 
hypotheses. I have constructed three hypotheses with the aim of capturing the nuances of 
horizontal linkages, vertical linkages and their interplay in the overall transition process.
Thus, first, I  argue that there is a strong interconnectedness and trade-off among 
economic, political and security policies during the transition, which inevitably generates 
social costs and limits the volume o f the government’s political resource necessary for  
transition reforms. Under these circumstances, for the transition to succeed it is crucial to 
better understand and manage the complex process o f interplay and interaction not only 
between democratization and economic liberalisation, but also among all the critical 
policy dimensions o f  transition, including security.
At the same time, questions arise:
1) Would even the best strategies of timing and sequencing of reform policies alone 
make it possible to eliminate the accompanying problems of social hardship and declining 
political legitimacy which impede the transition process, without external support?
2) To what extent should difficulties of the transition be attributed to governments 
and leaders, and to what extent to domestic and international constraints and causes?
This is very important to understand, especially for making correct judgements 
about the effectiveness of a government’s policies and of domestic and international 
supports and demands.
Thus, the transition process will be viewed, first, as a political process of horizontal 
interaction of different issue policies within the political system, the state. This mostly 
concerns horizontal linkages existing among the issue policies at the national level.
Second, I  argue that there is an essential link and interplay not only among 
different policy areas — economic, political, security -  but also there is an essential link
235 Linz, 1984, pp. 17-18.
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and trade-off among different levels — domestic, state and international — within the 
overall transition process. And, in order for transition to succeed, it is important that the 
resources and respective costs o f transition have been effectively, that is reasonably 
distributed in a timely manner among those levels. This certainly concerns vertical 
interaction.
Third, I  argue that the interaction o f  horizontal and vertical dimensions is 
reflected in the domestic and foreign policy relationship, thus creating an essential and 
direct link and interplay between domestic and foreign policy dynamics during the 
transition.
I shall now elaborate each of these assumptions. Within my first hypothesis, I  
suggest that there is a strong interconnectedness and trade-off among a government’s 
economic, political and security policies during the transition. All these dimensions are 
interrelated and mutually correlating. As we have seen, the relationship between 
democratisation and economic reforms has been extensively studied. However, I suggest 
that there is also a similarly essential link and interplay with other important pillars of 
transition politics, such as security.
The consequences of policy changes in any of these areas resonate in other areas, 
often in a negative manner. These policies seem to be linked at two levels. The 
assumption that there is a relationship and interchange among a government’s key policy 
areas during the transition is based on the facts that first, there is a limited amount of social 
costs that the domestic society is ready to bear for the sake of reforms. In other words, the 
amount of social support or social resource that the domestic society is ready to offer for 
reforms is limited. Second, all the reform policies are funded from the government’s single 
political/legitimacy resource and the government has to prioritise among those policies. In 
addition, the degree of the legitimacy of the government is linked to the level of social 
costs of the reform policies. The less socially costly the reforms are, the higher the 
government’s legitimacy is likely to be, and vice versa.
It is very unlikely that any government would be able to conduct such complex, 
systemic and simultaneous transformation as the transition with a limited political 
resource, unless there is a sufficient level of external demand and support. The analyses by
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authors like Przeworski, Laar and Offe discussed above strongly support my argument 
about the critical nature of external support.
It is logical to assume that any government would usually prefer to invest its 
political stock in areas that are politically less costly and more rewarding. However, during 
the transition process governments often have to deviate from this principle of politics to 
follow other imperatives dictated by the logic of reform and international conditionality 
(although when conforming to international conditionality, governments hope to generate 
external support, whether in the form of economic assistance or political backing).
Obviously, at the initial stage of unpopular shock reforms, it is impossible for any 
government to avoid a decline in legitimacy. The question is how much decline, and 
whether the decline would allow the government to survive or the reform policies to 
continue, even if at the cost of a change in government. Thus, a government can be 
expected to conduct more transition reforms with less cost to its legitimacy.
At the same time, the size of that single legitimacy resource at each stage will 
depend on the effectiveness of the government’s transition policies in the same economic, 
political and security areas, and their combination, interaction and interplay. Therefore, the 
success of transition will depend on the government’s political resource and its effective 
allocation and use of that resource for implementing transition reforms in economic, 
political and security areas. At the same time, depending on the effectiveness of those 
policies at each previous stage, the government will be left with a particular level of 
political resource, which will serve as the initial political resource for each next stage of 
transition reforms. In other words, the volume of that limited political stock, while not an 
end in itself, becomes an initial resource for each next stage of transition. The pace, timing 
and sequencing of each new cycle of reforms in the economic, political, and security 
spheres will to a large extent depend upon the amount of legitimacy that the reformist 
government acquires after the preceding cycle of reforms.
The peculiarity of transition is that voters may have dual expectations from the 
government — to conduct reforms, but also, and probably even more, to improve the living 
conditions. These goals, at least in the short term, can be contradictory, unless there is a 
sufficient level of external support. So voters may judge the effectiveness of a government
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and offer it support based on the tempo of reforms but, even more importantly, on 
economic, political and security conditions, which change as a result of those very reforms.
The interconnectedness among those policies, and the fact that there is a limited 
resource at the government’s disposal to pursue those policies, makes it even more 
important to analyse the existing situation with what is called timing, sequencing and 
pacing of different reform policies during the transition. Governments have to make 
critical choices in line with the demands and supports of domestic society and the 
international system as well as their own legitimacy needs. It is the choices that elites and 
governments have made under certain political, economic and other structural constraints 
that will determine whether the country will remain on the democratic transition path or 
not.
There is a similar gap when it comes to vertical interaction. Socialization theories 
study the process mostly in one direction— discussing the mechanisms by which 
international norms are internalized. While they offer a rich analysis of existing 
experience, they do not treat the domestic actors as an independent variable. Obviously, 
there is a need for a two-way approach. Often the causal relationship among different 
policy areas is not direct but intertwined, intermediated by international or domestic 
factors. In this respect, as my second hypothesis, I suggest that there is an essential link 
and interplay not only among different policy areas — economic, political, security -  but 
also there is an essential link and trade-off among different levels -- domestic, state and 
international — within the overall transition process. And, in order fo r  transition to 
succeed, it is important that the resources and respective costs o f  transition have been 
effectively, that is reasonably allocated in a timely manner among different levels.
There is a link between, on the one hand, the economic conditions of a domestic 
society and its government’s policies of economic reforms, marketisation, and, on the other 
hand, between those policies and the level of compliance with international economic 
regimes, their conditionality. In the early stages at least, because of the first shock reform 
steps, that link was not positive. Since they are a result of the government’s economic 
policies, domestic economic conditions have a feedback effect on those very policies. At 
the very beginning of transition, the domestic support for liberalization was in harmony
236 We will see examples of this in the case of both Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.)
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with the international demand for it. This was an ideal situation for the government to 
conduct liberalisation reform policies. However, as a result of reforms, the economic 
conditions of the domestic society erode. Domestic society may respond by withdrawing 
its support for the government’s economic reform policies. Under those circumstances a 
demand for international support rises. If there is timely and adequate international support 
in response. to the domestic demand, then the government can continue its economic 
policies. Otherwise, in a democratic environment unsatisfied domestic demand may lead to 
policy change, or to a change in the government, with the new government trying or not 
trying to continue the same reform policies. There is also a third option, when a 
government continues painful economic reforms without sufficient external support and 
against the will of the voters, thus giving up or compromising its democratization agenda. 
This demonstrates how the interplay between the domestic, state and the international 
levels occurs. It also shows how the lack of international support (vertical interaction) 
takes the game back to the national level (horizontal interaction), leaving the government 
often with no option other than to choose between market reforms or democratisation. 
These across-level linkages suggest that in order to make a judgement about a country’s 
transition progress, one should follow not only the dynamics of reform scores and 
indicators, but also that of the economic development and international assistance and 
support. The same logic is applicable to the interplay with the security dimension. In other 
words, the interaction can produce either a positive or a negative resource, which will 
mean either support for, or opposition to, the government’s transition policies; to domestic 
transformation and international integration. This leads to the third hypothesis.
In the third hypothesis, I  argue that the interaction o f  horizontal and vertical 
dimensions is reflected in the domestic and foreign policy relationship, thus, creating an 
essential and direct link and interplay between domestic and foreign policy dynamics 
during transition.
The aim of the government’s domestic policy is to allocate political resources 
horizontally-among economic, political and security issue policies. The aim of 
government’s foreign policy is to link across levels, to extract political support from and 
allocating political costs among different levels. The extraction and allocation occur 
within the existing domestic and international structural constraints and resource
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limitations, and serve to attain the transition goals which have previously been set. If the 
linkages and the resource allocation prove to be effective or at least not too costly 
domestically, then the country’s foreign policy survives and continues serving the 
transition goal; if not, it will be changed. Change does not necessarily mean a change of 
transition goals, targets and foreign policy direction; it can also mean a change in 
implementation or in the tempo of pursuing a particular transition goal or set of goals.
In that sense a variety of scenarios of interplay is possible. For example, in a given 
country where the economy and security are deteriorating but political liberties are in 
place, one should expect the government’s policy (either foreign or domestic) to change. 
Conversely, if the economy deteriorates, security threats grow, and there is no change in 
the government’s domestic or foreign policy, then one should look at the status of political 
liberties. Most probably, in that country the society will be deprived of the means of 
democratic self-expression. The interconnection is more obvious between the economy and 
security. To increase security, the government primarily needs finances, which only a well 
functioning economy can provide. Therefore, in the face of deteriorating security, if a 
government does not have the economic resources to improve its defence capabilities, it 
will be forced to change its domestic or foreign policy either to improve the financial 
situation or to eliminate the security threat. Alternatively, if the state uses existing scarce 
resources to arm itself, it will have no choice but to suppress democracy domestically. In 
that case, the state propaganda machine may be activated to try to compensate the society, 
for example, by feeding it with nationalistic ideology and increased propaganda.
The democratisation process may lead to a rise of ethnic or religious problems and 
conflicts, thus creating real security concerns. The country’s foreign policy direction may 
not be able to secure the necessary international support to prevent deepening internal 
division or even the breakup of the country. This may lead to a change in foreign policy 
direction (i.e. a change in geostrategic orientation: joining new international/regional 
security regimes, organisations; seeking new ties or reinforcing or halting existing bilateral 
ties). Alternatively, it may slow down or suspend the democratisation process.
As discussed above, in a transition country where market reforms have led to 
economic decline, the foreign policy will aim to seek international support in the form of 
economic assistance, investments, trade access, etc. If this does not succeed, under
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democratic conditions the foreign policy direction will be changed. Otherwise, the 
democratic reforms may be abandoned.
These three hypotheses are intended to support my overarching argument that 
transition can be better understood if viewed as a political process of complex interaction 
and interplay of different issue policies within the transition state and across different 
levels -  domestic, state and international. The following three chapters will test the validity 
of these assumptions on the countries of post-communist transition in general, and on two 
country cases in particular. For operationalisation purposes, I set out a schematic 
formulation of my model that aims to test these assumptions (Figure 1). This model aims 
to take into account 1) the initial socio-economic, political and security conditions and 
changes in those conditions resulting from government policies and their interaction, 2) 
based on those conditions, elite choices and government policies and their interaction, and 
3) initial domestic and external demands and supports, their interplay and change, resulting 
from government policies. As one can see, there are complex interactions between these 
components of the transition, which could be analysed in the suggested framework.
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Figure 3.1: Explaining the Dynamics o f  the Transition Process
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CHAPTER 4
States in Transition, Transition within States: Evaluating Post- 
Communist Transitions
Now, more than fifteen years after the collapse of the communist system, it is 
obvious that we witness essentially different transition outcomes for the twenty-five 
post-communist states. The Nations in Transit report, published by Freedom House, 
separates three clusters of transitional countries that emerged and persisted throughout 
most of the 1990s and beyond: most advanced, middle, and least advanced. In this 
chapter I will try to explore why the transition paths diverged so drastically for all these 
25 post-communist countries.
These countries understandably had different starting points. However, it is also 
the case that the conditions of transition have not been equal; therefore, there are 
numerous reasons for the differing outcomes. Karatnycky identifies four core reasons 
that account for disparate transition outcomes: “(1) dissimilarities in historical legacies 
and paths to post-communism; (2) the emergence of significantly different state 
systems; (3) substantial variations in the patterns of corruption and cronyism; and (4) 
considerable disparities in the development of civil society, political parties, and 
independent media.”237 The country specific legacy of the communist past is, of 
course, an important but not an exhaustive basis for explaining the current state of 
affairs in the transition world. Past experience surely has a role in causing differences 
in progress in transition states. However, there was no essential difference between 
Ukraine and Belarus in terms of their communist past. The fact that the countries within 
the three groups mentioned above are geographically bounded also does not provide a 
sufficient basis for explaining the existing differences. The position of Yugoslavia, 
Belarus, and Turkmenistan in the same category cannot be explained by geography. 
Obviously, there is a need for a more comprehensive approach to the study of transition 
phenomena.
237 Adrian Karatnycky, “Nations in Transit: Emerging Dynamics of Change”, The 
Nations in Transit, 2001, p. 17.
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Perhaps it was not geography itself, but the fact that the Central and Eastem- 
European states were the first to be afforded the opportunity to associate with NATO 
and the European Union as candidates with clear membership prospects, which 
accounts for their success. Obviously, tangible possibilities and a clear prospect of 
integration play not the least or the last role in explaining these countries’ successful 
transition. In these countries, politicians use the EU, as Moravcsik suggests, to add 
“legitimacy and credibility” to their domestic reforms.238 Motyl also supports this 
argument:
The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), with respect to prospects for membership, have given 
preference to the most advanced countries and, thereby, have effectively 
relegated the second and third clusters to a single category: the outsiders 
or, less generously, the losers...non-membership in EU and NATO 
structures is tantamount to exclusion from a political-economic space 
that is undergoing rapid -  even if somewhat indeterminate — 
institutional change.239
Vachudova finds that even merely by virtue of its existence and its usual
conduct, the EU has traction on the domestic politics of credible candidate states. She
calls it passive leverage and suggests that “it includes the (tremendous) political and
economic benefits of membership, the (dastardly) costs of exclusion, and the (not-so-
nice) way that the EU treats non-member states.”240 However, even with these,
Vachudova finds that:
The EU’s passive leverage merely reinforced liberal strategies of reform 
in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while failing to avert, end
238 Andrew Moravcsik, “Integrating International and Domestic Politics: A Theoretical 
Introduction” in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Double- 
Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1993, p. 515.
239 Alexander J. Motyl, “Ten Years After the Soviet Collapse: Persistence of the Past 
and Prospects for the Future”, Nations in Transit, 2001, pp.36-44, p. 41.
240 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration 
After Communism, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 4.
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or significantly diminish rent-seeking strategies for winning and 
exercising power in Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia.241
In addition, Vachudova suggests that there is also the EU’s active leverage - the
deliberate policies of the EU toward candidate states that include enormous entry
requirements and benefits that set the stage for effective conditionality. Three
characteristics of the process make it particularly powerful: “asymmetric
interdependence (candidates are weak), enforcement (tough but fair), and meritocracy
(most of the time). The process mediates the costs and benefits of satisfying EU
membership criteria in such a way as to make compliance attractive - and
noncompliance visible and costly.”242
Vachudova considers four alternative explanations for why different potential
members moved with different speed and enthusiasm towards EU membership:
coercion, geography, economic prosperity, the prospect for membership.243 Although
Vachudova agrees that almost all of them play a significant role in explaining the
situation, the answer to the variation in the responses of governments to the incentives
of EU membership is found in the costs that compliance imposes on the domestic
power base of ruling elites. She finds that political competition is central to
understanding variation in political and economic change in post-communist states.
The credible prospect of EU membership extended enormous support and
demand to the elites and societies of the future members in all spheres: political,
economic and security. The fact that these states are credible future members of the EU,
exposed to the full force of the EU’s active leverage, strengthens the hand of liberal
forces against illiberal ones 244
In that sense, Vachudova’s question is very much to the point:
What were the consequences of the absence of more active leverage on 
the part of the EU? Most important, elites in Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Slovakia were able to “play it both ways” for a long time -  seeking
241 Vachudova, 2005, p.4.
242 Vachudova, 2005, p.4.
243 Vachudova, 2005, p. 75
244Vachudova, 2005, p. 5.
119
membership as a matter of foreign policy, but engaging in ethnic 
intolerance and economic corruption as a matter of domestic politics.245
This question is even more to the point for the rest of the transition 
countries, which have never had even a hope of EU membership, so that they 
were not even exposed to the EU’s passive leverage.
Another important question raised by Vachudova is the following:
Did ruling elites in Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have just as much 
political will to comply with the EU’s requirements as neighbouring 
states, only they were hampered by the weakness of the economy, the 
feebleness of the state administration, or even the backwardness of the 
political culture in their countries? After all, shortcomings in their 
economic and administrative performance could be a consequence of the 
structure of the economy and the state inherited from communism, and 
not a consequence of the actions of the politicians in power after 
1989 246
In response to this question, Vachudova downplays the role of structural factors 
and ascribes the problems of non-compliance to the ruling elites and governments of 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. However, I cannot give such an unequivocal answer 
to almost the same question that I raise in my first hypothesis: To what extent should 
difficulties of the transition be attributed to governments and leaders, and to what 
extent to domestic and international constraints and causes? In CIS countries, structural 
factors along with governments’ behaviour surely play a significant role in shaping 
transition outcomes.
Alexandra Gheciu discusses the important role NATO played as an agent of 
international socialization in Central and Eastern Europe. What I find challenging is 
Gheciu’s assertion that “the logic of socialization of Central and Eastern Europeans into 
norms prescribed by NATO departed in important ways from the rationalist logic of 
socialization.”247 1 cannot agree that socialisation based on rational interest was not the 
leading force in Czech Republic and Romania. Gheciu’s starting point is that the 
membership perspective did not have a significant socialization impact because it was
245Vachudova, 2005, p. 102 .
246 Vachudova, 2005, p. 159.
247 Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 
“New Europe”, International Organization 59, 2005, pp. 973-1012., p. 977.
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obvious from the very beginning that the Czechs would receive membership, and that 
the Romanians would not. I believe that the Czechs, nevertheless had to work hard and 
the Romanians always believed that they had the prospect of membership. As 
Eurobarometer polls show, the Romanians have always believed that their future is in 
Europe. Therefore, while not excluding the possibility that the socialization in the two 
countries sometimes went beyond rational interest, I think that, overall, it was based on 
strong rational motivations.
The role and impact of International Organizations (IOs) on the Central and 
East European Countries (CEECs) is studied in a book edited by Ronald Linden. 
International Organizations have proposed key norms of international behaviour and 
acted as nannies to ensure that they were applied and, consequently, that the CEECs 
underwent international socialization. The different kinds of accepted norms were wide 
ranging, encompassing aspects such as democracy, liberalization and human rights. The 
contributors to the book find that nannying occurred either through an inclusive 
strategy such as the OSCE, or through an exclusive strategy such as NATO and the EU 
or an intermediate strategy such as the Council of Europe.248 The relationship between 
the IOs and CEECs was asymmetric one and, as the contributors recognize, strong 
pressure to conform to Western norms came from the need to comply with norms 
before entry in the case of the EU and NATO. Pressure was maintained through the 
attraction of funding and achieving targets laid down via regular progress reports.
Along the same lines, Anders Aslund observes “In effect, the West as a whole
adopted Central Europe, and Western Europe adopted the Baltics, while South-East
Europe, Russia, and the rest of the CIS were left out in the cold.”249 With hindsight,
Aslund continues, the results look obvious: as expected, Central Europe and the Baltics
have done better than the former Soviet states. However, looking closer Aslund finds
outcomes, which seem less expected:
Why has Western Galicia (in Poland) done so much better than Eastern 
Galicia (in Ukraine), although they share history, culture, and 
geography as long-time parts of the Hapsburg Empire? Why has West-
248 Linden, Ronald H. (ed.), Norms and Nannies. The Impact o f International 
Organizations on the Central and East European States. The New International 
Relations o f Europe, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, and Oxford, 2002.
249 Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation o f the Former Soviet Bloc, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 397.
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oriented Romania done so much worse than isolated and provincial 
Lithuania? Why has highly developed Belarus remained a state- 
controlled economy while poor and distant Kyrgyzstan has become a 
market economy?2 0
As Aslund puts it, the key question is why some transition countries have done 
so much better than others have. If the first group of countries are those that have made 
the final and comprehensive transition to democracy and a market economy, the second 
group includes countries that have registered essential progress in only one dimension 
at the expense of the other. Countries of the third group have failed in both 
democratisation and marketisation attempts. Aslund has tried to explain this with what 
he calls “traps” in the transition process. Some transition countries, he argues, have 
chosen suboptimal paths, leading to unfavourable equilibria. After a country has fallen 
into one of the economic or political “under-reform traps,” Aslund continues, it cannot 
easily develop further, since these traps represent “suboptimal equilibria.” He explains 
this phenomenon with the slow pace of liberalisation and democratisation in some 
countries at the outset of transition 251 What Aslund’s argument has in common with 
my approach is that he acknowledges the role of processes of political and economic 
interaction in the fate of transition, as a result of which there has been established some 
kind of political and economic equilibrium in these countries. His statement that, “the 
persistence of a strong anti-systemic force entails a dangerous temptation for semi- 
democratic leaders to abandon democracy altogether with the purported aim of ‘saving’ 
economic reform” coincides to some extent with my observations, since it implies a 
deficit of political resource.252 However, the deficit of political resource may be 
explained not only or necessarily by the semi-democratic inclinations of a leader but, 
for instance, by the absence of well-established democratic institutions, a democratic 
regime with a legitimacy of its own, which any leader could rely on, and by the absence 
of sufficient domestic and international demand and support for reforms.
Moreover, explaining the shortage of political resource only by the absence of 
radical reform strategies cannot be satisfactory. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are
250 Aslund, 2002, p. 401.
251 Aslund, 2002, p. 448.
252 Aslund, 2002, p. 450.
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diverse views on pace, timing and sequencing, on radical vs. slow transition reforms. 
Therefore, Aslund’s argument that “countries have entered these ‘under-reform traps’ 
because their governments failed to undertake radical and early reforms” does not seem 
to be sufficiently convincing. His explanation that if the opportunity of radical and 
early reforms “during the extraordinary politics in the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of communism has been missed, a variety of vested interests grow strong 
enough to trap the nation in a vicious circle” is not universally applicable.253 Hungary 
has pursued slow but consistent and fundamental reforms (gradual reforms) throughout 
the entire transition process. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, which started with very 
radical and ambitious political and economic reforms, and was deemed to be a success 
in the early years of transition, ended up by continuously reproducing itself as a semi­
authoritarian and semi-market system, which, in Aslund’s terminology, can be 
described as an “under-reform trap” or “suboptimal equilibria.”
The theories and approaches discussed previously have a legitimate place in 
explaining the state of affairs in transition countries. However, they do not account for 
the process of political interaction and interplay during the transition -  both internal 
and external. It is that interaction that is the subject of my attention in this study.
Defining and Measuring Mutual Demands and Supports
To start discussing policy interaction and interplay in the post-communist 
transition context, I will suggest concrete meanings and criteria for the international, 
state, and domestic demands and supports. To the extent possible, I will define concrete 
indicators for mutual demand and support during the transition process, to analyse the 
process of interaction and interplay. It will be difficult to assess the impact or link of a 
concrete demand on, or with, a concrete support. Of course, one can always explore the 
correlation between the two indicators. However, since in reality a political demand can 
be reciprocated with support from more than one different policy sphere, and vice 
versa, it will be more sensible to reveal the correlation of concrete support or demand 
indicators and the dynamics in achieving a concrete policy goal.
What is the demand-support exchange between the international level, the state 
and domestic society during the transition? I will combine the demands and supports 
into three kinds of supports and demands as suggested in the previous chapter -
253 Aslund, 2002, p. 450.
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economic, political, security. In very general terms, the international community 
expects the states in transition to integrate into the international system. We cannot 
operationalise the international system per se. Instead, I can discuss the expectations or 
demand various international regimes and international organisations have from the 
state during the transition process. This would mean having the state joining the critical 
international regimes, complying with the conditionalities of international 
organisations, and improving that compliance. All these conditionalities are about 
support-demand balance.
Economic dimension
The economic dimension has been a core dimension in the transition process, 
and therefore, can give us more explicit and deeper insight into national-international 
interaction processes.
Foreign economic aid — in the form of humanitarian, technical, or development 
assistance from international financial and other institutions or from donor countries’ 
governments -- composes the most direct international support to the countries in 
transition. This indicator is widely available for all transition countries in World Bank 
and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) reports. There are 
indirect supports as well, such as recognition of reforms by international organisations 
and credit rating groups, by granting membership or assessing the country’s risk status. 
In addition, for each country in transition there are data available on its participation in 
critical international organisations and projects. In addition, there are country specific 
data available on each country’s international commitments and undertakings.
In the same way, there is a support-demand balance or the need for such a 
balance between the state and the domestic society. Demands that a society can have 
from the state are wide. The most direct demand that domestic society has from the 
state is the fulfilment of social needs, of course. However, they are not limited to that. 
Such economic spheres as job creation, investment, taxes, which also depend greatly on 
government activity, require a more comprehensive assessment of a government’s 
support. For that purpose, we can use such indicators as GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
per capita foreign direct investment, unemployment rate, and Gini coefficient. Support 
for government policy can be measured with material support given, such as the 
payment of taxes and other levies. This can be measured both in absolute volume and 
as a proportion of the budget income.
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The picture is different from the government perspective. All governments 
value economic growth in itself and also because it boosts their legitimacy. This means 
that the same indicators of economic growth can be used for the government level as 
well.
What is the demand-support exchange between the international community and 
the state in transition? In the sphere of the economy, this may mean the liberalisation of 
the national economy. Indicators such as the Index of Economic Freedom compiled by 
the Heritage Foundation, give a general assessment of a particular economy’s openness 
towards the international system. One can find more and more aggregate data on the 
reform process in countries of transition such as the liberalisation score, transition score 
compiled by the EBRD Transition Report, etc., in the field of the economy. All these 
indicators show, on a comparative basis, the success and the extent of transition of a 
particular transition country, which means its domestic transformation and international 
integration. They also describe the state’s policy vis-a-vis the domestic and 
international levels. Therefore, they also speak about the state’s foreign policy, its 
external direction, or its change.
In return for a state’s compliance with democratic and human-rights regimes, 
the international community can reciprocate not only with political but also with 
economic support. One of the preconditions for granting foreign economic aid, for 
example, has been the government’s democratic performance and consistency in 
implementing reforms. Even without such a formal linkage, it is obvious that foreign 
economic aid has a direct and indirect impact on the democratic development of a 
country and its society. Besides, stability is an important factor for attracting foreign 
investment. A simple correlation of the dynamics of such indicators as foreign 
economic aid or foreign investment on the one hand, and a country’s political rights’ 
and civil liberties’ indexes on the other, can tell us whether there is any support- 
demand balance when it comes to a state’s democratic performance and the 
international economic support (see tables at the end of the chapter on foreign 
economic aid and on Freedom House indexes).
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Political dimension
In the political sphere, the international community’s expectation or demand 
will be that states in transition become more democratic, to comply with international 
and global human rights regimes, and to progress intensively towards meeting the 
conditionalities of international organisations that are effective internationally or 
designed for the states in transition. At the same time, this would mean the state’s 
support for the respective international regimes. There is no scarcity of data offering 
aggregate indicators describing the situation. One such indicator is the coincidence of 
voting patterns of countries in transition with those of the European Union and the 
United States on resolutions related to human rights and political rights and liberties. 
The extent to which states in transition meet particular core conditionalities, such as the 
abolishment of capital punishment, put forward by some international organisations can 
be an important indicator in this sense.
The government in its turn expects the respective international or regional 
organisations to reward it materially or by recognizing its good performance. The latter 
can be a serious legitimacy boost for any government. Reports by reputable 
organisations; country resolutions in international organisations; election to high-level 
UN bodies, such as the Council on Human Rights; or the Economic and Social Council 
or other prestigious international or European organisations, are, in a way, indicators of 
the international support to the state. In the political sphere, again, important indicators 
are the status of political rights and civil liberties, and the record of the conduct of free 
and fair elections as well as indicators of rule of law (i.e. Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index). All these data are available for the states in transition. 
Not surprisingly, in this field international and domestic demands toward a state are 
more or less the same. Indicators measuring the status of civil liberties and political 
rights in all countries put forward by Freedom House, and the democratisation scores in 
the Nations in Transit Report, give a dynamic picture in this field. Therefore, the 
support from the state to these two levels can be the same. However, there may be 
differences as well, which are mainly linked to a society’s traditions, customs, 
perceptions, values, and the specifics of its background. Sometimes meeting 
international human rights and civil liberties requirements collides with the domestic 
society’s value perceptions. For instance, the requirement of the Council of Europe to 
abolish capital punishment was not supported initially by some societies of post­
communist transition.
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Within the political dimension, there is another phenomenon that deserves 
attention. The political processes include also issues related to cultural patterns, value 
systems and symbols, among others. As one of the most common ways of extracting 
public support, the governments use nationalism. Rulers often try to shape public 
perceptions, society’s scale of assessment for government policies and their outcomes. 
In other words, governments use some propaganda tools as they conduct some 
interpretative explanatory activity to increase their legitimacy.
Although the overall legitimacy of a government is a result of its performance 
in all the dimensions discussed above, governments seek to influence the scale of the 
assessment of the society, to make their achievements look greater. This is not only an 
outcome of the political process but also one of its determinants, the impact of which is 
difficult to measure. The domestic society is interested in keeping its value system 
coherent. The domestic society can also adopt standards and scales spread globally and 
assess the government’s activity comparatively. Different actors to add legitimacy to 
own policies and demands can use a prior experience of others. For example, 
governments of transitional countries often refer to other states in transition, which 
have had a similar economic reform experience, in order to explain to their domestic 
audiences the reasons for economic decline in their own countries. Alternatively, a 
domestic society, to support its demands from the government, can refer to other 
domestic societies’ achievements. These references are stronger, more supportive and 
effective when the precedents are not just a few, but are widely spread. A government 
uses other states’ successes widely as an argument, when negotiating with the 
international community for some benefits.
To separate and measure the portion of the government’s legitimacy derived 
from its success in presenting and propagating its economic, political and security 
achievements is a complicated task. However, it will not be difficult to track. The 
empirical research can reveal cases when the government has either made no progress, 
or has declined in all the dimensions under discussion, but nevertheless preserves its 
legitimacy. Those are the cases where one should look for an explanation within this 
dimension.
The overall level of political support by the domestic society, or the level of the 
government’s political legitimacy, is reflected in public polls. However, the results of 
these polls are not widely available and polls have not been conducted in a systematic 
manner. Eurobarometer — surveys conducted by the EU among the transition states —
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was the only source conducting polls in early years of transition on the support level of 
transitional societies, not only towards their respective government’s policies, but also 
on existing values and perceptions. Meanwhile, the existing data on elections, changes 
in political landscapes in the parliaments of transition countries, toward left or right, 
speak for themselves.
Security dimension
The next dimension is security. Within the security dimension, the international 
community expects the particular state to be a responsible, stable and predictable 
member of the international community. The general criterion is compliance of the 
given state with the international security regimes’ main conventions, treaties and 
decisions. Membership and voting patterns of the given state in international 
organisations also can provide some information. Scoring methods that exist in the field 
of conflict assessment help evaluate the situation. The Fund for Peace, for example, 
uses its Conflict Assessment System Tool, an original methodology it has developed 
and tested over the past decade. It is a flexible model that has the capability to employ 
a four-step trend-line analysis, consisting of rating 12 social, economic, political, and 
military indicators; assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered 
essential for sustaining security; identifying idiosyncratic factors and surprises; and 
placing countries on a conflict map that shows the risk history of countries being 
analysed. 254
For the Failed States Index, the Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy magazine 
focused solely on the first step, which provides snapshots of state vulnerability or risk 
of violence for one time period each year. A state that is failing has several attributes. 
One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or of the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the 
erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide 
reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full 
member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of 
elements of the risk of state failure, such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, 
inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary 
dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality,
254 http://www.fundforpeace.org.
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institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain 
drain, and environmental decay. These aggregate indices and different combinations of 
their component indicators can be used for analyzing the security/state-building 
situation in the transition world. One of the problems however is the fact that especially 
for the first decade of transition there is no systematic data available.
A country rating based on a global survey of armed conflicts, self-determination 
movements, and democracy has been produced by the Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.255 There have been 
more recent attempts by scholars to develop their own methodology of evaluating a state’s 
vulnerability to security problems. For instance, Andrei P. Tsygankov proposed an index of 
stateness that would combine indicators of state unity/security, economic and political 
viability. However, when applying his methodology to the post-Soviet states he 
concluded that Moldova, for instance, which is often deemed to be a failed state, is one 
of the three most viable states. Tsygankov himself acknowledges, of course, “that any 
attempt to propose indicators and construct indices can only be preliminary and 
suggestive of a general trend. Case studies are necessary to further test how well such 
indices stand against the empirical record.”256
I will refrain from making quantitative analyses on the state of affairs in 
security sphere of transition states. One can draw conclusions based on the visible 
evidence without having to conduct detailed quantitative analyses. “ Another challenge 
that should be highlighted is the dual difficulty of “state-building” and democratization. 
Whether it is through violent conflict or peaceful means, almost half of the Nations in 
Transit countries covered continue to grapple with building basic structures and 
consensus about belonging together in a state. A state must be able to have in place and 
control basic institutions in order to engage in process of democratisation.” As one 
can see, the main security/state-building concern in the transition states often is not 
external but rather ethnic, mostly secession. And one can conduct analysis based on 
mere facts of existing interstate or ethnic disputes and conflicts, their background and
255 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/
256 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Modem at last? Variety of Weak States in the post-Soviet 
World”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40,2007, 423-439.
257 Nations in Transit, 2006, p.26
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dynamics. As for the status of state institutions, in addition to the above mentioned 
sources, there is also consistent data on market institution building and institutional 
performance provided by the EBRD Transition Reports. However, the situation in this 
sphere will be analysed in a detail in the two case studies.
Domestic society is interested in its security, both individual and collective. 
Within this dimension, I emphasize a society’s overall military security only. The 
criterion for domestic society is an increase of its security by the government, which 
can be reflected in an increase of military spending, number of armed forces, settlement 
of existing and potential conflicts and elimination of perceived threats, participation of 
the state in security treaties, pacts, agreements, etc. Quantitative measures such as 
military expenditures as a proportion of GDP, or the number of military personnel per 
1000 in the population, are indicators of a state’s security performance. To make a 
judgement on the perceived threats existing in a society, one needs to conduct public 
polls, or at least to have expert assessments. Although not as precisely as economic 
growth, the security of domestic society can be measured by indicators like those 
mentioned above.
For the government, again, the logic is the same. The government is interested 
in the increase of security since it helps to increase its legitimacy. Therefore, with the 
same kind of reservations mentioned in relation to the economic dimension, we can use 
the same indicators of security measurement. I will discuss only state security issues 
here, which include threats to domestic society, state sovereignty and integrity. The 
individual security of a society’s members, related to human rights, political liberties, 
and the rule of law, and problems of economic security will be covered within the 
political and economic dimensions respectively.
Horizontal Interaction
As I have stated before, in this chapter I aim to explore why the transition paths 
diverged so drastically for post-communist countries. My first argument in this regard 
is that the background conditions matter. However, in countries undergoing transition, 
governments possess a limited resource for pursuing reforms on the political, economic 
and security/state-building fronts; therefore, they have to make critical choices in line 
with the demands and supports of domestic society and international community, as 
well as their own legitimacy needs. It is these choices of the elites, made under certain
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political, economic and other structural constraints, that will determine what transition 
paths the country takes and whether the country remains on the democratic path or not.
Before analysing transition as a single political process, it would be useful to 
determine what role the domestic factors that I singled out in Chapter 1 might have 
played in shaping the transition paths of these countries and creating sub-groups that 
vary significantly in their reform achievement in democratization and marketisation 
after ten years of transition (1991-2001).
Table 4.1, which compares the initial socio-economic conditions, role of the 
first post-communist elites, political culture, institutional design, and other structural 
factors, such as state-building related or conflict related challenges, shows some 
similarities that countries belonging to the same region have. The countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States and, to a less degree, those in South Eastern 
Europe had relatively higher GDP per capita level ranging between $ 1300 and $ 3700 
(with the exception of Albania). Almost all of them, with few exceptions, have adopted 
a parliamentary political system, which, according to the theories of democratic 
institution building, provides better checks and balances, prevents political polarisation 
and promotes better social cohesion in society. Parliamentary systems are also known 
for their stability in terms of their policy choices and continuities. All these countries 
also had more or less lengthy previous democratic experience with independent state 
institutions.
In the countries of the CIS, in the early years of transition GDP per capita was 
lower than $13 00.258 GDP decline in the first 4-5 critical years of radical reform was 
deeper than those in the CEE and SEE. If one accepts’ the modernization theory 
argument, both “endogenous” and “exogenous”259, these countries had less chance of 
installing a democratic regime and consolidating it than those in the CEE and SEE 
region. The countries chose presidential or mixed systems with a strong executive, 
which, according to theory, leads to an excessive concentration of power in the hands
258 The only exception is Kazakhstan, which has vast natural resources.
259 On the other hand, the “endogenous” modernization theory does not seem to be valid 
when one looks at individual country cases. For instance, Slovenia had the highest GDP 
per capita and the lowest economic decline. Nevertheless, the country was far from 
being a regional champion in democratisation. Among the CIS countries, Belarus had 
the highest GDP per capita but that did not lead to the establishment of democratic 
regime, despite its location. See detailed discussion about modernization theory in 
Chapter 1.
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of the executive branch and thus, fosters authoritarianism. They were also less fortunate 
in their former democratic history. Not only did they lack any pre-Soviet democratic 
experience, but they also had no or only minimal experience of prior independent 
statehood.
Table 4.1 Domestic Factors Determining Transition Paths
Socio -Economic 
Conditions
Political factors Political
culture
Confli
ct5
GDP per 
capita, 
1990- 
1995
GDP
Decline6
1991-
1995
Initial
condition
s 1
Elite
turnover2
Inst
design3
Previous
democratic
experience4
Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States
Hungary 3677.6 -2.2 3.3 Y PL Y Y
Poland 2356.1 2.3 1.9 Y mixed Y N
Czech
Republic
3566.9 -0.8 3.5 Y PL Y Y
Estonia 2860.9 -6.4 -04 Y PL Y N
Lithuania 2324.8 -9.9 0.0 Y mixed Y N
Slovenia 7551.4 -0.5 3.2 Y PL Y N
Slovak
Republic
2727.6 -2.6 2.9 Y PL Y Y
Latvia 2160.7 -9.7 -02 Y PL Y N
South Eastern Europe
Albania 495.8 -1.4 2.1 N PL N N
Bulgaria 1474.9 -2.5 2.1 N PL Y N
Macedonia 1881.6 -4.6 2.5 Y PL N Y
Croatia7 3502.3 -5.6 2.5 Y/W Mixed/PL N Y
Romania 1340.2 -1.8 1.5 N mixed Y Y
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Western CIS and Caucasus
Moldova 562 -15.7 -1.1 N mixed N Y
Armenia 467.5 -10 -1.1 Y mixed N Y
Azerbaijan 747.7 -15.6 -3.2 Y PR N Y
Belarus 1589.9 -8.1 -1.1 N PR N N
Georgia 803.7 -20.6 -2.2 Y/W PR N Y
Russia 3045 -9 -1.4 Y PR N Y
Ukraine 1280.6 -13.5 -1.4 N PR N Y
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 1452.8 -9.3 -2.5 N PR N N
Kyrgyzstan 477.4 -12.5 -2.3 Y PR N Y
Tajikistan 342.2 -17.2 -2.9 W PR N Y
Turkmenistan 760.7 -8.9 -3.4 N PR N N
Uzbekistan 612.2 -4.0 -2.8 N PR N Y
1 EBRD’s Initial Condition Index: The higher values o f  the initial condition index relate to more 
favourable starting positions; Source EBRD Transition Report 2000.
}  The level o f  Elite Turnover indicates whether there was a regime change or the old communist 
elites remained in power: new elite-Yes, old elite -N o .
3 Institutional design: PL-parliamentary; M ixed- semi-presidential; PR-Presidential.
4 Existence o f  previous democratic experience.
5. Includes serious security and state-building challenges that the states had in the early years o f  post­
communist transition, i.e. major ethnic conflict, external minority, open territorial disputes, etc.
6. Average GDP growth rates and GDP per capita are derived from World Developm ent Indicators 
database.
7 Croatia changed its political system from semi-presidential to parliamentary system in 2000.
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To sum up, of course structural and other domestic factors differ significantly 
across these regions. These countries understandably had different starting points. 
However, it is also the case that the conditions of transition have not been equal. There 
are, therefore, numerous reasons for the differing outcomes. In the same way, past 
experience certainly has an enormous role in causing differences in progress in 
transition states. However, as mentioned before, there was no essential difference 
between Ukraine and Belarus in terms of their communist past and legacies. The 
Domestic factors may have facilitated the triple transition of the countries of CEE and 
SEE regions more than in other regions. However, domestic factors are important, but 
not sufficient for explaining the overall transition dynamics. For this reason, I suggest 
we should look at transition, first, as a political process of interaction and trade-off 
between a country’s political, economic and security policies.
Thus, in my first hypothesis I suggest that there is a strong interconnectedness 
and trade-off among a government’s economic, political and security policies during 
the transition. The consequences of policy changes in each of these areas resonate in 
others, and often in a negative manner. I further argue that there is a single limited 
political or legitimacy resource at the government’s disposal and it is unlikely that any 
government will be able to conduct the complex, systemic and simultaneous 
transformation required by transition, unless there is a sufficient level of external 
demand and support.
To discuss the interaction of various policies at the state level requires, first of 
all, a detailed study of how the reforms proceed in each of the policy areas: political, 
economic and security. It is not possible to conduct such a detailed, systematic 
examination for all 25 countries in the scope of this chapter. Instead, to give a general 
overview, I will use the available aggregate indicators and indexes that more or less 
reflect the status and dynamics of democratisation, market reforms and security/state- 
building in these countries to analyse the situation and to see whether the evidence 
supports my first hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the available quantitative data for security/state-building 
dimension is rather scarce and covers only recent years. Therefore, I cannot make a 
comparative analysis of the security/state-building dimension, and systematically 
correlate it with the other dimensions for all the transition countries. I will do this when
133
discussing concrete country cases in the following two chapters. At this stage, to 
discuss the horizontal interaction between different reform policies, I will focus on the 
two main pillars of transition — economic and political -  on which there is sufficient 
data. I assume that the comparative analysis of even these two dimensions should give 
as a primary view on general pattern of relationship between them throughout the first 
decade of transition.
From this point of view, the indicators of cumulative liberalisation and 
democratisation put forward in the EBRD Transition Report give a good insight into the 
overall reform processes in these two areas, their dynamics and correlation in all 
transition countries. Cumulative liberalisation denotes the number of years in which a 
country has achieved a score of at least 3 on price liberalisation and at least 4 on trade 
and foreign exchange liberalisation. Cumulative democracy denotes the number of 
years in which executives and legislatives have been freely and fairly elected. This 
information is based on the OSCE reports on country elections. According to the table 
on transition paths and determinants in the EBRD Transition Report here is the picture 
(table 4.2):260
These indicators show in comparison how successfully countries’ political and 
economic reform progressed in the same (the most critical) time period. These 
indicators show more than the structural side of the transition process. After all, they 
are also the results of each government’s reform policies, and of the support and 
demand by society and the international community for reforms.
260 Cumulative liberalisation denotes the number of years in which a country has 
achieved a score of at least 3-- on price liberalisation and at least 4-- on trade 
and foreign exchange liberalisation. Cumulative democracy denotes the number of 
years in which executives and legislatives have been freely and fairly elected Source: 
EDRD, Transition Report 2000, p. 21.
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Table 4.2 Cumulative Liberalisation and Democracy Scores (1990-2000)
Cumulative
liberalisation
Cumulative
democracy
1. Hungary 10.0 11.0
2. Poland 8.0 11.0
3. Czech Republic 9.0 11.0
4. Estonia 7.0 9.0
5. Lithuania 7.0 4.0
6. Slovenia 8.0 11.0
7. Slovak Republic 9.0 10.5
8. Croatia 7.0 3.5
9. Latvia 7.0 8.0
10. Albania 8.0 6.0
11. Bulgaria 5.0 8.5
12. FYR Macedonia 7.0 6.0
13. Romania 6.0 8.0
14. Kazakhstan 3.0 0
15. Kyrgyzstan 6.0 7.0
16. Moldova 6.0 7.0
17. Ukraine 0 4.0
18. Georgia 4.0 7.0
19. Azerbaijan 0 0
20. Russia 2.0 9.0
21. Uzbekistan 0 0
22. Armenia 5.0 0
23. Belarus 0 0.5
24. Tajikistan 0 0.5
25. Turkmenistan 0 0
Based on the data presented in table 4.2, one can identify three distinct groups 
of countries: The first group contains the countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Romania, 
Latvia) that successfully managed to pursue all transition goals in parallel. These 
countries, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, drastically liberalised their economies 
and still managed to keep their democratic records more or less clean for the same 
period, in the sense that they conducted better, free and fair elections, promoted the rule 
of law, etc. These countries had one thing in common — they were all strong 
candidates for the EU membership. The only exceptions seem to be Moldova and 
Kyrgyzstan, which according to their scores adjoin the first group of countries. 
Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, despite not being candidates for EU membership, 
surprisingly were able to both liberalize and, at the same time, democratise. They 
deserve special examination since they contradict my argument.
Countries in the second group (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia and 
Russia) progressed in one sphere but lagged behind in the other. Geographically, they
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roughly coincide with Western CIS and the Caucasus. The only exceptions seem to be 
Croatia and Lithuania, which according to their scores adjoin the second group of 
countries. Croatia and Lithuania, undoubtedly have higher scores if compared with 
other countries of the second group. However, both countries have substantial 
imbalance between the democratisation and the economic liberalisation scores. One can 
conclude that in countries like Armenia and Kazakhstan, and to an extent in Croatia and 
Lithuania, governments have put more emphasis on economic than on political reforms. 
Leaving aside Lithuania, which was under EU and NATO sponsorship and deserves a 
separate study, the rest of these countries had essentially similar problems: lack of 
commitment of governments to further reforms, and/or insufficient level of domestic 
and international demand and support. In other words, the problem was the availability 
of a political resource, or rather the lack of it. While meeting international demands on 
economic liberalisation, the governments of these countries were drastically deprived 
of domestic political support. Elections, in these circumstances, were seen as an 
opportunity to restore and consolidate their power even by undemocratic means. And 
there was no adequate and persistent international demand that could stop them from 
doing that. The existence of Croatia in this group supports my argument that without 
serious external demand and support (during the period covered in table 4.2 Croatia 
was not yet an EU applicant country) it is hard to conduct successful simultaneous 
transition reforms.
In this period, the governments of Russia, Ukraine and Georgia achieved higher 
scores in democratic than in their economic performance, since they were slow and 
cautious in liberalisation. In fact, they became relatively “popular” at the expense of 
economic reforms, and therefore could afford to conduct more or less free and fair 
elections, without a significant threat to their office. In 1992, Russia’s reformist 
government led by Gaidar lasted only 4 months and was sacrificed for the sake of 
political stability, as parliament demanded. Shevardnadze’s Georgia implemented 
gradual and socially not risky economic reforms. The same is true with regard to 
Ukraine under Kuchma. As one can see, in some CIS countries the contrast is more 
dramatic.
In the third group are the countries (Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan) in which, throughout the period covered in the table, the 
tempo and depth of reforms was not sufficient in either the political or the economic 
sphere. These countries failed to reform and chose a path that was not democratic.
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These are countries where there was neither significant and persistent domestic or 
international support/demand for reforms, nor a reformist government.
The question remains why did the governments in the second group who 
declared their intentions to adopt democracy and capitalism at the same time get such 
mixed results? The fact that the policies of the elites in the countries of the second 
group, all of whom had more or less similar starting structural conditions, diverge in the 
sense that some succeeded in democratisation and some in economic reforms, makes 
the modernization argument (more specifically what comes first democracy or market) 
and other explanations relying on the structural or political culture perspective less 
convincing.
What other factor(s) affected their choices of policies and the eventual reform 
results. I argue that along with domestic factors, it is the political process of interaction, 
both horizontal and vertical, that makes a difference in transition paths. The 
governments had a limited political resource for pursuing reforms on the political, 
economic and security/state-building fronts; therefore, they had to make critical 
choices, and it is this that shaped differences in progress and in their overall transition 
paths. It is these choices of the elites, made under certain political, economic and other 
structural constraints that determined what transition paths the country took.
Leaving aside the third group of countries, where we cannot speak about a 
transition per se, a significant factor that distinguishes the first two sub-groups with 
different levels of success in transition is the amount of the political resource that the 
governments of those countries had available for advancing reforms. After the early 
stage of radical reforms, which almost all the countries in the first and second group 
initiated, the social and political costs of transition rose drastically and public 
discontent grew, inevitably leading to a decline in the government’s legitimacy. At this 
critical point, the paths of post-communist countries started to diverge. As the 
framework in chapter 3 suggests, later policy choices not only largely depend upon the 
starting conditions, and the values and goals of the elites in power, but as importantly, 
they depend on the existing domestic and international supports and demands. If there 
is no domestic and international support and demand, the most probable step for a 
government in countries that do not have consolidated democratic and market 
institutions would be to abandon reforms, or to invest its political stock in the areas that 
are politically less costly and more rewarding, to devote more resources to one aspect 
of reform at the expense of another, to enhance its economic and political power.
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It is the balance of demands and supports of domestic society and the 
international community that eventually determines the continuity of the reform polices 
that have been adopted. In the first group there are countries with clear prospects for 
EU membership. In the second group, there are countries in which domestic and 
international supports and demands were mixed and were not as rigorous and tangible 
as for the first group. In the third group are countries where there was neither any 
significant and persistent domestic or international support/demand for reforms, nor a 
reformist government.
The dynamics of annual indicators of economic liberalisation and civil liberties 
and political rights showing the relationship between economic and political reforms 
also reveal similar regional patterns (Chart 4.1).261 As one can see, for the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, improving economic liberalization coincides with 
improving democracy status. For the countries of South Eastern Europe, the pattern is 
the same although not as vivid as in the first group. For the countries of the Western 
CIS and the Caucasus, an obviously more drastic economic liberalisation tendency is 
accompanied by an unstable and eventually worsening situation in democracy status. 
As for the countries of Central Asia, we see a slight improvement of the liberalisation 
score in the early years and a continuous worsening of democracy status. In contrast 
with the concepts of conflict, compatibility, and reconciliation among policy goals 
described by Huntington, which define the relationship among policy goals as either 
that of merely conflict, or compatibility, or reconciliation, we witness all scenarios 
developing in parallel during the first decade of post-communist transition. The 
approach I suggest does not exclude but rather explains the existence of all scenarios.
261 See table 4.5 for detailed data.
262 Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, Understanding Political Development, 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1987.
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Chart 4.1 Economic Liberalisation and Democracy Scores (average) 1990-20031 
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In sum, as one can see, the comparative analysis of the cumulative liberalisation 
and democratisation scores for the twenty-five post-communist transition countries 
predominantly supports my assumption that there is strong interconnectedness among 
reform policies, and that these governments have a limited resource for pursuing these 
policies. As a result, most often they end up pursuing one goal at the expense of the 
other. The analysis also shows that it is unlikely that the transition countries can deal 
themselves with such a systemic multi-issue transformation as transition, unless there is 
sufficient external support and demand. Because Moldova and Kyrgyzstan offer 
themselves as possible exceptions, I intend to focus on these two cases for more 
detailed study.
Even with an untrained eye, one can observe a striking difference in security/ 
state-building challenges that different regional groups of countries face, as indicated in 
table 4.3. The Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltics are in much
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better situation and the CIS states face the hardest challenges.263 By 2006 even 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are ranked as failed states.
Table 4.3 Failed State Index for Post-Communist Countries-2006264
Failed state 
Index
Central and Eastern Europe
Hungary 46.7
Poland 47.9
Czech Republic 41.8
Estonia 51
Lithuania 49.7
Slovenia 36.8
Slovak Republic 49.9
Latvia 56.2
South Eastern Europe
Albania 68.6
Bulgaria 62.1
Macedonia 75.1
Croatia 61.9
Romania 62.6
Western Commonwealth o f Independent 
States and Caucasus
Moldova 82.5
Armenia 71.5
Azerbaijan 81.9
Belarus 84.5
Georgia 82.2
Russia 87.1
Ukraine 72.9
Central Asia
Kazakhstan 71.9
Kyrgyzstan 90.3
Tajikistan 87.7
Turkmenistan 86.1
Uzbekistan 94.4
As in the case of the democratisation and marketisation scores, if one compares 
security indicators, one can see that countries of the same regional group have similar 
security/state-building levels. As discussed before, there is obviously a link among all 
these areas. The less pressing security and state-building problems are, the more likely 
it is that incumbents will be able devote more resources to other critical spheres, and
263 The rank order of the states is based on the total scores of the 12 indicators. For each 
indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity 
(most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum 
of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120.
264 Source: http://www.fundforpeace.org. Although the earliest comprehensive state- 
building/security index is for 2006, that index can still be useful since changes in this 
field take place slowly and many of the security challenges reflect processes that took 
place in the first decade of transition.
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the more likely it is that the country will progress in the economic and political spheres. 
It is obvious that the governments of those countries that declared their choice of 
democracy and the market but faced serious security and state-building challenges, 
have to distribute their limited political resource in such a way as to meet their security 
and state-building needs first if possible, even when this creates the “necessity to 
compromise between the democratic ideal and the necessities of state security 
challenges.”265 Meanwhile, we can see that transition countries such us Moldova and 
Georgia, which registered some progress in economic and political reforms, did not 
manage to resolve the serious security problems they face.
Vertical Interaction
I argue that not only is there a link between economic, political, and security 
policies, but also that there is an essential link and trade-off among different levels -- 
domestic, state and international -- within the overall transition process. \in order for 
transition to succeed, it is important that the resources and respective costs of transition 
have been effectively, that is, reasonably and in a timely manner, distributed among 
those levels.
How about the resources and the costs of transition, have they been effectively 
distributed among the levels? Is support-demand balance vertically provided? For 
countries in transition, this means analyzing how all the relevant actors at all levels 
share the burden of carrying out simultaneous reforms in all core policy areas, and how 
the balance of such demand and support affects the ability of those actors to continue 
with reforms, and how it affects a country’s overall pace and trajectory in transition. It 
is difficult to overestimate the role played by international organisations, especially the 
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, the Council of Europe, the EU, 
and NATO. To what extent these organisations effectively carry out their missions 
individually, or as a group, is a different issue, of course. However, one should not 
underestimate the power and value of these organisations' political, financial, and even 
advisory support, policy support statements, which can have an essential, legitimising 
effect for a government, both domestically and internationally. These are what a
265 Reimund Seldelmann, “International Security and Democracy Building” in in 
Zielonka, Jan and Alex Pravda (eds.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe 
Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 
115-116.
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transitional state expects or, in my terminology, demands from the international 
community; at the same time, these are the material and non-material supports that the 
international community can offer to a state in transition.
Political Dimension
Even an untrained eye can see what makes the first group of countries different 
from the second group of countries when one analyses the external driving forces of 
democratization. The first group of countries that managed to pursue all transition 
goals in parallel are those that had a clear EU membership prospective. Anders Aslund 
provides a useful insight about transition countries that differ in their reform 
trajectories:
Preconditions, politics, and economic policy matter, but western policy 
has made a great difference. Six transition countries undertook early and 
successful transformations, and they all gained adequate international 
support. While we cannot disentangle the impact of various factors and 
prove that they would have failed without international assistance, the 
coincidence is remarkable.
What type of socialization is responsible for their successful transition is not an 
issue here. The fact is that these countries retained domestic support for continuing 
reforms because they received international support adequate to their reforms, both 
economic and political. More importantly, this support was in the form of membership 
or the prospect of membership in the EU. This made reform steps rewarding rather 
than painful for society, and as a result, the governments could pursue both goals with 
almost the same depth and intensity.
Vachudova correctly observes that in 1992 the European Commission was 
conscious, that offering the prospect of membership would be the best incentive for 
promoting liberal democracy and the market in Central and Eastern Europe and that by 
offering a membership perspective, “the Community will provide encouragement to 
those pursuing reform and make the short term economic and social consequences of
266 Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation o f the Former Soviet 
Bloc, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 401.
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adjustment easier to bear. This perspective will also provide a stimulus to investment 
and discourage excessive nationalism.”267
Societies in the CEECs retained substantial support for EU membership 
throughout the entire pre-accession phase. Through its conditionality, the EU extended 
the necessary demand and support to the governments in aspirant countries to build 
genuine democracy and a market economy. The EU extended direct criticism to rent- 
seeking illiberal governments in CEECs, stopped them abusing opposition parties and 
elections, paid close attention to democratic standards and the protection of minority 
rights, discouraged nationalism, helped build strong democratic and market institutions, 
and to create modem and independent judiciary. The external transparency of aspirant 
government activity demanded by the EU also produced internal transparency, thus 
facilitating the work of pro-reform parties and civic groups. The EU empowered 
domestic groups against government ill-practice wherever needed, by undermining 
information asymmetries, teaching the opposition parties and groups to work 
effectively. The EU and NATO also embarked on an intensive international 
socialization effort in the societies of aspirant countries. By giving access to its trade 
and investment market, the EU enhanced pro-reform economic groups. The EU 
provided sizable financial assistance and foreign investment to the governments for 
meeting its requirements. As I argued within my second hypothesis, in order for 
transition to succeed, it is important that the resources and respective costs of transition 
have been effectively, that is reasonably and in a timely manner, distributed among the 
domestic, state and international levels. From this point of view, I think it is more than 
evident that the EU provided in a timely manner all the necessary political resource for 
successful and comprehensive reforms to the governments and societies of the first 
group of countries.
Vachudova argues that “the domestic requirements of EU membership 
proscribed the very mechanisms by which governing elites in illiberal states 
consolidated political power and cultivated their domestic power base: limited political 
competition, partial economic reform and ethnic nationalism.” Meeting EU 
requirements threatened to undermine the domestic power of ruling elites in Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Slovakia by strengthening opposition forces, limiting rent-seeking
267 Vachudova, 2005, p. 102.
268 Vachudova, 2005, p. 73.
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opportunities from non-transparent economic deals, and precluding exploitation of 
ethnic issues for the sake of rallying support. Thus, Vachudova observes that the EU 
pursues its task of domestic reform in two ways. First, the EU alters the domestic 
political system by making it more competitive. Second, the EU directly influences the 
illiberal governments, limiting their misuse of power.269 1 want to emphasise, however, 
that both tasks demand a political resource that, it seems, can only be made available by 
the international community.
The second group of countries, (identified according to table 4.2) which 
coincides with the Western CIS and Caucasus, advanced on one front but lagged behind 
on another. In these countries although there was considerable financial assistance from 
the international financial institutions, there was little real effort to facilitate trade and 
investment. There was also little significant international socialisation effort with the 
societies of the second group’s countries which might have helped to shape strong 
market and democratic convictions and form continual support and demand for the 
market and democracy within these societies. International actors did not adopt 
consistent policies towards illiberal governments and policies in this region, of the type 
that they adopted in the CEECs. In those countries where the governments had no 
intention to democratise the country from the beginning, this situation could be used to 
further justify their inaction. In the countries with more or less democratic 
governments, their legitimacy could suffer significantly, and they could become 
unenthusiastic in their democracy building.
The accession of transition countries to the Council of Europe, in general, could 
have been a fact of recognition of these countries’ democratic reform efforts. However, 
it is difficult to assess to what extent the granting of accession was timely and effective 
for each country from the perspective of encouraging democratic reforms and as 
recognition of a country’s accomplishments. There has always been a greater need for 
the CIS countries to be engaged in democratic reforms. However, the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe were admitted first. The accession process started with 
Hungary in 1990 and ended with Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2001, although these 
countries applied for accession to the Council of Europe in 1992. Later Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were admitted in 2002, and Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. On the other 
hand, a simple comparison of the democracy status of each country at the time of their
269 Vachudova, 2005, p. 187.
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accession attests to the fact that there has not been a common accession threshold for 
all countries in transition (see table 4.7 for details on Freedom House Index and 
accession years). Therefore, the demand-support balance in the political sphere has 
also been distorted.
Another EU initiative, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in which 
some of the countries of the CIS, such as Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were included in 2003-2004, is also unlikely to have a significant and, most 
importantly, a consistent impact on promoting democracy and human rights in these 
countries. A study, analysing the role of ENP as an instrument of democracy and 
human rights promotion in the group of participant countries argues that its impact is 
limited:
Although political conditionality was introduced to ENP as an 
institutional and identity-based legacy of Eastern enlargement and 
general external relations principles, it lacks the prerequisites of 
effectiveness: a credible membership promise, a consistent application 
of conditionality, and domestic conditions of impact in the target 
countries. Thus, the political conditionality in ENP is likely to remain a 
ceremonial affirmation of basic EU values and norms without major 
practical consequences -  and to deepen the credibility crisis of the EU in 
this issue-area.2 0
Economic dimension
To make a cross country, cross-region comparison of supports and demands in 
the economic sphere, I suggest looking at the correlation among indicators and scores 
that show the support for transition from each level; supports such as foreign economic 
aid from international organisations, foreign direct investment, economic liberalisation 
and economic freedom scores from the state and the domestic society, and change in 
per capita GDP from the domestic society. The level, and especially the decline, of 
GDP indicate the risks or costs that are domestically borne as a result of reforms, in 
particular the liberalisation of trade and the economy. In that sense, the change in GDP 
per capita can serve as an indicator that reflects the domestic society’s degree of 
support or lack of support towards the economic policies conducted by the government. 
Foreign direct investment is an indicator describing both the benefits that the
01C\ Frank Schimmelfennig and Sylvia Maier, “Shared Values: Democracy and Human 
Rights” in Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?, by Katja 
Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun (eds), Manchester University Press 2006.
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international/global level has from the liberalisation of a particular national economy 
and the risks it bears by taking part in that process. To a large extent its size depends on 
a favourable economic environment. At the same time, FDI contributes to the 
enhancement of the business and economic environment. Foreign economic aid is a 
direct indicator of the international level’s support for liberalisation and 
democratisation in the states in transition. The scale of reforms greatly depends on the 
size of the foreign economic aid. The size of the aid, in turn, depends at least nominally 
on the scale and tempo of reform.
It is obvious that the sizes of the above mentioned indicators are interrelated. 
The logic behind this is the following. The implementation of liberalisation reforms 
initially creates economic hardship, which is reflected in GDP decline. Continuing 
reforms require tight monetary and fiscal policies in transitional countries which put 
additional financial and social costs on the shoulders of domestic society. Adam 
Przeworski gives a good insight into the dynamic of popular support in the countries 
that undergo radical reform: “...even when people do support the radical treatment at 
the outset, the limited data we have indicate that this support erodes, often drastically, 
as social costs are experienced. Opposition is expressed in public opinion surveys, 
elections, strikes, and, at times, riots.”271
To what extent have these transition costs been supported, compensated, or 
complemented by the international community for the sake of continuing the 
integration process and helping the domestic society sustain its support for reforms? A 
quick overview of lending by the international financial institutions shows an 
imbalance between the demand and support extended by these organisations to the 
states in transition. We are all aware that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for 
example, has been sharply criticised for inconsiderately enforcing the neoliberal 
prescriptions of the Washington consensus for radical reforms, through so-called shock 
therapy. Without going deeply into each country’s specifics, the IMF designed and, as 
the master of the situation, enforced measures that are reported to have adversely 
affected transition economies and resulted in unnecessary losses of economic output, 
increased unemployment, and social tension. While the IMF played an active and 
decisive role in drafting and starting structural reform programmes in almost all post­
271 Adam Przeworski, Democracy And The Market: Political and Economic Reforms In 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 167.
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communist countries, it has not been consistent in loaning money appropriately, in 
accordance with each country’s reform performance. Not surprisingly, “disbursements 
of IMF credits per capita between 1989 and 2002 were relatively equal across Central 
Europe and the Baltic states (60 SDR), South-Eastern Europe (78 SDR), and the CIS 
(78 SDR).”272
As far as overall foreign economic aid is concerned, the contrast between the 
above-mentioned countries is not essential, especially if one compares the starting 
points, reform tempos, and accordingly, the decline in economic growth of these 
countries. The average per capita foreign economic aid for the years 1991 -  2001 (table 
4.4). has been the following: for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovak Republic, it 
has been slightly more than US $20; for Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, almost US 
$30; for Poland, $40; Georgia, $34; Armenia, $52. For Kyrgyzstan it was 42, for 
Moldova, 15.
Foreign economic aid alone, however, can be a misleading indicator for 
international support to a reforming country. That indicator should be viewed in the 
context of the percentage of the country’s gross national product the foreign economic 
aid comprises. It is also important to consider how hard the country was hit by the 
initial reforming efforts (i.e. the dynamics of GDP per capita), what the initial 
conditions were -- not only the economic conditions, but also the political and security 
conditions — from which the country started its economic reforms. Only by taking all 
these factors into consideration can one get a real picture of the scope of the 
international support. For instance, although the difference in average per capita 
foreign economic aid between Armenia and Poland is $11, for Poland, foreign 
economic aid composes only 1.6 percent of gross national income (GNI). By contrast, 
foreign economic aid composes 8.5 percent of Armenia’s GNI, due largely to a huge 
decline in economic growth. Generally, for Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
countries, average foreign economic aid does not exceed 1.6 percent of GNI. For 
Georgia, for the same reason as in Armenia, average foreign economic aid composed 
8.3 percent of GNI.273
272 Alexander Cooley, “Western Conditions and Domestic Choices: The Influence of 
External Actors on the Post-Communist Transition”, Nations in Transit, 2003, p. 31.
273 See World Development Indicators database-2003.
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Table 4.4 Foreign Economic Aid per capita in Post-Communist Countries (average), 1991- 
2001274
Country
Foreign  
Econom ic  
Aid (in US$)
Czech Republic 22
Estonia 44
Hungary 23
Latvia 29
Lithuania 28
Poland 40
Slovak Republic 22
Slovenia 30
Albania 89
Bulgaria 27
Romania 14
Armenia 52
Azerbaijan 15
Belarus 11
Georgia 34
Kazakhstan 7
Kyrgyz Republic 42
Moldova 15
Russia 10
Tajikistan 16
Turkmenistan 6
Ukraine 8
Uzbekistan 5
One should also take into account that all these countries had different starting 
conditions. The EBRD has suggested an index of initial conditions, presented in table 
4.1, which is derived from factor analysis and represents a weighted average of 
measures for the level of development, trade dependence on CMEA, macroeconomic 
disequilibria, distance to the EU, natural resource endowments, market memory, and 
state capacity. According to that index, Armenia’s initial conditions index is -1.1 and 
Georgia’s index -2.2. For comparison, I should mention that Poland’s index is 3.3, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia both have an initial conditions index of 3.2, and the 
Slovak Republic’s is 2.9. The index of initial conditions for Kyrgyzstan is -2.3; for 
Moldova, - 1.1. The picture of initial conditions also speaks to the fact that the demand-
274 Source: World Bank, World Development indicators, 2003. See table 4.6 at the end 
of this chapter for detailed data on foreign economic aid.
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support balance in the case of the above-mentioned countries has been 
disproportional.275
If we take GDP as an overall indicator reflecting the economic situation, then 
we can see that at the early stage of the transition process -- whether as a direct or 
indirect result of economic liberalisation — GDP decline in the above-mentioned groups 
of transition states was very different. Therefore, the social tension and the need for 
support in order to sustain the reform tempo were quite different. In Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states the biggest decline in the economic growth in real 
GDP composed -10.3 percent and -2.2 percent in 1991 and 1992 respectively. In the 
states of South-Eastern Europe, on the other hand, it was -14.8 percent and -9.6 
percent, and for the CIS countries -6.0 percent and -17.4 percent, and it continued at 
-12.7 percent in 1993, -14.1 percent in 1994, and -4.9 percent in 1995. In Kyrgyzstan 
in 1992-1993, GDP fell by 16.4 percent and with only minor variations, GDP per capita 
continued to be almost the same between 1995 and 2003. In Moldova, the biggest 
decrease was in 1994, -  30.1. According to the same source, compared with the pre­
reform year 1989, the estimated level of real GDP in 2002 for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic countries overall comprised 113 percent, while for the countries 
of South-Eastern Europe it was 81 percent; and for the CIS countries, 65 percent.276 
This single comparison already indicates that there has been little correlation between 
the amounts of IMF funding and a given country’s reform performance.
A similar pattern in terms of support-demand imbalance can be traced when 
examining the role of another, perhaps more important, instrument -- Foreign Direct 
Investment, across the three groups of countries. What foreign aid implements through 
its conditionality, foreign direct investment and foreign corporations do just by 
definition, through their character, technology, and culture of performance. Their role is 
enormous in helping sustain and promote reform, as well in forming and developing the 
private sector necessary for that legal framework, thus also promoting political reform 
and the democratisation process. Foreign direct investment means even more: it is a 
justification of economic reforms, economic liberalisation, and the social costs of
275 EBRD, Transition Report 2000, p. 21, Table 2.2.
276 EBRD, Transition Report Update, May, 2003, p. 18, Table A 1.1.
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reform that have been borne domestically. Besides being an instrument for promoting 
the liberalisation process in any country in transition, it is an end in itself.
Vachudova observes that progress in the pre-accession process built credibility 
in the eyes of economic actors. She demonstrates that the growth in cumulative FDI in 
Central and Eastern European countries after they were actively engaged with the EU 
reform process was very large during 1995-2000 compared with the same indicator 
during 1990-1994. Trade relations grew incrementally throughout this entire period. As 
a result, pro-EU business groups in these countries became stronger, benefiting from 
evolving trade and economic relations.
According to the EBRD Transition Report, cumulative FDI inflows for 1989 - 
2002 in the Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries comprised US$1774 
per capita. In the countries of South-Eastern Europe for the same period, the figure was 
US$388 per capita, while for the CIS it was US$245 per capita, and would have been 
even lower if it had not been for foreign investment in the oil and gas sectors of 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. However, investment in the extractive sectors not only did 
not serve the ends listed above, but often retarded the reform process, both economic 
and political.
The overall analysis will not be complete, and the contrast in demand-support 
balance will not be that obvious, without presenting the levels of economic 
liberalisation that countries belonging to different groupings have achieved. 
Surprisingly, Armenia, with an Economic Freedom Indicator of 2.63, as put forward by 
the Heritage Foundation, has been continuously ahead of Croatia, at 3.11, Slovenia, at 
2.75, and, in the last three years, it has also been ahead of such a leading country in the 
first group as Poland, which scores 2.81 and is almost at the same level as Hungary at 
2.60, and yielding slightly to the Slovak Republic at 2.44, the Czech Republic at 2.39, 
and Latvia at 2.36. Armenia’s index of 2.63 is also ahead of the entire group of 
countries of South-Eastern Europe: Albania, 3.10; Bulgaria, 3.08; Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, 3.30; Macedonia, 3.04; and Romania, 3.66. On comparable levels to the 
countries of South-Eastern Europe is Moldova with an Economic Freedom Index equal 
to 3.09 and Georgia at 3.19.277 For Kyrgyzstan the indicator is 3.41. Economic 
freedom or economic openness shows a country’s willingness and readiness to accept
277 See Index of Economic Freedom-2004 by The Heritage Foundation, 2004. A higher 
score here means a lower level of performance.
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foreign direct investments. However, the volumes of per capita foreign direct 
investment for the year 2002, and cumulatively for 1991 -  2002, for the same countries 
are as follows: Armenia, $36 and $2214; Croatia, $254 and $1631; Poland, $108 and 
$1310; Hungary, $297 and $3413; Latvia, $21 and $131; and Romania, $52 and $396. 
For Moldova, these volumes amounted to $21 and $131, for Kyrgyzstan, $1 and $93 
and for Georgia, $35 and $221 (table 4.5).
Table 4.5 Foreign Direct Investment per capita in Post-Communist Countries, 1991-2001278 (in
US dollars)
C ountry 1991-2002 2002
Czech Republic 3504 833
Estonia 2276 209
Hungary 3413 297
Latvia 1182 108
Lithuania 1021 205
Croatia 1631 254
Poland 1310 108
Slovak Republic 1852 767
Slovenia 1818 832
Albania 27 44
Bulgaria 620 115
Macedonia, FYR 456 38
Romania 396 52
Serbia 213 18
Armenia 2214 36
Azerbaijan 678 170
Belarus 161 25
Georgia 221 35
Kazakhstan 979 174
Kyrgyz Republic 93 1
Moldova 131 21
Russia 188 24
Tajikistan 30 6
Turkmenistan 280 22
Ukraine 102 14
Uzbekistan 35 3
Security dimension
Although no security scores are used to measure the trade-off among political, 
economic and security policies of transition countries, a brief comparative overview of 
the dynamics and divergence in the evolution of security problems in the post-
278 The table is derived and computed from World development Indicators’ 2008 
database.
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communist space can also give an idea of how limited the legitimacy resource of the 
ruling elite can be in dealing with serious security issues without adequate external 
support and demand.
There are several internal conflicts in the transition space, essentially Central 
and Eastern Europe and the CIS. These conflicts are considered the most direct threat to 
sovereignty and security by the so-called host states. In this respect, the states in 
question expect the international community to recognise their territorial integrity and 
to reinforce it. This touches upon the very basics of the international system. States 
expect the international community to support actions and measures that they 
implement for the sake of preserving their territorial integrity. On the other hand, 
society or rather, the seceding part of society, expects the international community to 
recognise its claim to self-determination. These cases represent dilemmas that have 
remained unresolved in the transition space. For example, Chechnya is a security issue 
for Russia, and therefore, the state undertakes respective measures adequate to its 
understanding and interpretation of the problem. As mentioned above, a state’s natural 
demand would be to have international support for the steps it takes. However, 
Chechnya is also a human and political rights problem for the international community. 
Although Russia expected the international community to support its territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, the Council of Europe suspended the Russian delegation to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at the peak of the armed conflict.
Also, “the wars in Chechnya have acted as an indirect brake on Russia-EU 
relations.”279
The Balkan conflict was rather different, in the sense that it acquired a uniquely 
wide-scale and bloody character in the centre of Europe, and therefore, the international 
community became heavily engaged. The potential conflict between Hungary and 
Romania over Transylvania did not evolve and it was unique in the sense that it was 
resolved in a civilized way. Political divorces, such as those between the Czechs and 
Slovaks, and between Serbia and Montenegro, present unique cases. Putting aside the 
bloody wars between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Bosnians, Bosnians and Croats, and
279 For more details see Margot Light, “Russian Political Engagement with the 
European Union”, in Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe, Roy Allison, Margot 
Light and Stephen White, Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 61.
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Serbs and Kosovo, the above-mentioned cases in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe have managed to resolve their problems peacefully.
There are limits to the extent that any government will compromise the values
that compose the basis of its own legitimacy. State sovereignty and security are two of
the most basic values. In sovereignty-related cases, international demand/support is a
prerequisite for making or supporting unpopular or unconventional decisions. How
else, if not with the presence of the EU or the promise that it brings, can one explain the
fact of peaceful conflict resolution in Central and Eastern Europe, at least for the
above-mentioned cases? EU leverage also had a significant impact on improving the
security situation of CEE countries. Containing ethnic nationalism and maintaining
ethnic tolerance and the inviolability of the borders of the CEE countries was of great
importance to the EU. The role of the EU in cultivating and reinforcing a civic rather
than an ethnic notion of nationalism in these cases was significant and widely
acknowledged. Even such a potential conflict as the problem of the Russian minority in
the Baltic states was affected by the prospect of EU membership:
Russophones perceived the European Union as a factor developing a
political regime under which all residents in Estonia could receive equal
status via European citizenship, and would consequently be freed from
their exclusionary alien status. Estonians, on the other hand, had high
expectations regarding the EU role in providing security guarantees,
both domestic and foreign. Therefore, international ties are crucial both
to Russophones and to Estonians, although working in opposite
directions. The mutual will points westward, toward Europe, an
international environment which has constructively acted as a third party
mediating on-going domestic conflicts, making Estonia more
‘accessible’ to European values and mores and pushing Estonia towards
a more inclusive minority policy. This has enabled many Estonian
politicians to support their policies on the basis of Brussels’
• •  280 prescriptions.
The EU’s tremendous efforts in the CEECs were complemented by those of 
NATO. Any attempt to violate these norms had come into open conflict with those 
countries’ goal of attaining EU and NATO membership. The “Stability Pact” in 1993 
and later measures came to assert these principles openly and vigorously. As one can 
see, the EU’s enormous political, economic and security resources played a crucial role
280Eric Berg, “Local Resistance, National Identity and Global Swings in Post-Soviet 
Estonia”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2002, pp. 109-122, p.l 14.
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in advancing reforms in the CEEC’s. At the same time, it is obvious that none of these 
instruments was available for the rest of the transition countries.
Alexandra Gheciu finds that NATO greatly helped CEE elites to redefine their 
conceptions of liberal-democratic identity and interests and was involved in educating 
and shaping public opinion, especially on such issues as national identity.281 
Vachudova, however, argues that neither the Council of Europe nor NATO exerted 
influence using the same mechanisms as the EU’s active leverage. “Whatever influence 
these organisations did have was weaker than and different in kind from the active 
leverage of the EU.”282 1 would suggest that NATO, however, complemented the EU’s 
efforts to some extent, especially if one compares it with the situation in the CIS 
countries, where NATO’s socialization role was not any tangible.
One of the earliest international support/demand for the resolution of some of 
the open and violent conflicts in the CIS came from the OSCE. However, due to the 
nature of the organisation, its role was limited to facilitating peace talks. There is also a 
relatively recent EU initiative, ENP, which has political/security aspects, including 
conflict prevention and resolution, in its Country Action Plans for several countries of 
the CIS. However, as Michael Smith and Mark Webber indicate:
On the basis of overall effectiveness, ENP is not particularly inspiring in the 
area of political cooperation, though it may help facilitate this goal indirectly through 
the other policy domains.283
In sum, one can see that the resources and costs of transition are not equally and 
effectively distributed among the levels, especially if it is assumed that the interest in 
integration is equal at all levels. The evidence shows that there is indeed an imbalance 
in the supports for reforms in the transition countries of the CIS. In my opinion, this 
largely explains the poor performance of those countries during the transition process. 
In my second hypothesis, I suggested that there is an essential link and interplay not 
only among different policy areas -  economic, political, security -  but also an essential 
link and trade-off among different levels — domestic, state and international — within 
the overall transition process. In order for transition to succeed, it is important that the
281 Gheciu, 2005, p. 1009.
282 Vachudova, 2005, p. 132.
283 Smith and Webber, in Weber, Smith and Baun, 2008.
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resources and respective costs of transition have been effectively, that is, reasonably 
and in a timely manner, allocated among different levels.
High achievements in all spheres of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and Baltics indicate the crucial role of international support in transition. As the 
analysis of the indices of the countries of the CIS shows, countries have one general 
resource for the overall policymaking process, which is limited, and therefore, 
wherever they were successful in one sphere, the success came at the expense of the 
other. This is especially discernible in those countries where the demand and support 
for the government’s reform policies, first domestic and then international, are not 
satisfactory. In general, the analysis of indices of the countries of both groups supports 
my first hypothesis, in which I suggested that there is a strong interconnectedness and 
trade-off among a government’s economic, political and security policies during the 
transition. In addition, I argued that it is very unlikely that, with a limited political 
resource, any government would be able to conduct such a complex, systemic and 
simultaneous transformation as the transition, unless there is a sufficient level of 
external demand and support. According to these indices, the only exceptions would 
appear to be Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. While these two countries distinguished 
themselves with vigorous liberalisation, as we have seen from the analysis of vertical 
interaction, they did not receive consistent, effective and continuous demand and 
support from the international community.
Other analysts have noticed the unexpectedly good performance of Moldova 
and Kyrgyzstan as well. A study evaluating the interaction of initial conditions, 
political change, reforms and economic performance in a unified framework covering 
28 transition economies in East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the FSU, 
comparing all the available data and indices, alongside its general conclusions also 
notes that:
Countries such as Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic, Estonia and Lithuania 
have liberalized substantially more than expected given their initial 
conditions. In contrast, the Czech and Slovak republics, which faced 
favourable initial circumstances, show negative values of the residuals, 
despite the high degree of liberalization achieved. Belarus, Romani,
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Turkmenistan, and Ukraine liberalized substantially less than expected 
given their initial conditions.284
How did the governments of Moldova and Kyrgyzstan manage to distribute 
their political resource so evenly and succeed simultaneously, at least in the political 
and economic spheres, given the tremendous political, economic and security/state- 
building challenges that those countries faced. Was it due to the choice of correct 
policies and better timing and sequencing strategies? Was it due to elites and their 
choices or was it due to structural conditions? Would the two countries still look good 
if one added their performance in another vital sphere of transition -security, or did 
success in the economic and political dimensions in these countries come at the 
expense of security? In sum, the cases of Moldova and Kyrgyzstan deserve detailed 
scrutiny to see whether they represent a serious challenge to my argument. These cases 
will be analysed in the framework suggested in Chapter 3 to test my core arguments. To 
do that, I will analyse the triple process of state-building, and the building of market 
and democracy institutions in the two countries, in order to demonstrate how the 
interaction and the trade-off among key policy areas -- political, economic, security -- 
and among the three levels took place and what the key structural factors affecting that 
process were and what role the governments played. I will analyse the two countries’ 
domestic and foreign policy dynamics to demonstrate how the demands and supports 
(or pull and push) from domestic society and the international community shaped and 
re-shaped those policies.
284 Martha de Melo, Cevdet Denizer, Alen Gelb, and Stoyan Tenev, “Circumstances and 
Choice: the Role of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transition Economies”, The 
World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-31, p. 16, 26.
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Table 4.6 Foreign Economic Aid Per capita (current US $)285
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 1 22 13 10 14 14 12 11 44 32 43 31
Estonia 10 68 28 30 40 42 47 66 61 47 50
Hungary 6 61 22 16 20 -24 20 18 24 25 25 41
Latvia 1 31 13 21 25 29 33 41 42 38 45
Lithuania 1 25 17 20 49 25 29 38 38 28 37
Poland 35 66 37 28 47 98 30 22 23 31 36 25
Slovak Republic 1 22 12 9 15 18 18 13 29 59 21 30
Slovenia 4 16 26 41 50 21 16 31 63
Albania 3 101 122 90 51 57 72 53 86 157 102 85
Bulgaria 2 37 17 14 19 14 22 26 29 33 38 44
Bosnia &Herzeg. 2 11 109 273 239 236 240 269 185 157
FYR Macedonia
Romania 11 14 10 7 7 13 10 10 16 17 19 29
Serbia&Monten. 5 9 7 9 10 64 107 123
Armenia 1 6 32 57 66 90 52 61 67 69 69
Azerbaijan 0 5 11 19 15 12 23 15 21 17 28
Belarus 18 27 18 12 22 8 5 4 4 4 4
Georgia 0 4 22 33 39 58 45 39 46 32 55
Kazakhstan 7 1 1 3 4 8 9 14 11 13 10
Kyrgyz Republic 5 25 38 62 50 51 50 58 44 38
Moldova 2 7 12 15 8 15 9 25 29 28
Russia 2 4 13 16 12 11 9 5 7 13 11 8
Tajikistan 2 5 12 11 17 14 26 20 23 25
Turkmenistan 2 7 6 6 5 3 5 5 6 13
Ukraine 6 7 11 6 6 6 8 5 9 11 11 11
Uzbekistan 3 3 1 4 4 6 7 6 8 6
285 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC, 2001.
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Table 4. 7 Average Economic Liberalisation and Democracy scores for Post-communist States (1990-2005)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Central and Eastern Europe & Baltics
Hungary
Lib. 1.9 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Dem. 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Poland
Lib 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
Dem. 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Czech
Republic
Lib 1.0 2.4 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9
Dem. 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Estonia
Lib 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9
Dem. 2.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Lithuania
Lib 1.2 1.2 1.8 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.7
Dem. 2.3 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Slovenia
Lib 1.8 2.0 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Dem. 2.3 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Slovak
Republic
Lib 1.0 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8
Dem. 3.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Lativia
Lib 1.0 1.2 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7
Dem. 2.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
South Eastern Europe
Albania
Lib 1.0 1.1 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1
Dem. 7.6 4.4 4.3 2.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
Bulgaria
Lib 1.1 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5
Dem. 3.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Macedonia
Lib 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2
Dem. 3.4 3.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.3 4.4 3.3 3.3
Croatia
Lib 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
Dem. 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 2.3 3.2 2.2 2.2
Romania Lib 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
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Dem. 5.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Western Commonwealth o f Independent States and Caucasus
Moldova
Lib 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Dem. 5.4 5.5 5.5 4.4 4.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.4 3.4
Armenia
Lib 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2
Dem. 5.5 4.3 3.4 3.4 4.4 5.4 5.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Azerbaijan
Lib 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8
F 5.5 5.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Belarus
Lib 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
Dem. 4.4 4.3 5.4 4.4 5.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
Georgia
Lib 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Dem. 6.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 4.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Russia
Lib. 1.0 1.1 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0
Dem 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Ukraine
Lib. 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0
Dem 3.3 3.3 4.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Central Asia
Kazakhstan
Lib. 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Dem. 5.4 5.5 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Kyrgyzstan
Lib 1.0 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Dem. 5.4 4.2 5.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Tajikistan
Lib. 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6
Dem. 3.3 6.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5
Turkmenistan
Lib. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
Dem. 6.5 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
Uzbekistan
Lib. 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1
Dem. 6.5 6.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
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Table 4.8 Freedom House Index and Years o f Ascension in to Council o f  Europe286
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Croatia 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 2.3 3.2 2.2 2.2
Czech Republic 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Estonia 2.3 3.3 3.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Hungary 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 L2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Latvia 2.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Lithuania 2.3 2.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Poland 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Slovak Republic 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Slovenia 2.3 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Albania 7.6 4.4 4.3 2.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
Bulgaria 3.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Bosnia &Herzeg. 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 HEQ 4.4
FYR Macedonia 3.4 3.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.3 4.4 3.3 3.3
Romania 5.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
Serbia&Monten. 5.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.5 4.4 3.3 3.2 w arn
Armenia 5.5 4.3 3.4 3.4 4.4 5.4 5.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Azerbaijan 5.5 5.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.5 m 6.5 6.5
Belarus 4.4 4.3 5.4 4.4 5.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
Georgia 6.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 4.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Kazakhstan 5.4 5.5 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Kyrgyz Republic 5.4 4.2 5.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Moldova 5.4 5.5 5.5 4.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.4 3.4
Russia 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Tajikistan 3.3 6.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5
Turkmenistan 6.5 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
Ukraine 3.3 3.3 4.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Uzbekistan 6.5 6.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
286 Ali Piano, Arch Puddington, and Mark Y. Rosenberg (eds.), Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey o f Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties, Freedom House, 2003.
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CHAPTER 5
Kyrgyzstan’s Transition Path: Inevitable Process or Subjective
Choice?
Based on the framework developed in chapter 3, in this chapter I will try to test my 
assumptions on Kyrgyzstan’s transition experience. In particular, my first assumption is 
that there is a strong interconnectedness and trade-off among economic, political and 
security policies during the transition, which inevitably generates social costs and limits 
the amount of political resource that the government has available for transition reforms. 
To test this assumption, the transition in Kyrgyz republic will be viewed, first, as a 
political process of horizontal interaction of political, economic, and security policies.
My second assumption is related to the first. To further explain policy choices and 
change, one also needs to look at across level interaction. I assume that there is an 
essential link and interplay not only among different policy areas -- economic, political, 
security -  but there is also an essential link and trade-off among different levels — 
domestic, state and international — within the overall transition process. And, in order for  
transition to succeed, it is important that the resources and respective costs o f  transition 
have been effectively, that is reasonably and in a timely manner, distributed among those 
levels. In other words, one needs to check whether the support-demand balance has been 
vertically provided.
The shifts on the domestic front are reflected in the country’s foreign policy. 
Changes in foreign policy direction may lead to changes in international support and 
demand, which will affect the transition process within the country.
Others have recognised the importance of this linkage as well. Gleason, for 
example, has tried to explore the extent to which the foreign policies of the Central Asian 
states have facilitated or promoted domestic political developments And what the 
relationship is “between the foreign development strategy adopted and domestic
9 8 7democratization”
287 Gregory Gleason, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Central Asia”, Central 
Asian Survey, Vol. 20. No.2, 2001, pp. 167-182.
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Thus, my third assumption is that the interaction o f  horizontal and vertical 
dimensions is reflected in the domestic and foreign policy relationship, thus creating an 
essential and direct link and interplay between domestic and foreign policy dynamics 
during the transition.
Based on the comparative study conducted in chapter 4, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova 
seemed not to support my assumptions about the common pattern of transition. As we shall 
see later, Kyrgyzstan seriously retreated from its reform path. Already by the mid-1990s, 
growing authoritarianism had begun to replace the extraordinarily rapid democratisation 
and liberalisation of the first years. So far, no comprehensive explanation has been offered 
to explain this trajectory of success and decline.
1) What factors are responsible for such developments and changes? Can they be 
attributed mainly to the role played by the country’s leadership or have there been more 
fundamental national and international structural factors and constraints present?
I do not underestimate the role of leaders and elites in shaping differing policy 
responses to similar circumstances. For example, it is difficult to detach President Akaev’s 
long years of presidency from the current history of Kyrgyzstan, with its accomplishments 
and failures. To what extent those accomplishments and failures should be attributed to the 
personal traits of President Akaev and to what extent they are due to national and 
international structural constraints and factors is an issue worthy of scholarly discussion.
2) Can transition succeed in all three dimensions simultaneously, without external 
support; or does success in one dimension come at the expense of others? Would even the 
best strategies of timing and sequencing of reform policies alone make it possible to 
eliminate problems of social hardship and declining political legitimacy, which accompany 
and impede the transition process, without external support and demand? Were external 
factors, international demands and supports important and, if so, to what extent?
Addressing these issues will also help to explain whether the case of Kyrgyzstan’s 
transition supports my assumptions.
Most of the studies analysing the successes and failures of Kyrgyzstan’s transition 
discuss only one side of the problem, highlighting the importance of one specific variable 
or another. For example, some studies suggest that focusing on “internal” factors, such as 
clans and pacts among the clans, is the best way to understand the causes of
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authoritarianism in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan. Other studies tend to focus on 
Akaev’s personal preferences.288 There are very few attempts to address the issues in a 
more complex and multidimensional manner. For instance, in her article “Democratisation, 
Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia,” Anna Matveeva stresses the important 
role of political legitimacy, as I suggest in my concept, as a driving motivation in the
^OQ
political process. The ruling groups in Central Asia, she finds, are also concerned with
the issues of political change and the legitimacy of their rule.
The domestic requirement to provide a basis for legitimacy derives from 
two considerations. First, legitimacy embodies the consent of the majority 
of the population, and it is easier to rule in conditions of compliance than to 
rely heavily on enforcement mechanisms. Secondly, international pressure 
and fear of exclusion from the Western sphere of influence make ever more 
acute the need to be accepted as legitimate.... Politicians are concerned 
with legitimacy as they are interested in stability, which legitimate rule is 
more likely to deliver.290
The question that Matveeva raises about the state of affairs in the Central-Asian
countries emphasises the link between the legitimacy of the rulers and the extent to which
they can afford to be democratic.
The issue is whether democracy as such is unsuitable as a basis for 
legitimate political order in Central Asia, or whether democratisation 
projects live through hard times because the forms in which they were 
implemented failed to take into account Central-Asian realities.291
The conclusion that the author arrives at, as I do in my framework, emphasises the 
link between security -  both domestic and state -- and policy choices, in this case the
288 See Kathleen Collins, “Clan, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia”, Journal o f  Democracy 
Vol. 13, No. 3, 2002, pp. 137-152.
289 Anna Matveeva, “Democratisation, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, 1999, pp. 23-24.
290 Matveeva, 1999, p. 23.
291 Mateeva, 1999, p. 31.
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chosen goals and outcomes of the transition process.
The emergent regimes are, at best, a hybrid between authoritarianism and 
democracy; at worst, a choice between state disintegration and 
totalitarianism. If the choice appears to be one between civil war, a 
gangster economy, and corrupt networks as a surrogate for politics, on the 
one hand, or authoritarian regimes headed by personal leaders who promise 
law and order, on the other, it is hardly surprising if attempts are made to 
install authoritarian rule.292
What I want to emphasise in this statement is not the conclusion itself but the 
linkage between the level of a state’s security and that of democratisation. It supports my 
argument that there is a trade-off among political, economic, and security dimensions for 
every government and the governments of transitional countries are particularly sensitive 
to that trade-off, due to their limited “reservoirs” of legitimacy and the scarcity of 
resources that can be invested.
Analysing Central Asia’s future, some authors come to conclusions that are even 
more sceptical. Paul Kubicek, for instance, goes even further and argues that under the 
circumstances, cost-benefit calculations leave no room for democratic development. 
Policies have costs, and one must weigh their costs against each other. In essence, then, the 
question is transformed into a pragmatic one: would democracy be effective? In the 
context of post-communist Central Asia, a variety of other goals must be considered, such 
as constructing nation-states, building effective political institutions, and modernizing the 
economy, while at the same time preventing social upheaval. These are formidable tasks,
9Q^and current conditions will provide little room for democracy to consolidate itself.
Of course, one can disagree with the substance of these statements. However, the 
view that the level of authoritarianism or the level of democracy is not a predetermined 
policy but rather derives from the circumstances, as a natural and cost-effective response to 
the situation, is essential to my thesis. According to Kubicek, democracy may not only be
292 Matveeva, 1999, p. 36.
90^ Paul Kubicek, “Authoritarianism in Central Asia: curse or cure? ”, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 19, No 1, pp. 29- 43, 1998, p. 41.
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ineffective but it may even be destructive for the integrity of the society in some 
circumstances.
Kubicek strongly highlights the links among different policy goals, which are core 
to my concept. And more importantly, he finds that the status quo reflects the existing state 
of affairs:
Is it worth risking democracy today, knowing that it could jeopardize social 
stability or even the very integrity of the state? Is a democratic experiment 
“worth” the possible cost of another Tajikistan? Is it realistic to expect that 
democracy could survive in the current conditions of Central Asia? These 
questions need to be answered, and they all seem to point towards 
acceptance of the status quo, although this does not mean that the most 
atrocious features of these regimes must or should be accepted.294
Another observation, emphasizing the importance of vertical linkages, 
Kyrgyzstan’s unique trajectory of reforms and the international community’s interest in 
integrating Kyrgyzstan, is suggested in the report prepared by the International Crisis 
Group (ICG). Since its independence, Kyrgyzstan has been described as an island of 
democracy and stability in the region. The ICG report acknowledges that compared with 
other countries in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has indeed carried out deeper economic and 
political reforms and has conducted politics that are more democratic. The report goes on 
to point out that:
Recent developments, however, indicate that this stability is fragile, and 
that hard-won democratic gains are being eroded. If the government of 
Kyrgyzstan resorts to authoritarianism or crumbles under the weight of the 
country’s moribund economy, the international community will suffer a 
setback for its hopes of the state and the society in Central Asia... 
International support and constructive pressure will be crucial in helping 
President Akaev embrace a more responsible political direction.295
In his article “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist 
World,” Jeffrey Kopstein demonstrates that geographic proximity to the West has a
294 Kubicek, 1998, p. 41.
295 International Crisis Group, Asia report No. 22: Kyrgyzstan At Ten: Trouble in the 
Island o f  Democracy”, 2001, p. III.
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positive influence on the transition of post-communist states. He explains the failure of 
Kyrgyzstan by its geographical isolation in the East. He tries to prove statistically that 
“location matters more than domestic policy itself in determining outcomes, or at least
9QAappears to influence which policies are chosen.” What is valuable about Kopstein’s 
approach is that he attempts to go further and explain why “spatial context” (proximity to 
the West, behaviours of neighbouring states) influences transition outcomes. Among the 
explanations the author provides, he especially underscores the “impact of external actors
9 0 7on the structure of domestic interests and the policies chosen by elites.” Kopstem 
concludes, “externally induced incentives are part of what accounts for differences in 
institutional reform, state behaviour, and popular discourse in the countries of 
postcommunist Europe.”298 And, in this regard, no matter how well the states of Central 
Asia perform, their policies have been constrained by “their isolation, their politically and 
economically unstable and undemocratic neighbours, and the absence of sustained outside 
sponsorship by economically powerful, democratic states.”299
Michael Mandelbaum suggests that democratic ideas and institutions can spread 
through what might be called the “membership effect.” The post-communist countries 
aspire to become members of Western-dominated international and regional organisations, 
which require adopting western values, institutions, and laws. According to Mandelbaum, 
the closer a country is to the West geographically, the better its chance of becoming a part 
of the West, and the greater are its incentives to reconstruct its political and economic 
structures into the Western form. “With a fully functioning market economy, the Czech 
republic can expect to gain admission to the European Union,” states Mandelbaum. “This 
will not be possible for Kyrgyzstan, however,” the author continues, “not in the near 
future, no matter how pristine its capitalism.”300
296 Jeffrey Kopstein, “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist 
World” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2000, pp. 1-37, p. 24.
297 Kopstein, 2000, p. 25.
298 Kopstein, 2000, p. 25.
299 Kopstein, 2000, p. 36.
300 Michael Madelbaum, (ed.), “Introduction,” Post-Communism: Four perspectives, 
Council on Foreign Relations Books, 1996, p. 15.
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As one can see, different authors reveal and emphasise different factors and links 
between the transition policies and goals. However, separately these factors do not fully 
explain Kyrgyzstan’s transition trajectory. To come up with a more comprehensive 
explanation, I will try to analyse the links and interplay among transition factors, goals and 
policies in Kyrgyzstan, based on the framework developed in chapter 3.
Horizontal Dimension
How did horizontal interaction take place among different policy goals, and how 
did policy choices and policy changes occur in Kyrgyzstan? This section discusses the 
country’s transition policies in the economic, political and security/state-building domains, 
as well as their interplay, in order to highlight the domestic factors that influenced the 
country’s overall transition path.
Political Aspect
Before discussing the domestic politics of Kyrgyzstan, it would be useful to 
highlight several major factors that affected Kyrgyz state-building and transition, such as 
its weak national identity and the tribal nature of Kyrgyz society, the political culture, 
based solely on the previous Soviet experience and the absence of any prior democratic 
experience; its geographic location and the presence of large Russian and Uzbek minorities 
in the country. Other conditions, such as a low level of economic development, a 
traditional culture, a weak civil society, the leading role of the old nomenclature (if not 
within the government, within the opposition) and ethnic cleavages, continue to affect the 
development of Kyrgyz statehood. They also influence the country’s domestic and foreign 
policy choices and overall transition process.
T A 1
For detailed discussion of Kyrgyz history and identity, see Denis Sinor, The 
Cambridge History o f Early Inner Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1990; 
Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation o f  Nations, New York: New York 
University Press, 2000; William Fierman, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
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Many dormant conflicts in the post-communist space were activated when the 
USSR started to collapse, and Kyrgyzstan was no exception.302 In June 1990, the first 
ethnic clash between Kyrgyz and Uzbek occurred in the southern Osh of Fergana Valley, 
which is mostly populated by Uzbeks, the third largest minority in the country. The 
Kyrgyz Communist Party was unable to cope with ethnic violence in the southern city of 
Osh. This further weakened the Party’s hold on power and accelerated its downfall within 
only few months. It was based on such legacy that the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet sought to 
contain the mounting tension by choosing a new president in October 1990. Askar Akaev, 
who was a physicist, had not held high office in the Communist Party. Although he had 
limited political experience, he was a compromise candidate acceptable to all parties in the 
Supreme Soviet. In August 1991, Kyrgyzstan declared its independence, and in October 
1991, Akaev was elected in a nationwide referendum. With the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, the Kyrgyz Republic joined the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 
December 1991. Concerned by the rising exodus of Russians and other non-indigenous 
groups, whose departure affected the industrial sector and other areas employing skilled 
workers, Akaev took a number of steps to encourage them to stay. He made the Russian 
language an official language of the republic in 2001 (although in late 2001, the 
Constitutional Court turned down a proposal to allow dual citizenship with Russia). Akaev 
also sought to satisfy some of the demands of the Kyrgyz nationalists —setting aside some 
privatised farmland for ethnic Kyrgyz — while restricting their more extremist elements.
President Akaev’s reformist ideas were very radical and ambitious. On taking 
office, Akaev initiated democratic institution-building and substantial political 
liberalisation, encouraging the development of a more open press and the emergence of 
civil society. He even announced his country’s intention to remain neutral and not to have 
an army. He wanted to turn the country into the Switzerland of Central Asia. He espoused 
massive privatisation and shock therapy. However, while undertaking that enormous task, 
he was not successful in implementing reforms at the speed he wanted and delivering the
302 For detailed discussion of political developments in post-soviet Kyrgyzstan see Gregory 
Gleason, Central Asia: Discovering Independence, Boulder: Westview 1997; ShireenT. 
Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, Westport: Praeger, 1996; Ronald Z. Sagdeev 
and Susan Eisenhower (eds.), Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change, Chevy 
Chase: CPSS press, 1995; Lena Jonson, Russia and Central Asia: A New Web o f  Relations, 
London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998.
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results he promised. Moreover, the implementation of radical reforms has brought negative 
side effects. Not only did the conservative part of the country’s elite turn to open 
opposition, but also some of his own supporters in the Supreme Soviet and the Communist 
Party started to oppose his policies. As a result, there was a movement to oust Akaev at the 
same time as the attempted coup against Gorbachev in Moscow in August 1991. In 
reaction, the president banned the Communist Party and seized its assets. Realising that the 
Soviet Union was doomed, Akaev also moved his country to independence, which few in 
the country wanted. Akaev was the most liberal leader in Central Asia, although his 
liberalism had its limitations. When he stood for president in a direct election in October 
1991, no opposition candidate was allowed to register. In 1992, he continued to use former 
communists in the government to ensure that the state was tightly run and to prevent the 
growing number of Kyrgyz nationalist groups from gaining power. Akaev was able to keep 
control until late 1993 because he faced a divided opposition: there were a large number of 
fragmented nationalist groups, and there were reformed communists who were more 
committed to improving inter-ethnic relations than to supporting economic and political 
reforms.
While on the one hand, Akaev was trying to widen the scope of his powers, on the 
other hand, the Supreme Soviet was proposing to curtail his powers, thus trying to 
maintain a balance between the executive and legislative branches of government. In 
addition, inter-ethnic relations had grown increasingly tense. Russians left the country in 
large numbers due to worsening socio-economic conditions in the country, and their 
proportion declined to only 17 percent from 22 percent of the population in 1989.
The economic situation in the South worsened and the Uzbeks of Osh were badly 
hit by the temporary severance of trade with Uzbekistan after the hostile reaction of the 
Uzbek authorities to the Kyrgyz Republic’s currency reform of May 1993. Uzbekistan 
closed its border with Kyrgyzstan and imposed border controls.
The situation deteriorated in late 1993 when the government was accused of 
appropriating part of the country’s gold reserves. The government collapsed, Kulov 
resigned, and Akaev's position was in danger. Former high-ranking Communist Party 
nomenclature members who were members of parliament led this anti-incumbent attack. In 
response to these attacks, which threatened to bring a rapid decline of his legitimacy,
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Akaev called a referendum of confidence in himself on January 30, 1994. The United 
States sent Vice President A1 Gore to demonstrate the extent of American support. Akaev 
was constantly cited by the United States as an example of how democracy could flourish 
in Central Asia. This step of international/foreign support was a significant legitimacy 
boost for Akaev.
It should be noted that not every new leader in the post-Soviet space was given 
such support during the elections. In addition to the referendum of confidence, Akaev also 
offered the positions of prime minister and deputy prime minister to communists in order 
to bolster his position. This shows that because of the shock reforms Communists started to 
enjoy popularity among the public and President Akaev chose to neutralize his opponents 
by bringing them into the government. Moreover, while reaching a political compromise 
with his opposition was a positive step from the perspective of democratic theory, it also 
marked the beginning of the erosion of Akaev’s reformist policy.
According to some sources, the referendum of confidence in January of 1994 was 
manipulated; with a 95.9 percent turnout, Akaev won 96.2 percent of the vote. In sum, 
Akaev received a new volume of domestic and international support to continue his 
policies. Encouraged by the referendum result, he started to take drastic steps to weaken 
the legislative branch. Since it was not a professional parliament, many deputies in the 
Zhogorku Kenesh were either regional governors or heads of administration and thus, 
dependent on the patronage of the executive. Using this leverage, Akaev ensured that they 
boycotted parliament, thus paralysing its work and forcing the government to resign.
On the same day that he received his vote of confidence, President Akaev issued 
thirteen economic reform decrees launching radical economic reforms. It was widely 
recognised that the core of the dispute between the president and the parliament was the 
issue of economic reform, with Akaev being perceived as the pro-reform progressive force 
and the parliament as an anti-reformist remnant from the Soviet era. Early in his tenure, he 
argued that the Kyrgyz parliament was populated with Soviet-era holdovers who opposed 
political and economic reforms. This assertion was generally viewed with sympathy by 
liberal forces both in Kyrgyzstan and abroad. To proceed further with his reform agenda, 
Akaev sought to reduce parliament’s powers in favour of the executive, gradually turning
303 ITAR-TASS news agency, “Akayev scores ‘landslide’ in referendum”, February 1, 1994.
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the country into a “delegative democracy” where the president rules by decrees and 
horizontal accountability is absent.304 All powers had passed into the president’s hands, 
with the justification that it was necessary for the sake of the reforms.
In sum, in only three to four years after coming to power as a democratic leader, 
Akaev had lost a significant amount of public and elite support due to the radical reforms 
he conducted in the economic sphere, his state-building policies and the external and 
internal security threats to the country (as I will demonstrate in the next two sections). He 
started pursuing mutually contradictory policies at the same time; on the one hand, he 
pushed a new cycle of radical economic reform, which was becoming more and more 
difficult due to the rising social and political costs. On the other hand, he used the need for 
further reforms as a pretext to gradually alter the established democratic institutions to 
further strengthen his hold on power. In this early period, it is obvious that, at least in the 
political sphere, Akaev also had relatively high international support (as demonstrated by 
OSCE/ODHIR statements on Kyrgyz elections, foreign visits, etc.), which, however, was 
not accompanied with a similarly persistent and adequate international demand for not 
diverting from the democratic path. This almost unconditional international support waned 
relatively late.
Interestingly, the consolidation of his power coincided with Akaev’s attacks on the 
free press, which had become unprecedentedly hostile to him. In general, the media in 
the Kyrgyz Republic were relatively free compared to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan until 
President Akaev began to curb their activities in 1995. Since then, anti-government
304 Guillermo O’Donnell describes Delegative Democracy as a political system that meets 
Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy but is less representative and more majoritarian, 
extremely plebiscitary, and anti-institutional. See Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative 
Democracy,” Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 55-69.
305 A Russian-language newspaper published by the Zhogorku Kenesh, Svobodnyye Gory, 
was banned by the courts, legal procedures were used against two other publications: 
Politika and Res Publika.
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newspapers have often come under pressure and in early 2002, legal cases stopped the 
operation of several papers critical of the government.
The parliament’s hostility to Akaev's reforms and repeated allegations of high-level 
corruption in the executive branch led to confrontation between the president and the 
parliament. Akaev responded by circumventing the legislature. The isolation of the 
parliament and successful harassment of the press gave Akaev the ability to reshape and 
alter the political landscape in a way that best fitted his political aspirations and, most 
importantly, the security of his presidency. To expand his powers further, he proposed 
changes in the constitution that had been adopted in 1993. On October 22, 1994, a 
referendum ratified the new presidential powers (including the right to call more referenda) 
and altered the structure of the legislative branch to reduce the number of deputies.
Askar Akaev’s main argument for changing the structure of the parliament was that 
it made the legislative branch a better reflection of the entire social spectrum of society. 
The new parliament was to be transitional, as the country was only taking its first steps 
towards democracy. He argued that a “Westem-style parliamentary system was not
•  • •  0^7practical while the country had a weak economy and an under-developed civil society.”
In reality, however, he was hoping to have a more compliant parliament by forming an 
informal pro-government majority. To his frustration, the main opponents who had led the 
attacks on him in the previous parliament were elected to the upper house in the first round 
of voting. It was obvious that this parliament would be even more hostile to political and 
economic reforms. Not surprisingly, Akaev took advantage of existing divisions among the 
deputies and once more expanded his powers at the expense of the parliament by 
introducing new rules. Interestingly, the parliamentary elections in 1995 were reported by
306 More than 400 newspapers were registered in late 2001, but their accessibility is limited. 
Russian-language newspapers published in Bishkek have the largest circulation: in 1998 
more than 80% of newspaper copies sold were in Russian. Russian-language channels, 
including ORT and RTR, attract the largest audiences. According to the UN, the number of 
television sets dropped from 18 per 100 inhabitants in 1992 to just 8 per 100 inhabitants in 
2000, Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003, Kyrgyz Republic, p. 22.
307 Liz Fuller and Michael Mihalka, “The IMF delegation in Bishkek was waiting for the 
election results, before going ahead with loans to the Central Bank,” OMRI Daily Digests, 
February 6, 1995.
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observer missions of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to 
have been “generally fair, with quite high turnout and inessential criticism of the practice 
of multiple voting by heads of families and other minor irregularities countenanced by the
• •  '3 A O
authorities.” However, as Paul Kubicek puts it, the case of the 1995 parliamentary 
elections in Kyrgyzstan, the freest elections in the region, is instructive. “This does not 
necessarily mean that the formation of more democratic systems will be more reformist or 
responsive in Central Asia.”309
Although tensions continued between the parliament and the president, the 
institutions of civil society developed relatively freely. The Nations in Transit score 
measuring civil society’s independence, influence, and viability remained the same (4.50) 
during the years 1997 - 2005. In contrast, the attitude towards the independent media and 
therefore, freedom of speech, deteriorated drastically. The relevant score given by Freedom 
House, reflecting the existence and implementation of relevant policies promoting an 
independent media, declined from 5 to 6 in 2005.310 Akaev imposed a number of 
restrictions on the independent media and the political opposition. The presidential 
administration defended its actions by arguing that strong executive powers were needed to 
deal with pressing security and economic problems. In fact, however, they were exploiting 
existing difficulties to establish that Akaev was irreplaceable. During the 2000 presidential 
elections, for example, the president’s supporters argued that the opposition’s lack of 
experience and integrity would put not only the safety, but even the very existence, of 
Kyrgyzstan at risk. Akaev won the elections with more than 74 percent of the vote despite 
widespread accusations of irregularities. After the election, relations between the executive 
branch and the parliament steadily eroded, as did the relationship between the presidential 
administration and the media. This is a vivid example of how the government can use 
propaganda, as suggested in previous chapters, to shape public perceptions in order to gain
-JA O
OSCE/ ODIHR, Statement on the parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan, 1994.
309 Kubicek, 1998, p. 40.
Jeannette Goehring and Amanda Schnetzer, Nations in Transit 2005: Democratization 
in East Central Europe and Eurasia, Freedom House, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 2005.
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the support of the domestic society, in an attempt to fill the legitimacy gap resulting from 
inefficient economic, security, and other policies.
One can also observe that as the leadership gained more power, it became more 
authoritarian in an attempt to defend itself against rising criticism, to maintain itself in 
office, and to stay in power unchallenged and unopposed. For example, in 1995, the pro- 
presidential block in parliament began a campaign to cancel the 1996 presidential 
elections. The argument used was that the presidential polls would be unnecessarily 
divisive for society and the elite. Government officials claimed by September to have 
collected more than 1.16 million signatures in favour of a referendum that, following the 
precedents in Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, would cancel the presidential 
elections and keep the president in power for another five years unopposed. The 
Legislative Assembly blocked the referendum campaign. However, two days later, the 
Assembly voted unanimously to bring elections forward by a year, to December 24, 1995.
During his electoral campaign, Akaev stressed that he would focus in the future on 
three major issues: (1) the revival of the economy, (2) the prevention of the emigration of 
the Russian-speaking population, and (3) the resolution of tension between the inhabitants 
of northern and southern Kyrgyzstan, knowing that the people of southern Kyrgyzstan 
were dissatisfied with the fact that almost all key government positions were filled by
O i l
northerners. Thus, domestic society’s integrity was a major concern already in 1995 and 
was further exacerbated by the growing economic hardship.
Akaev won a decisive victory in the December elections. There were two 
explanations for this. First, he changed the electoral rules to make it harder for opposition 
nominees to register as candidates. He controlled the Central Electoral Commission and 
the media. Second, under the circumstances, Akaev was presented, and eventually viewed 
by the large majority of Kyrgyz society, as the only candidate who could resolve the 
problems that the Kyrgyz state and society faced. Not surprisingly, 71.6 percent of the 86 
percent of the electorate who cast their vote reportedly voted in favour of Akaev remaining 
as president. Most interestingly, the representatives of the UNDP and the OSCE described
311 Interfax, October 11, 1995.
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the presidential election as "generally free and open" and a step forward compared to the 
parliamentary elections.312
One can observe that already in 1995 the support-demand from the international 
community was not adequate in the case of Kyrgyzstan. The support that the country was 
getting from the international community (i.e., positive evaluations of manipulated 
elections) was not accompanied by an adequate demand on the government of Kyrgyzstan 
to become more democratic. In other words, there was not enough pressure from outside 
for further political reforms. In fact, in the public polls conducted in 1999 only 25 percent 
of those interviewed were satisfied with the course of political reforms, while 46 percent of
•  inthem were dissatisfied. These data mean that there was a demand from domestic society 
for a change, which was not met by the government.
Successfully retaining his office, Akaev spent 1996 enhancing his position. 
Immediately after the election, Akaev submitted a draft law, which would give him 
sweeping powers. The new law, which was passed with a 94.31 percent “yes” vote on 
February 10, 1996, vastly expanded the powers of the Kyrgyz presidency. The President 
would have the power to personally formulate domestic and foreign policy, coordinate the 
functioning of the branches of government, and directly appoint and dismiss cabinet 
ministers, ambassadors, and judges without consulting the Kyrgyz parliament. The 
opposition in the Zhogorku Kengesh criticised the draft as an attempt to turn Kyrgyzstan 
into a "presidential republic."314 Once again, Akaev presented the expansion of his powers 
as necessary in order to accelerate economic, political, and legal reforms and to rein in
^  1 c
regional and clan influences in the Kyrgyz government.
The rest of 1996 was characterised by a continued presidential anti-corruption 
drive. Large numbers of officials were sacked or disciplined, with little noticeable effect on
312 Reuters, December 28, 1995.
313 Talanbek Sakishev and Sergey Doronin, “Are We Able to Use Public Opinion or Not” 
in Res Publica, Bishkek, December 28, 1999, p. 3. (in Russian) 1200 people were 
interviewed by SGI CMA independent sociological centre.
314 OMRI Daily Digest, January 10, 1996.
315 Jamestown Foundation's Broadcast, “Kyrgyz President Expands Powers”, February 14, 
1996, Vol. II, No. 31.
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the level of corruption. In parallel, the president also continued his pressure on the 
independent press. It was in this period that Amnesty International indicated that the 
country had taken some steps backwards. According to their report, while Kyrgyzstan was 
still the most democratic of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, there was an 
alarming departure from the international community's ideals of human rights.316 However, 
even at that time Western analysts were still optimistic about the future of Kyrgyz 
democracy. Some analysts even thought that some democratic procedures were perhaps 
incompatible with the existing political culture and national traditions of Kyrgyzstan, and it 
would take time for the country’s leadership to introduce them. They concluded that in 
order for Kyrgyzstan to keep its image of a democratic country, “a method of introducing 
these accepted Western norms without gross deviation from traditional wisdom must be
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found.” The U.S. State Department's annual human rights report, issued on January, 
1997, said that the human rights situation in Central Asia had deteriorated in 1996. The 
report noted that the growth of presidential power in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan caused 
them to lag in the development of democracy and human rights.318
Further developments deepened Akaev’s authoritarian stance. In 1998, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that he could stand for a third term. Following his court 
victory, Akaev initiated further constitutional changes in 1998.
The presidential elections in 2000 again registered a decisive victory for the 
incumbent president. According to the OSCE, the “remarkable level of transparency” in 
that poll “had been marred by irregularities.” The report concluded that “The 2000 Kyrgyz 
presidential election failed to comply with OSCE commitments for democratic elections.” 
Nevertheless, “democratic developments in the Kyrgyz Republic remain comparatively
-J 1 Q
viable though increasingly challenged.”
316 Amnesty International, Kyrgyzstan: A tarnished human rights record, May 1996, AI 
INDEX: EUR 58/01/96 at http://web.amnesty.org.
317 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic Glow Dims”, OMRIAnalytical Brief #140, 
1996.
318 OMRI Daily Digest, January 31, 1997.
319 OSCE/ODIHR, Preliminary statement on the presidential election in Kyrgyzstan, 29 
October 2000 at http://osce.org/odihr-elections/documents.html.
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In sum, one could observe further attempts to fill the government’s increasing 
deficit of legitimacy — resulting from the deteriorating economy, security, and inadequate 
policies -  not only by pro-incumbent rhetoric but also by constant consolidation of 
presidential power at the expense of other branches. After his election in 2000, Akaev 
launched a new set of initiatives to alter key democratic institutions: changes in the 
constitution, election law, in the status of the judiciary, and in the role of political parties. 
All of these changes were aimed at minimising the accountability of the executive branch 
as well as preventing any challenge to the president’s authority. Thus, Akaev tried to make 
his power look both legal and legitimate, by institutionalising the existing de facto, pro- 
presidential status quo.
Although the first Kyrgyz constitution adopted in 1993 provided for a relatively 
fair distribution of power between the president, government, and parliament, repeated 
amendments by Akaev gradually increased his powers at the expense of parliament. Once 
again a referendum was conducted in February 2003, to boost Akaev’s legitimacy and 
respond to a wave of increasing political unrest. The new amendments granted legal 
immunity to former presidents, their families, and changed the election system from a 
proportional to a majoritarian system. The opposition again was severely critical and made 
repeated calls for his resignation. The population was asked to vote on two items: should a 
new package of constitutional amendments be adopted, and should the president serve out 
the remainder of his term, meaning until 2005. Referendum results showed over 76 percent 
supported the amendments, and no less important, nearly 79 percent supported President 
Akaev serving out his term. Turnout, although a matter of serious doubt, was claimed to be 
as high as about 88 percent of the registered electorate.
Despite the official results being disputed in a number of respects, according to the 
Economic Intelligence Unit’s Country Report, Akaev is likely to have had the support of a 
majority of those who cast a vote. Very interestingly, according to the same report, 
independent surveys carried out in January in the Kyrgyz Republic's main urban centres —
Kabar news agency, Bishkek, “Kyrgyz referendum final results confirm people support 
president”, February 6, 2003.
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Bishkek, the capital, and Osh, in the South -- showed that some 66 percent of respondents 
supported the referendum proposals.321
In that period there was some international pressure for political reforms. However, 
it was not sufficient to generate drastic changes in the political system already geared 
towards authoritarianism. The electoral code was amended to meet international 
requirements. Although there were some improvements322, the occasion was also used to 
alter the law to best fit the executive’s aspirations to reproduce itself. There was no doubt 
that the amendments to the election law -- banning those with a criminal record from 
standing for the presidency and preserving a Kyrgyz language test for presidential 
candidates -- were specifically designed to prevent the imprisoned former vice president, 
Russian speaker Kulov, Akaev’s main challenger, from contending the presidency in the 
next elections.
However, as mentioned in previous chapters, the comparative experience plays an 
essential role in shaping domestic societies’ views and actions. The chain reaction effect of 
peaceful regime changes in Georgia and Ukraine, where the incumbents were ousted and 
opposition forces took a majority of seats in parliament, was significant for the opposition 
parties in Kyrgyzstan. On the verge of the 2005 parliamentary elections the opposition 
parties had already started to merge and form election blocks in Kyrgyzstan.
The February 2005 parliamentary elections were marred by irregularities. Falsified 
elections triggered mass protests in March with demands for President Akaev’s 
resignation. Within only a few days, Akaev’s government was ousted and replaced with 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. Bakiev was the leader of the People’s Movement, which was a loose 
coalition among opposition parties. In a contested election, where Bakiev ran in tandem
321 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004, Kyrgyz Republic, p. 5.
322 Such as giving observers and participants full access to electoral documents, envisaging 
more detailed voting and counting procedures, decreasing the proportion of civil servants 
on such commissions, and excluding members of the state administration from serving on 
district election commissions.
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with the political prisoner and former Vice President, Felix Kulov, he won the majority of 
the votes in July 2005 and became the President of Kyrgyzstan.323
In the context of wide public and elite discontent with Akaev’s policies, there were 
high expectations from Bakiev’s government. Did the change of government in 
Kyrgyzstan bring about a more democratic regime in the context of the same structural 
constraints? The key policy steps to be addressed urgently by Bakiev’s government were: 
1) political reforms — to re-establish the balance between the branches of power, restoring 
civil rights and political freedoms, opening up closed media outlets, and freeing jailed 
political prisoners and journalists; 2) economic reforms — addressing the issues of poor 
governance that made corruption and patronage chronic features of the country’s economy, 
addressing the issue of south-north regional and social inequalities adequately (i.e., 
creating more job openings in the South, and directing more public and private 
investments to the region), redistributing illegally privatised property, and resolving land 
ownership issues; 3) security concerns, both internal and external — handling issues of U.S. 
and Russian military bases, resolving minority issues, and containing the expansion of the 
radical Islamic Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation.
In addition, the post-revolution environment seems to be unstable. There have been 
prison revolts, political violence, and the security forces have become less controllable. In 
addition, there has been growing discontent in the Uzbek community about discrimination 
against them and numerous cases of clashes between the titular nation and ethnic Chinese 
living in Kyrgyzstan.
Facing the same problems, however, the elected government of Bakiev, who was 
originally from the South (a more deprived part of the country) did not enjoy the same trust 
and legitimacy as Akaev did in the early stages of his tenure. According to a public 
opinion poll conducted in Bishkek and a number of other cities in 2006, only 17 percent of 
respondents said that they trusted Bakiev, and 58 percent said that they expected a second
323 Christopher Walker, “The Former Soviet Union’s Next Wave of Democratization,” A 
EurasiaNet Commentary July 14, 2005.
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revolution.324 Thus, with its limited resources of legitimacy, the new government was even more 
limited than the old one in manoeuvring between the issues of democratization, economic reform, 
and overall stability.
Bakiev’s democratic stance lasted a shorter period than his predecessor’s. Shortly 
after his election, he started to curtail the independent media.325 There was also noticeable 
intolerance of dissidence. Instead of dealing with urgent problems of security and privatization 
deals, Bakiev started to suppress internal opposition. Bakiev also started to use the same 
populist steps of circumventing the legislative branch and using referendums to strengthen 
his position vis-a-vis other branches of power. For instance, he ordered a national 
referendum to be held at the end of 2006, aimed at offering voters “the choice of various 
systems of government, the possible removal of presidential, parliamentary, and judicial 
immunity, and some questions on judicial reform.”
Even so, Bakiev was reluctant to address the issue of amending the constitution to 
restore the balance of power between legislative and executive branches. Many in civil 
society and in the opposition found that the changes that the 300-member Constitutional 
Assembly, chaired by Bakiev, suggested were minor and aimed at diverting attention from 
the major problems.327 Tension grew between the parliament and Bakiev because of these 
controversial constitutional changes. Bakiev blamed the parliament for advancing “untimely 
constitutional-reform demands” and openly accused the parliament of attempting to “go beyond
• 328its mandate” and seize power, thus contributing to the atmosphere of instability m the country.
324 EurasiaDigest, “Poll Shows just 17 Percent of Public Trusts Kyrgyz President”, Kyrgyz 
Daily Digest, February 10, 2006.
325 See for instance, “Kyrgyz Presidential Administration Head Sues Newspaper for 1 
Million”, Eurasia Digest, RFE/RL, February 16, 2006; “Kyrgyz Journalists Protest 
Dismissal of Editor,” Eurasia Digest, RFE/RL, January 31, 2006.
326 RFE/RL Newsline, “Kyrgyz President Orders Preparations for Nationwide 
Referendum”, December 22, 2005.
327 See Leila Saralaeva and Cholpon Orozbekova, “Kyrgyz Leader Pushes for More 
Power”, IWPR, Reporting Central Asia, no. 420,15 November 2005.
328 Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyz President Slams Parliament in Address”, Eurasia Insight, 
February 4, 2006.
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Pressured by public demonstrations, Bakiev submitted another draft constitution, 
which ceded some of his powers to the parliament. However, in late December 2006 
Bakiev pushed through a revised version of the constitution that overturned many of the 
initial concessions. After the parliamentary approval of the constitution, Bakiev then tried 
to reinstate Kulov as prime minister. Kulov’s nomination was overturned by two 
successive parliamentary votes and as a result he joined the opposition. In April 2007 
mass protests demanding constitutional reform and the resignation of the president began 
again.
In sum, Bakiev’s administration faces the same challenges as those that Akaev 
faced, or even worse, since the country’s political stability was seriously undermined after 
the revolution. And, as we can see, his policy choices were no different from those of his 
predecessor. Clearly, post-Akaev developments prove that Kyrgyzstan’s problematic 
transition should be attributed largely to existing national and international structural 
constraints and factors and not just to the leader’s personality.
In this section, I have tried to demonstrate how the politics of reform evolved after 
the installation of a post-communist regime. Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s political transition can 
roughly be divided into two periods:
1991-1994- country’s new post-communist leadership pursued political reforms 
and initiated substantial liberalisation of politics and established all basic democratic 
institutions;
1995-2006- Akaev’s domestic policies became more authoritarian. He gradually 
amended the constitution, undermined the key democratic institutions and distorted the 
“rules of democratic game.” Widespread public and elite discontent in 2000-2005 led to 
the downfall of Akaev’s regime. However, two or three years after the leadership change, 
which was labelled as the “Tulip revolution”, not much had changed in the general trend 
towards authoritarianism. Furthermore, the country’s human rights record deteriorated 
further, the country became defined as a failed state, and crime and corruption become 
widespread.
329 Alexander Kuptadze, “Organized crime before and after the Tulip Revolution: the 
changing dynamics of upperworld-underworld networks”, Central Asian Survey Vol, 27, 
No. 3, 2008 , pp. 279-299.
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I have demonstrated the dual nature of political reforms: on the one hand, core
institutions of democracy and market were built and significant freedom of political rights
and civil liberties were allowed. On the other hand, the political institutions were modified
and distorted in order to cope with the social and political costs of economic reforms and
state-building. The incomplete turnover of the elite, which meant that the country’s
legislative branch was dominated by the former communist top nomenclature for most of
the time, was also a factor that often forced the country’s leadership to violate the rules of
the game in order to push for further reforms. The situation was exacerbated due to
structural factors inherent to the country, such as south-north cleavages, and other security
issues. In other words, the missing link between these two periods of political
developments lies in the parallel developments in other key dimensions. It would be
incomplete, if not impossible, to explain this divergence from the democratic path of
reforms without taking into account the interplay of political, economic and security
aspects of the country’s transition. As some authors correctly noted about this
transformation of politics in Kyrgyzstan:
...in response to pressures from neighbours, a mounting economic crisis 
and increased domestic criticism, Akaev’s regime became increasingly 
corrupt and authoritarian.330
It appears that democratic institutions and political liberties in Kyrgyzstan were 
sacrificed first and suffered most when serious tensions emerged in the process of 
simultaneous changes in economic, political and security spheres and when structural 
constraints become even more compelling.
There were no persistent and sufficient international demands and supports to 
prevent the country leaders from reversing their initially democratic policies and part of the 
reason was that, as it will be demonstrated in the next sections, no serious socialisation 
effort was made by any of major regional and international players.
Why did Akaev’s government prefer to pursue economic reforms at the expense of 
its legitimacy and why did it not abandon them first? I think the explanation can be found
330 Sally Cummings, “‘Revolution’ not revolution”, Central Asian Survey Vol. 27, No. 3, 
2008, pp.223-228, p. 224.
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in two factors. First, compared to the political field, where international actors engaged 
intermittently during elections, international and regional actors in the economic sphere 
where more involved in the country. Not only was their assistance more sizable but their 
engagement was also relatively more consistent, compared to the political sphere. The 
second reason why economic reforms were continued despite their mounting social costs 
was the promise of benefits that the country could reap (i.e. high foreign direct 
investments) after establishing a free market.
Economic Aspect
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 paved the way for 
independence for the Central-Asian republics but it also undermined their economic 
systems. The Kyrgyz SSR had received a large volume of transfers and subsidies from the 
centre and was fully dependent on inter-republican trade. The breakdown of the command 
economy resulted in a rapid decline in the country’s living standards. It is with this legacy 
that the new post-communist government of Kyrgyzstan, the first among the CIS countries, 
accepted an IMF stand-by agreement in 1993 and embraced the recommendations of the 
multilateral institutions to liberalise its economy. Beginning in 1994, it entered into the 
three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangement. Kyrgyzstan opted for a 
radical reform strategy.
In general, one can observe a diversity of approaches towards reform strategies not 
only in the CIS but also across the entire post-communist transition space. Some analysts 
attribute Kyrgyzstan’s choice to several factors: its political and economic legacy, the 
scarcity of natural resources, the post-Soviet political environment and leadership, and the 
international and regional economic situation. Under these circumstances, Kyrgyzstan had 
no choice other than to rely on international support, for which radical reforms were 
demanded as a precondition. Of course, Akaev’s personal convictions and vision played 
not the least role. Other analysts argue that “at the initial stage of the transition era (1991- 
92), Kyrgyzstan’s government did not have a clear picture of the direction, methods and 
speed of implementation of economic changes However, the Russian “shock therapy”
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approach affected Kyrgyzstan’s government’s decision to speed up its reforms.331 I would 
also add the World Bank’s and IMF’s advice in the choice of a reform strategy.
During the 1990s the economic reforms were conducted in three major directions: 
1) macroeconomic stabilisation and the introduction of a national currency; 2) price and 
trade liberalisation and decentralization of the state management; 3) deregulation, 
privatisation and restructuring.
As in most of the post-communist countries, radical reforms led to disastrous 
changes in the socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan. Due to the reforms, the Kyrgyz 
economy experienced a much deeper decline in GDP in the 1990s compared to that of 
other Central-Asian Republics. GDP growth rates decreased significantly (see Charts 5.1,
5.2). For instance, between 1992 and 1993, GDP fell by 16.4 percent. With only minor 
variations, GDP per capita continued to be almost the same between 1995 and 2003 — 
$330.7 and $333.6 respectively. The official unemployment rate in 2001 comprised 17.4 
percent, compared to 14.5 percent in 1995.333
Chart 5.1 Growth in real GDP in Kyrgyzstan, 1991-2003 (percentage)
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331 Rafis Abazov, “Economic Transition in Kyrgyzstan”, Central Asian Survey Vol. 18, 
No.2, 1999, pp. 197-223.
332 World Bank, Kyrgyzstan: The Transition to a Market Economy, 1993.
333 EBRD, Transition Report 2003: Integration and Regional Cooperation, 2003, p. 162.
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Chart 5.2 Change in Consumer Prices, 1991 to 2003 (percentage)
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Chart 5. 3 Comparative Progress in Economic Liberalisation in Central Asia, 1990-2003
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In contrast to the political reforms described in the previous section, Akaev’s 
government was consistent in its economic liberalization efforts. According to the EBRD’s 
liberalisation index, Kyrgyzstan was a leading reformer in the entire Central Asia region 
and the most drastic changes took place in the first 3-4 years after independence.(Chart
5.3)
However, the pay off from following the multilateral financial institutions’ 
prescriptions was incommensurate with the rising social and political costs in the country.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
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Radical economic reforms engendered high levels of unemployment and mass 
impoverishment, deepened regional disparities, and increased social inequality. All these 
side effects, accompanied by the abolition of the social safety net and deterioration in the 
health and education systems, resulted in a rapid decline in the country’s living standard. 
This caused public discontent towards the reforms as well as the government. As the 
results of public opinion polls show, Kyrgyz society has become largely divided on the 
issues of the economic situation and the reforms in the country. According to a public 
opinion survey conducted in October 1999, 56 percent of those interviewed thought that 
the economic situation in the country had worsened, 45.4 percent thought that the Kyrgyz 
government’s economic course was wrong, and 40 percent thought that unemployment 
was the main problem.334 Interestingly, despite these views, Akaev (but not his radical 
reform policies) still enjoyed a significant amount of support among the population in 
1999. He was considered the most popular politician, and about one third of those 
interviewed insisted that they would cast their vote for him. As mentioned before in this 
chapter, this was the result of state propaganda and the targeted actions of the government 
against the opposition leaders.
Economic decline made the structural cleavages identified at the beginning of this 
chapter more acute and pressing. As will be demonstrated in the next section on security 
and state-building, mounting economic hardship led to further polarisation in Kyrgyz 
society. In the most critical period, reportedly, there was even an attempt by the 
government to reverse some of its radical economic polices. The worst economic crisis 
experienced in 1993 “forced the government to return to the system of selective state 
intervention.” However, “under the pressure of the international assisting organisations in 
1994 the government liberalised the prices again.”335
In addition to economic stagnation, especially outside the capital, the declining 
standard of living, rising social inequality, and the process of economic stabilisation made 
the disparity between the poorest and richest groups in society especially visible. 
Compared with 1989, when 35 percent of the population was estimated to be poor, in 1993
334 Source: Sakishev and Doronin, 1999, p. 3.
335 Abazov, 1999, p.205.
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more than 80 percent of the population was estimated to be below the poverty line. In 
2000, according to the World Bank estimates, 64 percent of the population lived below the
336 • • • • • •poverty line. The regional disparities in economic development became even larger. 
According to the 2002 Nations in Transit report, 70 percent of all investments to that point 
had been attracted by the capital and the surrounding economic zone.
The gap in economic development dividing the north and south widened even 
more. Disparities between the centre and the remote eastern and southern regions became 
sharper in levels of salaries and unemployment. They sometimes differed by as much as 
twice or even three times. The most significant negative effect of economic recession, 
widespread poverty, a deteriorating social infrastructure, and unemployment, according to 
the report, was declining support for democratic reforms.337 As the 2002 Nations in Transit 
Report pointed out, “Widely promised economic recovery came slowly, and only a few
'I ' l Q
people have benefited from foreign investment.” As will be demonstrated in the next
section, there were even attempts at secession in the southern part of the country and
heightened activity by Islamic fundamentalist groups. In other words, economic
deterioration undermined not only the pace of political and market reforms but the overall
stability and security of the state.
According to Nations in Transit report:
...most of the country’s urban, middle-class intelligentsia, which in the 
early 1990s served as the main electoral base of democratic organisations, 
has lost its social status and has been compelled to struggle for survival.
Many are increasingly in favour of quick fixes and “strong hand” policies.
The spread of poverty and economic inequality among rural populations 
could engender social unrest and support of radical militant
339organisations.
World Bank, Kyrgyz Republic Country Data: Kyrgyz Republic at a Glance,
Washington, DC: September 2000,
htttp://www. worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/kgz_aag.pdf.
337 Karatnycky, Motyl and Schnetzer (eds.), Nations In Transit 2002: Civil Society, 
Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, 
Freedom House, 2002, p. 236.
338 Karatnycky, Motyl and Schnetzer, 2002, p. 237.
339 Karatnycky, Motyl and Schnetzer, 2002, p. 236.
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The country, which had been recognised as one of the toughest reformers, was 
ranked 110th out of 177 countries by the United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Index in 2006.340
In sum, although the theorists and designers of economic reform predict that the 
more radical the reforms, the sooner the recovery, this did not happen in Kyrgyzstan. 
There were positive results, of course, after the first stage of difficult reforms, such as the 
achievement of macroeconomic stabilisation, the emergence of a private sector, the 
creation of a relatively liberal economic environment. However, the immediate impact of 
those positive changes on high levels of unemployment, mass impoverishment, social 
polarisation and wide spread corruption was inconspicuous. The recovery was slow, 
because, despite the generous economic assistance, there has no commensurate volume of 
foreign investment and risk insurance, debt restructuring, or trade access.
To what extent can one blame the choice of the reform path and sequencing for 
such a steep decline and extreme economic hardship in Kyrgyzstan. Would the adoption of 
a more gradual strategy of reform have prevented such a decline? The comparative 
experience in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet countries, as well as in some other 
transition countries, demonstrates that radical reforms almost entirely ignored the social 
side of economic reforms. The reform experience across the region also suggests that the 
situation would have been only slightly different, given the unfavourable starting 
conditions of Kyrgyzstan.341
However, as I stated in Chapter 3, different country strategies were not just the 
subjective choice of the governments but also reflections of the objective structural and 
political circumstances existing in and around these countries. In this particular case, the 
Kyrgyz leadership did not have much choice but to follow the IFI’s advice and to embrace 
quick and radical reforms given its harsh structural conditions and legacies: it was deprived
340 UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006.
341 See for instance, Yahqi Tong, Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political 
Change in Hungary and China, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.
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of natural resources, was among the poorest states even during the Soviet period and no 
alternative strategies were available.
Second, as I have stated, my aim is not to focus on technical aspects of reforms, but 
rather to understand the political side of the issue. The reform strategy was chosen in the 
early stage of transition and what I am interested is what factors played a role in the change 
(if any) of economic policy at a later stage; how the results of economic reforms affected 
policies in other key spheres, what factors and conditions emerged from their interplay that 
influenced the overall path of transition.
Economic deterioration affected the domestic society to the point that it withdrew 
its support for continuing the government’s economic reform policy. In other words, due to 
the country’s isolation, poor resources, and other factors, the political and social costs of 
market reforms were high in Kyrgyzstan, and the country’s leadership was not able to cope 
with the costs appropriately. The failures on the economic front were accompanied by 
failures in other dimensions and began to threaten the very stability and integrity of the 
state. Without sufficient security, economic and political support and demand from the 
international community, the relatively liberal administration of President Akaev quickly 
exhausted its legitimacy resource. In order to compensate his lost legitimacy and to 
maintain the status quo, he opted for more authoritarian measures, i.e., ruling by decree, 
calling for frequent “votes of confidence,” curbing the rights of the parliament, and 
suppressing the media and political opposition. As already noted above, receiving weaker 
or insufficient support-demand impulses from the international community in the political 
sphere, Akaev tightened his grip on power and undermined democratic institutions without 
any major resistance from outside the system.
Security Aspect
Immediately after gaining independence, the Kyrgyz leadership faced serious 
security and state-building challenges. Ethnic clashes started between the Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks, in the southern city of Osh, which is largely populated by Uzbeks and was placed
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within the borders of the new Kyrgyz state during the Soviet period. By 1993 there were 
even attempts in Osh to push for political autonomy.342
Besides inter-ethnic tension, there were other potential conflicts in the country that 
surfaced after the demise of the Soviet empire. Not only is there tension between south 
and north Kyrgyzstan, but a considerable rivalry also exists between the Kyrgyz of Osh 
and the rest of the southern Kyrgyz Republic, on the one hand, and the northern Kyrgyz on 
the other. The country’s mountainous terrain, which geographically separates the country’s 
North from the South, exacerbates this problem. The regional disparities between the 
South and North in terms of economic development and living standards, as well as the 
elite’s participation in the government, are quite significant. Southern Kyrgyzstan is poorer 
and more deprived. This intra-Kyrgyz tension is one of longstanding tribal rivalries 
intensified by the fact that the North dominates the country's economy. The economic 
decline and increasing social tensions have essentially threatened the integrity and social 
cohesion of Kyrgyz society, if  not of the Kyrgyz state. The North-South Kyrgyz divide has 
not spilled over into violence to date but it has grown into a chronic feature of politics and 
an urgent policy issue. The sub-regional cleavages have often made even the enforcement 
of the rule of law and the implementation of basic state functions such as tax collection a 
challenging task in some areas.
Economic hardship and the inability of the state to protect its borders encouraged 
the flourishing of radical Islamist groups in the southern part of the country. The Islamic 
militant insurgencies in the south of the country increased again in 1999 and 2000. 
Tensions have grown in relations with Uzbekistan, an essentially powerful neighbour that 
is striving to assert itself as a regional power. Therefore, the Kyrgyz government has had to 
be flexible in its relations with Uzbekistan. Although there were threats from Uzbekistan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic joined the Uzbek-dominated Central Asian Economic Union. There 
remains a substantial risk that Uzbekistan might intervene militarily in southern 
Kyrgyzstan if it deems that the government in Bishkek is not acting effectively to halt the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) organisation. Even a small-scale intervention on 
Uzbekistan’s part would raise fears that Tashkent was seeking to annex territory and
342 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and 
Regional Security”, United States Institute of Peace press, Washington, DC 1996.
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possibly provoke clashes between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities. As a result, 
the Kyrgyz Republic has needed to take a harder stance against Islamic fundamentalism in 
order to limit Uzbekistan's inclination for unilateral action against alleged militant Islamic 
groups stationed outside its borders. However, the continuation of unauthorised crossings 
into Kyrgyz territory by the Uzbek security services in 2004 caused some tension in the 
bilateral relations. Other sources of tension have emerged since 2000, after the decision by 
Uzbekistan to build fences and minefields in the border areas led to the death or injury of 
several Kyrgyz citizens. The Uzbek government refused to clear the mines or provide maps 
showing their location. Disagreements over the shared use of water resources and 
ownership of energy deposits in border areas have also persisted. Also, a memorandum 
signed by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz prime ministers on the exchange of land was voted 
down by the Kyrgyz parliament in 2001.
Incursions by militant Islamic groups prompted the Kyrgyz government to tighten 
its border controls to prevent attacks, as well as to prevent illegal arms and drug 
trafficking. Since then, the government has seriously increased its expenditure on defence 
and has concluded security agreements with China on the guarding of border areas. 
However, the country remains heavily dependent on Russian or Uzbek military support to 
counter new incursions. Of course, the heightened security measures have had serious 
economic consequences. Security concerns play an important role for foreign companies 
when considering investment opportunities. In addition, “the expansion of border 
restrictions hampered trade, denying many farmers in the area of their main source of 
income.”343 In 2003 there were also clashes and riots on the border of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan over farmlands that were claimed by both sides and the situation was 
complicated by the fact that there are two Tajik enclaves on Kyrgyz territory where 
residents did not want any border restriction to prevent them crossing to their motherland.
343 Alisher Khadimov, “Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Riots Highlight Building Inter-Ethnic 
Tension in Central Asia”, EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight, July 2003.
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Although Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have recognized their existing borders with 
Kyrgyzstan, as of 1996 Tajikistan had still not done so. Relations with China have 
improved steadily since independence. There had been some complications in 2001 created 
by the reaction of some Kyrgyz parliamentarians to bilateral agreements on border 
delimitation, which they claimed would deprive the Kyrgyz Republic of pastoral land. If 
ratified, these would give China more than 100,000 hectares of Kyrgyz territory. It was 
also argued that by giving away substantial territory without informing the parliament, 
Akaev was in breach of the constitution. The Kyrgyz government made serious efforts to 
control the damage caused by the leak of two secret border agreements signed with China 
in 1996 and 1999, also threatening to begin impeachment proceedings against President 
Akaev for the misconduct of the border matters. The agreement was ratified by the 
parliament only in 2002, and the two countries finally settled their border demarcation 
disputes.344 After that economic cooperation agreements were signed, and the volume of 
trade has increased. Chinese nuclear tests at the test site in Xinjiang province, some 1,000 
kilometres from the border, caused fears in Kyrgyz provinces adjacent to China, leading to 
official protests from the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic hosts at least 40,000 
ethnic Uighurs, many of them emigrants from China's Xinjiang region, who oppose 
China's rule in Xinjiang. In order to remain on friendly terms with China, the Kyrgyz 
authorities have refused to register the Uighur Freedom Organisation and a Uighur cultural 
organisation called Ittipak (Unity). The Kyrgyz government continues to monitor and 
suppress Uighur separatist activity, which China claims is still conducted from bases in the 
Kyrgyz mountains.
The border issue with China affected Akaev’s legitimacy. At the same time, the 
government used the militant Islamic threat to unify society and to contain the criticism of 
Akaev.
344 The Jamestown Foundation, “One Small Step from Democracy to Autocracy”, Prism, 
Volume 7, Issue 8, August 29, 2001, http://www.jamestown.org.
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Akaev’s initial intention not to have an army proved to be unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz defence forces are small and in a poor state of readiness. The 
Kyrgyz Republic has one motorised rifle division, two brigades of mountain troops, an air 
defence brigade, and smaller tank and artillery units. Security concerns have prompted the 
Kyrgyz leadership to channel more and more resources to the country’s defence system. 
For instance, while Kyrgyzstan spent $30 million in 2000 to fight Islamic militants, about 
13 percent of the country’s total budget, in 2001 the amount was doubled.345 Meanwhile, 
the Kyrgyz government has been accused by the opposition of exaggerating the threat of 
Islamist extremism to cover up its poor economic management. As one of the Central Asia 
experts put it:
The overwhelming preoccupation of Kyrgyzstan’s leaders, like those of most 
other states in the region, has been with trying to control external challenges 
to domestic security. These security concerns have been used to explain away 
failings of democratic political institution building. Although in fairness, 
some of these security concerns are real and addressing them has eaten up an 
enormous amount of official attention.346
As suggested previously, addressing security concerns drained valuable political 
and economic resources, so vital for advancing transition reforms in other dimensions. 
Although Bakiev was originally from the south, and many expected that his leadership 
might ameliorate the growing north-south divide, the situation has not improved much. 
Some even claim that Bakiev underestimated the role of a unifying state ideology which 
contributed to “intensification of divisions between northern and southern political 
elites.”347
345 BBC News, “Calls for bigger Kyrgyz defence budget”, April 13, 2001.
346 Martha Brill Olcott, “The Case of Luxury Democracy”, Testimony before the Helsinki 
Commission, December 12, 2001.
347 Erica Marat, “National Ideology and State-building in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan”, Silk 
Road Paper, January 2008, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.
193
Vertical Dimension
To what extent have the Kyrgyz state’s reform policies been demanded, supported, 
compensated, or complemented by the international community in order to help the 
domestic society sustain its support for reforms and to prevent the divergence of the 
government and the society from a democratic path of transition.
Political Aspect
Since its independence, there has been a limited and rather ‘formal’ engagement of 
international and regional political and security organisations in Kyrgyzstan, perhaps with 
the exception of the OSCE, which has been more active.
The cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the European Union has been based on 
the belief of the EU states that to achieve their basic strategic goals, such as containing 
Islamic radicalism or preventing nuclear proliferation, they need to engage the Central 
Asian states with EU institutions and assist them in their reforms. Desire to establish a 
good relationship with the EU was understandably important for the radical reformist 
Kyrgyz leadership. The relationship of Kyrgyzstan with the European Union has been 
evolving within the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in February 
1995. This agreement covers the entire spectrum of relationship, from economic and trade 
to political and human rights issues. In addition to economic assistance and trade access, 
the PC A establishes an ongoing political dialogue between the EU and Kyrgyzstan. To 
speak, however, about the serious practical involvement of the EU in any of these issues 
would be wrong. As one of the experts noted:” The EU’s presence in Bishkek was always 
rather tenuous, with only one EU-country embassy in Bishkek, and most EC funding going 
to TACIS programming, almost none of it linked to democratisation or human rights.
The OSCE has been the main Western political organisation in Central Asia and in 
Kyrgyzstan in particular, throughout the entire transition period. Kyrgyzstan became a 
member of the OSCE on October 1992. The OSCE provided an early and functional 
instrument to enhance Kyrgyzstan’s presence in the international arena. It aimed to 
enhance security of the Kyrgyz state and society and to promote democracy, human rights
348 David Lewis, “The Dynamics of Regime Change: Domestic and International Factors in 
the Tulip Revolution”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2008, pp. 265-277, p. 270.
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and market principles in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, thus far the OSCE has not proved 
effective in achieving any of these tasks. This is because of the OSCE’s lack of resources, 
inability, or unwillingness to become deeply and consistently involved in any area, 
especially if its major Western members do not have urgent interests. Kyrgyzstan 
continues to be vulnerable to outside pressures by its immediate neighbours and other 
regional players. Although there has been a working plan adopted by the organisation and 
the government of Kyrgyzstan on those issues, there has not been noticeable progress in 
ensuring transparent and fair elections, in the effort to guarantee border security and solve 
trans-boundary problems, in combating corruption, or in freedom of speech and the 
development of independent mass media. Recently, however, there has been some 
progress, on issues such us establishing the office of an Ombudsman on human rights, 
reform of the law-enforcement system, opening an OSCE Academy to educate and 
propagate the OSCE principles within Kyrgyz society. However, these are institutional 
arrangements and it is too early to speak about real progress in human rights and 
democracy or in the socialisation of Kyrgyz society. The OSCE’s failure to extend 
sufficient demand to the Kyrgyz government, its continuing optimism and positive 
reporting on elections throughout the Akaev tenure, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
surely played a negative role in the shortcomings in the state of democracy in Kyrgyzstan 
today.
Not surprisingly, the “vacuum” that the OSCE and other international political
organisations persistently failed to fill, has gradually been filled by other, less democratic
regional alternatives. As Roy Allison correctly notes:
Monitoring elections by different regional organisations in Eurasia in CIS 
states, prompted by Russia and conducted under the aegis of CIS and 
Shanghai Cooperative Organisation (SCO), now contests the OSCE’s terms 
of democratisation. It is seeking to create alternative rules and practices for 
democratisation and to confer legitimacy on this basis to the leadership of 
those states under political scrutiny.349
349 Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central 
Asia”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2,2008, pp. 185-202, p. 190.
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Kyrgyzstan has good relations overall with the United States despite criticism from 
the latter for human rights violations and undemocratic practices in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
During the early years of independence, relations with the United States were even better. 
As already mentioned, Akaev received glowing personal endorsements from both U.S. 
President Bill Clinton and Vice President Gore, as well as significant economic assistance 
from the United States government. This lasted until the closure of the Kyrgyz parliament 
by Akaev.
The role of the US and NATO could have been significant in the international 
socialisation of Kyrgyzstan, especially after their deeper security engagement in the 
country after 2001. However, as some experts suggest, the new role “accorded to them 
[some Central Asian states] in the war on terrorism has led to a new self-confidence among 
the leaders, as it has allowed them to bring something to the international community and 
not just take from it.” In other words, their new enhanced role in the global fight against
•> f A
terror made them “less rather more vulnerable to US criticism.”
To sum up, on the one hand, the interplay of domestic politics of political, 
economic reforms and security/state-building generated high social and political costs and, 
as a result, the domestic support for the incumbent government waned, as demonstrated in 
the previous section. On the other hand, there was not sufficient international engagement 
in the country that would meaningfully and persistently extend the necessary demand and 
support to the government, work with society, and thus prevent the incumbent from 
reversing the liberal reform policies he had adopted earlier.
In the exit strategy for Kyrgyzstan recommended by the International Crisis Group, 
a special role is ascribed to the international community, to not only its support but also its 
demand.
The resolution of Kyrgyzstan’s political crisis is largely in the hands of the 
Kyrgyz themselves. But the international community can play a positive 
role from backstage by pushing for political reform, supporting dialogue 
between political groups, and opposing actions of the government and 
opposition that will only worsen the situation...Poorly targeted financial 
aid has lessened the pressure on the government to push for its own 
solutions to economic problems and has probably promoted the growing 
corruption within the system. Further assistance must take into account the
350 Martha Brill Olcott, “Taking Stock of Central Asia”, Journal o f  International Affairs, 
Vol.56, No. 2, 2003, pp. 3-17. p. 17.
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problems of governance and political stability, focusing on reforms of the 
political system and the introduction of more transparency.351
The International Crisis Group Report is an attempt at a comprehensive and critical 
assessment of the international community’s role in the Kyrgyz Republic’s transition, 
which concludes that “it would be extremely significant if the main Western political 
players could develop a common platform on at least the basics of systemic reform. A 
common message from the U.S., EU, OSCE, and other governments and international 
organisations is more likely to be influential...”352 Such an understanding of the 
international community’s role supports my assumption that it is very unlikely that with a 
limited political resource any government would be able to conduct such complex, 
systemic and simultaneous transformation as the transition, unless there is a sufficient level 
of external demand and support.
Economic Aspect
As already mentioned, the engagement of the international community in 
Kyrgyzstan’s economic reforms was relatively more significant than in its security and 
political reforms. The question is whether international and regional financial institutions’ 
demand and supports were adequate and balanced.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
'1C '\
I deem foreign direct investment to be an indicator of external support. After 
analysing the investment situation in post-communist states in transition and their 
experience in attracting foreign direct investments, Anders Aslund concludes that people 
and governments in post-communist states often had misperceptions about Foreign Direct 
Investment. “Especially in the former Soviet countries, people were concerned about 
sharply falling rates of investment and thought of FDI as a substitute for faltering domestic
International Crisis Group (ICG), Asia Report N  37, “Kyrgyzstan ’s Political Crisis: An
Exit Strategy,” Osh/Brussels 2002, p. 27.
352 ICG, 2002, p. 28.
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investments.” However, “illusions about hungry foreign investors died slowly and bitterly” 
the author continues. According to Aslund, “foreign investment financing neither can nor 
should play a major role in the early transition” rather “it has come as the proof of the 
success of reform rather than a catalyst of growth.” 354
Thus, Aslund considers Foreign Direct Investment as an indicator of success of
reform.
Table 5.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Kyrgyzstan (net in US$ million)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Kyrgyzstan 10 38 96 47 83 87 38 -7 -1 16 45
Belarus 18 11 15 105 350 201 443 119 96 434 250
Armenia 1 8 25 18 52 221 122 104 70 110 135
Source: EBRD Transition report 2003.
Kyrgyzstan is not an exception to this common description. Throughout the decade, 
a series of active steps were taken in the country to eliminate obstacles adversely affecting 
foreign economic engagement. There is no discrimination against foreign investors. The 
current commercial code in Kyrgyzstan takes a common approach to domestic and foreign 
investors. However, this approach has been perceived as unfair by the local, less wealthy 
businessmen. Moreover, this approach has not brought the expected volume of foreign 
investment. Foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan was regulated by the Law on Foreign
Some studies try to explain the implications of different types of foreign capital flows 
(i.e., foreign official aid, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment) on the political 
system of a destination country. For instance, foreign direct investors are considered more 
likely than aid donors to care about domestic politics and about a certain level of 
liberalisation. Portfolio investments, however, apply the highest degree of pressure for 
market reforms. It is argued that this type of foreign capital flow can restrict discretionary 
powers of authoritarian governments by disciplining the business environment, limiting 
patronage, and strengthening civil society. See Charles Lindblom, “The Market as 
Prison,” Journal o f  Democracy, pp. 324-336; J. A. Winters, “ Indonesia: on the Mostly 
Negative Role of Transnational Capital in Democratization” in Armijo, L.E. (ed.) 
Financial Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets, Plagrave, New York, 2001. 
For the application of these hypotheses to the states of Central Asia and Caucasus, see 
Oksan Bayulgen, “Foreign Capital in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Curse or Blessing?”, 
Communist and Post-Communist studies 38, 2005, pp. 49-69.
354 Aslund, 2002, pp. 436-437.
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Investments of 1997. A new Law on Investment was adopted in March 2003.355 There are 
restrictions on the inflow of foreign investment in terms of volume and the sectors of the 
economy. Foreign investors can be the sole owners of property. They enjoy a liberal visa 
regime and a liberal currency regime. Tax and customs privileges for foreign investors are 
considered by the international financial institutions to be ineffective in attracting foreign 
direct investment, and also discriminatory and expensive. However, in an attempt to attract 
foreign investments, Kyrgyzstan has established four free economic zones, in areas 
suitable for mass production. Businesses in these zones are exempt from all taxes, levies, 
and customs duties on exports, imports, and re-exports except for a 1 to 2 percent charge 
on the income earned from the sale of goods and services produced. Exports are free of 
quotas and licensing requirements. Despite all these measures and privileges, Kyrgyzstan’s 
free economic zones, the biggest of which I visited some years ago, do not have much to 
impress one, apart from a handful of small enterprises.
Despite the introduction of special incentives for foreign investors and a liberal 
exchange-rate regime, total FDI inflows since independence are less than US$550 million, 
(table 5.1) and most of it is invested in the gold mining sector. In 2003 net FDI did not 
exceed US$45 million. The capital, Bishkek, has received 50 percent of the country's total 
FDI inflows. The volume of portfolio investment is small as well. Local analysts consider 
the scarcity of valuable natural resources, the long distance from world trade arteries, high 
transportation expenses, large taxes, and a small internal market space as the main
i f /
impediments for financial investment into Kyrgyzstan. One of the “side effects” of the 
limited Western interest is that the Kyrgyz authorities began to look to more traditional 
partners in the CIS, especially Russia and Kazakhstan and to engage in more eastward 
regional economic organisations, such as Eurasian Economic Community.
355 Source: Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic, http://www.minfin.kg/eng.
356 Aijan Baltabaeva, “Investors Attracted but Not Appear”, Central Asia-Caucasus 
Analyst, March 26, 2003.
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Trade Access
For emerging market economies, access to large export markets is critical for 
economic growth. The long-term success of economic reforms and economic development 
in the transitioning countries depends on integration into the world trade system. 
According to Aslund, “Recovery in all transition economies has been preceded by a 
substantial restructuring and expansion of exports. The openness of Western markets has 
been vital.” After a three-year accession process, Kyrgyzstan became a member of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1998. Interestingly, Kyrgyzstan and Latvia were the 
first countries of the entire former Soviet space to enter the WTO in 1998. Estonia and 
Georgia entered a year later, in 1999, while Lithuania did not enter until 2000. As is well 
known, a country seeking WTO membership has to undergo serious domestic economic 
transformation and it has to create a legal regime and external trade regulations that accord 
with WTO principles and demands. In sum, a country has to make serious compromises 
that become essential sacrifices for some period of time. The most direct consequence of 
WTO membership for Kyrgyzstan has been the declining contribution of tariff revenues to 
the state budget. Before joining the WTO, the average tariff rate was 9.18 percent; in 2000, 
in line with WTO obligations, it had fallen to 5.2 percent and it continued decreasing 
further, reaching 5.07 percent in 2002. The share of customs revenues overall fell from 6.2 
percent in 1998 to 2.4 percent in 2001 as a result of reduction of tariffs and decline in 
imports.
All these figures are simply to show that any liberalisation, including the 
liberalisation of the trade regime, entails essential and concrete costs for the country and its 
population, at least in the short run. Despite Kyrgyzstan’s strenuous efforts towards 
meeting WTO requirements, it cannot benefit yet from WTO membership. The 2003 
Transition Report points out that “As the experience of countries such as Georgia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova shows, WTO membership on its own does not guarantee 
unhindered access to international and regional markets, or the removal of key trade
357 Aslund, 2002, p. 428.
‘I f  o
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Managing 
Globalization in Selected Countries with Economies in Transition, New York, 2003, p. 89.
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• ^359barriers.” Kyrgyzstan faces serious obstacles: geographical remoteness, lack of 
investments, little access to Western markets, poor industries and low quality products, the 
fact that it is a landlocked country which does not have WTO member countries as its 
neighbours (although China is formally a member, it is still in the transition period), and 
other reasons present serious obstacles. In sum, although the Kyrgyz government’s foreign 
policy in relation to this issue, namely its foreign trade and economic policy, has been 
directed to joining the WTO and to supporting the international trade regime, it has 
become a costly and unrewarding policy for Kyrgyz domestic society. Eventually, it 
decreased popular support for the government’s policy in this area and in general.
Foreign Debt
According to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development’s Transition 
Report, the Kyrgyz Republic's total external debt stock was US$1.7 billion at the end of 
2001, equivalent to 138.9 percent of GDP. Some 45 percent of this was owed to 
multilateral institutions on concessionary terms. External debt continued to remain high at 
the end of 2003, comprising 93 percent of GDP (see table 5.2). Faced with an increasingly 
unsustainable debt burden over the past years, with destructive implications for the 
economy, in 2002 the government finally managed to conclude a debt-rescheduling 
agreement with the Paris Club of creditors. However, the debt overhang continues to limit 
the government’s policy choices. Even with Paris Club debt relief, fiscal adjustment 
continues to be critical. The country’s external debt burden has been unsustainably high 
since 1999, and has required payments of US$117.2 million.
Moreover, the debt rescheduling was neither timely nor conditioned on further 
economic reforms and democratic improvements. Many analysts have acknowledged that 
it will not help a country that no longer has a firm commitment to sustaining economic and 
political reforms.360
' I C Q
EBRD, Transition Report 2003: Integration and Regional Cooperation, 2003, p. 20.
360 Daan van der Schriek, “Kyrgyz Economy More in Need of Reform than Aid,” BBC 
Report, January 25, 2002.
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Table 5.2 External Debt o f  Kyrgyzstan as a percentage o f  GDP, 1994-2003
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
37.3 61.2 71.4 96.9 119.3 170.1 155.8 138.9 134.9 93
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003.
In sum, Kyrgyzstan has achieved significant results in the economic sphere in terms 
of establishing the basic institutions of a capitalist economy, adopting laws and regulations 
that would ensure economic liberalisation, and opening the country for integration into the 
world economy. These achievements are reflected in the Index of Economic Freedom (see 
Table 5.3; on scale of 1 to 5, higher scores mean a lower level of performance).
Table 5.3 Index of Economic reedom in Kyrgyzstan, 1995-2006361
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
2.99 3.34 3.41 3.46 3.60 3.75 3.73 3.68 3.95 N/A N/A N/A
The review of international financial institutions’ and other economic actors’ 
involvement in Kyrgyzstan shows that their financial assistance policy to Kyrgyzstan was 
inconsistent and the support and demand balance was significantly distorted. 
Approximately US$1.7billion in loans has been allocated to the Kyrgyz government, 
mostly from international financial institutions. Many valuable programmes and a 
considerable amount of macroeconomic reform were implemented. However, there has not 
been an adequate volume of foreign investments and risk insurance, debt restructuring, or 
trade access. The membership of WTO did not have any significant impact on the 
country’s economic situation for the reasons stated above. In fact, it had a negative effect; 
it created additional barriers for the country’s trade with its immediate neighbours. As a 
result, economic deterioration affected domestic society to the point where it withdrew its 
support for continuing the government’s economic reform policy. Moreover, as one can 
conclude from this section on the economic dimension, economic deterioration also 
negatively affected the security and the stability of the state and society.
361 Source: The Heritage Foundation, 2006 Index of Economic Freedom at 
http://www.hertiage.org.
202
Security Dimension
Kyrgyzstan’s geographic location, as well as its weak and dependent economy and
divided society, makes it particularly vulnerable to geopolitical shifts and major power
• •  •pressures. Geopolitical factors play a significant role in either escalating or defusing the
tensions existing in Kyrgyz society. Realizing the challenge, Akaev pursued a "multi-
vectoral" foreign policy to maintain balanced relationships with the large powers — Russia,
China, and the United States — and to ensure their participation in the defence and
economic security of the country. As Martha Olcott puts it:
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy is governed by two basic considerations. The 
first is that the country is too small and too poor to become economically 
viable without considerable outside assistance. The second is that it lies in a 
nervous and volatile comer of the globe, vulnerable to a number of 
unpleasant possibilities. Both of these considerations force Kyrgyzstan to 
play slightly different roles simultaneously in its relations with the outside 
world, which has sometimes made the country’s foreign policy seem 
confused or contradictory.”
As already indicated, Russia, China, and the United States are the main players in 
the region. The European countries and the EU have minimal, rather reluctant, interest in 
the country, although the EU concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with 
Kyrgyzstan in early 1995.
Relations with Russia are particularly sensitive, given the presence of a large 
Russian minority in the country and the specific character of the former Soviet economy. 
This has often inclined Akaev to yield to Russian pressure, whether over economic issues 
or the position of the Russian minority in his own country. Another major incentive for 
pursuing close cooperation with Russia is the apparent regional terrorist threat. Russian 
border guards keep watch over the Chinese frontier. The recent presence of U.S. military
362 For Kyrgyzstan’s security issues, see Martha B. Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: 
Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, Washington: USIP, 1996; William 
E. Odom, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, 
Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1996, Hafiz Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its Strategic 
Importance and Future Prospects, New York: St. Martins press, 1996.
363 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and 
Regional Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1996, p.87.
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forces on Kyrgyz territory has been balanced by an agreement signed with Russia in 
December 2002 allowing Russian forces to establish a base at Kant, some 20 kilometres 
from the capital, Bishkek. The granting of a long-term lease to Western forces in 2003 was 
followed by an agreement allowing Russia to reinforce its airbase in the Kyrgyz Republic 
as part of its air defence umbrella. In addition to bilateral security relations, there is 
considerable defence cooperation with Russia within the Framework of the CIS and 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Most of the CIS troops in the Kyrgyz Republic 
were under CIS and Kyrgyz joint command until 1993. These forces are nominally under 
full Kyrgyz command, but, in practice, operational command is shared with Russia. The 
existing overall good relations between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation 
do not help much to stop ethnic Russians migrating from the Kyrgyz Republic.
Kyrgyzstan joined the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994. 
Within the PfP Kyrgyzstan has participated in a number of PfP exercises. NATO started 
seeking deeper cooperation with Central Asian partners based on decisions taken in 
Istanbul Summit of 2004. NATO and Kyrgyzstan started developing practical cooperation 
in a number of areas through the newly established Individual Partnership Programme 
(IPP). Key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, especially counter­
terrorism cooperation and border security, defence reform, crisis management, and civil 
emergency planning. The country joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 
2007 to work more closely with the Allies on military interoperability and defence 
planning initiatives. Kyrgyzstan also provides essential support to NATO’s ISAF mission 
in Afghanistan by allowing NATO Allies to use the Manas Airbase outside of Bishkek for 
logistic support to the ISAF mission. As one can see, more or less meaningful cooperation 
started only recently. As for Kyrgyzstan’s participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) programme, it has been more political than military in its meaning. Kyrgyz 
governments have continuously stated that Kyrgyzstan has no intention of becoming a 
NATO member. Nor has the NATO side demonstrated any persistent desire to further the 
relationship. The existing level of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, which provides its 
facilities for the fight against the terror, seems to be mutually satisfactory. However, 
NATO’s engagement does not have any direct impact on alleviating country’s security 
problems related to regional security threats.
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The events of September 11, 2001, created a new situation in Central Asia and 
reopened a possibility for Akaev to improve his relations with the U.S. leadership The 
Kyrgyz Republic extended its support to the U.S.-led War on Terror. The Kyrgyz 
parliament voted to permit the United States to base military aircraft and personnel on 
Kyrgyz territory. However, the presence of international coalition forces at the Manas Air 
Base has only added to the strategic competition around the country. There are many 
members of parliament and within the broader Kyrgyz society who criticise the bombing 
of Afghanistan and subsequent military operations in Iraq and who have resisted the idea 
of a long-term U.S. presence in the Kyrgyz Republic. Some have also expressed concern as 
to how such developments would be viewed in Russia. Nevertheless, Akaev continued 
supporting the international coalition. On the other hand, the Kyrgyz Republic's relations 
with Russia developed to the level of strategic ally in 2003.
The Kyrgyz Republic is also a member of several regional organisations, including 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and, more recently, the Eurasian Economic 
Community. However, these have largely proved ineffective in enhancing regional security 
and economic cooperation, and foreign policy has therefore tended to be conducted 
primarily along bilateral lines.
Of course, Kyrgyz government’s primary motivation of engagement in these
regional organisations was to enhance regional security. However, some experts claim that
these organisations have a more specific and compelling function of ‘protective
integration’, especially after “colour revolutions”:
This engagement creates a basis for political solidarity between state 
leaders and their protecting against and resistance to a perceived 
interventionist agenda of democracy-promotion by Western states, 
international organisations and donor agencies.”364
From this review, one can see that security challenges and their costs were much 
higher than a small and poor country like Kyrgyzstan could bear without serious damage to 
its economy and domestic politics. As Seldelmann rightly noted, the relationship between
364 Allison, 2008, p. 188.
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democracy and security is very delicate and sensitive. Immediate security threats and state- 
building challenges often lead to the necessity to compromise between the democratic ideal 
and the necessities of state security.365 Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy aimed to search for 
support to remedy its multiple internal and external security threats. However, there was 
no meaningful engagement by the international community in this area. The engagement 
of NATO’s and the OSCE in regional security efforts was rather symbolic and 
insignificant. This made the country’s leadership search intensively for other alternatives to 
guarantee the integrity of its borders and resolve security issues. Its new partners, such as 
China, Russia and the more eastward looking regional organisations, such as the SCO, 
CSTO, took the primary role. As there is less engagement by international organisations, 
the country’s government has also become less vulnerable to international pressure to 
democratise.
Conclusion: Interaction
In chapter 3 of my thesis I first argued that in order to understand transition in a 
country, it should be viewed as a political process in which there is a strong 
interconnectedness among the economic, security, and political policies of a government. 
The discussion in this chapter and recent developments in Kyrgyzstan demonstrate not 
only that such interrelation and interplay exists,. It also explains to a great extent why the 
country has transitioned to an even more authoritarian regime.
In the economic dimension, market reforms have failed to bring economic 
prosperity. Radical reforms engendered a high level of unemployment and mass
366impoverishment. More than 60 percent of the population live below the poverty line. 
This extreme poverty has increased the social as well as the regional disparities and the 
north-south divide in the country. It has brought about public discontent with the economic 
situation, threatening political stability in the country. As public opinion polls show,
365 Reimund Seldelmann, “International Security and Democracy Building” in in Zielonka, 
Jan and Alex Pravda (eds.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Volume 2: 
International and Transnational Factors, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 112-138.
366 World Bank, Kyrgyz Republic Country Data: Kyrgyz Republic at a Glance, Washington, 
DC: September 2005.
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Kyrgyz society has become largely divided on the issues of the economic situation and 
reforms in the country. Domestic society essentially withdrew its support for the 
government’s reform policy. Continuing vital economic measures was no longer possible 
without going against the will of people. The eroding economic situation had a negative 
impact not only on the political but also on the security sphere.
In the security dimension, independence has not diminished the security threats in
Kyrgyzstan. They include incursions by the guerrilla organisation IMU, ethnic tensions
between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern part of the country, and disputes with
neighbouring states over borders, resources, and the conduct of counter-insurgency
campaigns. Economic hardship and the weakness of the central state to protect its boarders
instigated the flourishing of radical Islamist groups in the southern part of the country. In
the context of poverty and unemployment, the underground Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir
(Party of Freedom) has become even more popular. The deprivation of democratic self-
expression has activated anti-regime forces in the country:
As the authorities have become increasingly authoritarian and repressive, 
the popularity of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Freedom) has grown 
concomitantly. Because all other avenues of criticism and opposition have 
been closed, the secretive movement has become one of the few remaining 
outlets for any kind of dissent, despite being outlawed since November 
2003. Recently, Hizb ut-Tahrir has turned its attention to the dissemination 
of anti-government propaganda, which has caused the Kyrgyz authorities 
greater concern.367
The addressing of some of these security concerns, however, has meant violating 
the basic “rules of the game” of democracy. Numerous territorial disputes and border 
demarcation issues and Akaev’s attempts to resolve them peacefully made him politically 
more vulnerable and damaged his legitimacy. For instance, Akaev’s popularity suffered 
greatly in 2001 when it was discovered that the government had signed three secret border 
agreements with China. The parliament threatened to begin impeachment proceedings 
against him for the misconduct of the border issues. Improvement of the relationship with 
China came at the expense of depriving the Uighur ethnic minority of their independent
367Intemational Crisis Group, 2004.
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cultural and political organisations.368 The security situation and measures to address it in 
turn affected the economy negatively by draining political and financial resources, and 
impeding trade and investment. Security concerns also served as a pretext for the 
government to toughen its control over the country, thus curtailing democracy.
All the problems stemming from the deteriorating economic situation and 
numerous security challenges resulted in a deep legitimacy crisis in the country. In order to 
compensate for his lost domestic support and to maintain the stability and integrity of the 
state and his regime, Akaev began curbing civil liberties and political freedoms, while 
continuing economic liberalisation (see Chart 5.4). More often he opted for more 
authoritarian measures in order to enforce his policies without resistance from the elite and 
society, i.e., ruling by decree, calling for frequent “votes of confidence,” curbing the rights 
of the parliament, suppressing the independent media, and jailing his political opponents.
Chart 5 .4D yn am ics o f  Political R ights and C ivil liberties and Liberalization Index,
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In addition to the measures described above, Akaev undertook serious 
“remodelling” of the basic institutions of democracy, such as modifying the country’s 
constitution and the election code, thus trying to legalise de facto the pro-presidential
368 This is in a country where civil society was developing freely and independently.
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status quo. The government’s propaganda machine served the same purpose. This is a 
vivid example of how a government can try to change the rules of the game and to use 
propaganda means to shape public perceptions to gain domestic society’s support, thus 
trying to fill the legitimacy gap resulting from inefficient economic, security, and other 
policies.
In sum, all these simultaneous developments in the domestic politics of Kyrgyzstan 
demonstrate the horizontal interconnectedness of economic, political and security policies 
during the transition and how the high social and political costs of those policies forced the 
government to choose among them because of insufficient and inconsistent external 
support and demand. The limited volume of political resource available to the government 
made it undertake critical revisions and even reversals in its initially radical policies, 
driven by the desire to ensure the survival of its own regime.
Not surprisingly, these developments created a vicious cycle. Partial and arbitrary 
reforms in the political sphere and repressions against political opponents had further 
direct and indirect consequences for the economy, the security and the government’s 
overall legitimacy. Consequently, it shattered the government’s credibility in the eyes of 
the international community.
The analysis of the political, economic, and security dimensions and their 
interrelation in post-communist Kyrgyzstan shows that the growing authoritarianism of 
Akaev was a reaction to compensate his declining legitimacy and maintain the stability 
which had been eroding as a result of intermingled political, economic, and security 
cleavages. As the International Crisis Group, analysing developments in Kyrgyzstan and 
the causes of authoritarianism, correctly noted, “In retrospect, Akaev’s authoritarian bent 
has been more a steady evolution than a sudden shift.”
The explanation for such an “evolutionary” or gradual shift to authoritarianism lies 
not only in those domestic political, economic, and security cleavages and Akaev’s 
attempts to address them with the least possible damage to his legitimacy, but also in the 
interaction among domestic, state and international levels. How were the resources and 
costs of transition distributed among domestic, state and international levels in 
Kyrgyzstan? To what extent was a support-demand balance provided vertically?
369 ICG, 2001, p. 26.
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Due to poor starting conditions, geographical isolation, scarcity in resources, 
tremendous security concerns, and societal divisions, the political and social costs of 
democratisation in Kyrgyzstan were extremely high. And the country’s leadership was 
unable to cope alone with the costs in a satisfactory manner. Although Kyrgyzstan did get 
foreign economic aid, whether for objective or subjective reasons there has not been an 
adequate volume of foreign investment and risk insurance, debt restructuring, or trade 
access, on the one hand, and strict political conditionality on the other. Nor did Kyrgyzstan 
benefit from the international socialization available to transition countries closer to the 
European Union. In the context of severe hardship and criticism of poorly targeted and 
mismanaged foreign aid and a heavy external debt burden, Akaev’s government was 
perceived as bankrupt, weak, and corrupt by Kyrgyz society. In the same way, the high 
expectations that foreign direct investments would pour into a country so advanced in 
liberalising its economy proved to be false. As a result, economic deterioration affected the 
domestic society to the point that it withdrew its support for the continuation of the 
government’s economic reform policy. The failures on the economic front were 
accompanied by failures in other dimensions and started to threaten the very stability and 
integrity of the state and the society. Without sufficient economic and political support- 
demand from the international community, the relatively liberal government of Akaev 
quickly exhausted its legitimacy resource and started moving towards authoritarianism. 
And there was insufficient international engagement to stop him from doing that.
The involvement of regional and international political organisations in Kyrgyzstan 
has been limited and rather formal. With the exception of some economic programmes 
through TACIS and some exchange within the PCA, it would be wrong to speak about any 
practical involvement by the EU. The OSCE, although it has been involved since the 
independence of Kyrgyzstan, has not achieved noticeable progress in helping the conduct 
of transparent and fair elections, guaranteeing the security of borders, solving trans­
boundary problems, combating corruption, or ensuring freedom of speech and the 
development of independent mass media. The OSCE’s failure to extend sufficient demand 
to the Kyrgyz government, its continuing optimism and positive reporting on elections 
throughout Akaev’s tenure, as discussed in this chapter, surely played a negative role in 
encouraging the current state of affairs in the field of democracy. NATO’s engagement in
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Kyrgyzstan’s security efforts was rather insignificant. Its engagement did not have any 
direct impact on alleviating country’s security problems related to regional security threats. 
In addition, one cannot speak about any real effort by these organisations to engage 
Kyrgyzstan in international socialisation. The vacuum created by the minimal engagement 
of western organizations was filled by alternative regional organisations.
All these facts support my argument that one of the reasons why there was a slow
down and even a reversal in Kyrgyzstan’s transition trajectory is that the resources and
respective costs of transition have not been distributed reasonably and in a timely manner
among the three levels. As the ICG Report correctly noted:
Overall, Western assistance has done little to promote democracy in 
Kyrgyzstan and is partly responsible for the present political crisis. Further 
assistance must take into account the problems of governance and political 
stability, focusing on reforms of the political system and the introduction of 
more transparency. It is no longer possible to separate political and 
economic reforms... [in Kyrgyzstan]. Further aid -  particularly that 
flowing into conflict-prevention programs -  should consider the political 
aspects of development as well as basic welfare needs. The latter will only 
be effective under a political system that improves governance, and 
promotes stability.370
My other argument was that the interaction of horizontal and vertical dimensions is 
reflected in the domestic and foreign policy relationship, thus creating an essential and 
direct link and interplay between domestic and foreign policy dynamics during the 
transition. I argued that in countries where the economy and security are deteriorating but 
political liberties are in place, one should expect a change in government policy, be it 
domestic or foreign. If policy change does not occur, I suggested looking into the political 
dimension of the government’s policy to see whether the society in that particular country 
is deprived of democratic self-expression. I also suggested that if the democratisation 
process leads to a rise of ethnic or religious conflict, the country’s foreign policy would 
aim to seek the necessary international support for preventing a deepening internal division 
or even the breakup of the country. If a country’s foreign policy direction fails to secure 
that support, it may lead to a change in the foreign policy direction (i.e. changing its
370 ICG, 2001, p. 27.
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geostrategic orientation: joining new international/regional security regimes, organisations; 
seeking new or reinforcing or halting existing bilateral ties). Alternatively, the government 
may slow down or suspend the democratisation process.
The case of Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that despite some failed attempts, Kyrgyzstan 
was not able to resolve its political, economic and security problems within the foreign 
policy it initially adopted. There was not much room for change, and despite some 
insignificant attempts, foreign policy remained largely unchanged. As some authors 
correctly observed, Akaev’s foreign policy was a “confused and contradictory one”.
There were also some unsuccessful attempts to complement different foreign policy 
directions. However, overall there has not been any foreign policy shift. In this particular 
case, as one can see, limits in foreign policy choices made the government address its 
problems mostly by revising and adjusting its domestic policy choices. Kyrgyzstan would 
have been in a better position, in terms of consolidating its newly bom and fragile 
democracy and capitalism, had international support and demand been more persistent and 
adequate. In this regard, a policy recommendation that one can draw from this analysis is 
that as a government’s economic, security, and political policies are interrelated and 
interdependent, support-demand from the international community should address all 
spheres equally and take into consideration the mutual impact of and consequences for 
policies on each other. Another conclusion is that there should be greater international 
support and demand for those countries where the costs of transition are objectively high. 
Finally, it is not quick results but the country’s long-term commitment to reform which 
should be the criterion for continuing international engagement.
371 Olcott, 1996.
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CHAPTER 6
Moldova’s Transition: Success or Failure?
Introduction
Based on the framework developed in chapter 3, in this chapter I will try to test my 
assumptions on Moldova’s transition experience. In particular, my first assumption is that 
there is a strong interconnectedness and trade-off among economic, political and security 
policies during transition. Success in one dimension often comes at the expense o f  success 
in another. It is hard to achieve progress in all dimensions, unless there is sufficient 
external support. To test this assumption, the transition in Moldova will be viewed, first, as 
a political process of horizontal interaction of political, economic, and security policies.
My second assumption is related to the first. To further explain policy choices and 
change, one also needs to look into across level interaction. I assume that there is also an 
essential link and interplay among different levels — domestic, state and international — 
within the overall transition process. And, in order for transition to succeed, it is important 
that the resources and respective costs o f transition have been effectively, that is 
reasonably and in a timely manner, distributed among those levels. In other words, one 
needs to check whether the support-demand balance has been vertically provided.
As I suggested in chapter 3, countries in transition often exhibit critical shifts in 
foreign and domestic politics within a short period of time. In this chapter I also aim to 
demonstrate in Moldova’s case how the shifts on the domestic front were reflected in the 
country’s foreign policy. Changes in foreign policy direction may lead to changes in 
international support and demand, which will affect the transition process within the 
country. Thus, my third assumption is that the interaction o f  horizontal and vertical 
dimensions is reflected in the domestic and foreign policy relationship, thus creating an 
essential and direct link and interplay between domestic and foreign policy dynamics 
during transition.
At first glance Moldova seems to present a serious challenge to my arguments. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, in Moldova, where security and the economy were in decline,
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reforms had been progressing at least until 2000 and so had democracy. As in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan, in Moldova the cumulative indicators of both economic and political reforms 
continued to be equally high throughout the first decade of transition, even while the 
economy and security were continuingly declining. However, in Moldova this pattern 
changed after the Communist Party came to power and the trend in political liberalisation 
reversed.
What factors explain these developments in Moldova? What factors differentiate 
Moldova from the second group of countries identified in chapter 4, that is, countries that 
succeeded in one area of reform but lagged behind in others? Among the factors 
distinguishing that group from the first group of countries, that is, those which succeeded 
more or less in all spheres of reform, were their starting conditions, and more importantly, 
the degree of external demand and support that they received throughout transition.
Can transition succeed in all three dimensions simultaneously, without external 
support; or will success in one dimension come at the expense of the others? Can such 
developments be attributed mainly to the role played by the country’s leadership or are 
more fundamental national and international structural factors and constraints responsible? 
Were external factors, international demands and supports important and, if so, to what 
extent?
Scholars give different, though complementary, explanations for Moldova’s 
transition pattern. Way Lucan, for instance, explains it by the weakness of the Moldovan 
state and the high degree to which the elite is split. According to him, pluralism survived in 
Moldova “not because leaders are especially democratic or because societal actors are 
particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to 
impose authoritarian rule in a democratic international context.” Lucan calls this state of
• •  * 372affairs “pluralism by default,” a form of political competition specific to weak states. As 
Lucan contends:
... the relative resilience displayed by Moldovan pluralism is less a product 
of contingency and much more a function of long-term structural factors - 
just not those typically associated with democracy. In post-Soviet states 
without the rule of law, a democratic history, or a dynamic civil society, the
372 Lucan A. Way, “Pluralism by Default in Moldova”, Journal o f  Democracy Vol. 13, No. 
4, 2002, p. 127.
214
degree to which pluralism endures has depended on how severely split 
elites are, and how long they stay that way.3
According to the 2001 Nations in Transit report on Moldova the explanation is in
the failure of the state and the political system:
Moldova has been one of the democratic stand-outs in an otherwise dismal 
post-Soviet array. Its elections have been free and fair, its parliament 
strong, and its political culture tolerant of minorities. Still, a decade after 
independence, Moldova is something close to a failed state. Its economy is 
in tatters, with a little foreign investment... And the situation in 
Transnistria is no closer to being resolved... Its main political parties 
repeatedly have shown themselves willing to block needed reforms, often 
simply because a reform bill was proposed by a rival political faction...
The continued presence of Russian troops... The future of Moldova as a 
viable state is thus in doubt.374
These two explanations are not far from each other and, in a way, they support my 
approach. While the first emphasises the existence of a somewhat disintegrated society, the 
second points to the close-to-disintegration state. They can, of course, explain many 
peculiarities of Moldova’s transition. In this chapter I will look into Moldova’s transition 
in much greater detail, to find the answers to the research questions raised above.
Scholars of transition politics list numerous factors that, according to them, have 
impacted Moldova’s transition. William Crowther, for instance, finds that Moldovan 
democratisation to date has been affected most powerfully by “(1) the character of the 
immediate transition from communism, (2) the international environment, (3) the course of 
intra-elite politics in the early transition, (4) the interest cleavage structure in Moldovan
' in c
society, and finally (5) the process of political party formation.” I agree with him only 
partially because some of the factors that he points out are, I believe, outcomes of other,
373 Lucan, 2002, pp. 137-138.
Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schetzer (eds.), Nations in Transit, 
2001, Freedom House, 2001, p. 274.
375 Crowther, 1997, p. 282.
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more deeply rooted causes. Of course, the smooth transition that allowed many 
Communists to join the nationalist umbrella organisation, thus providing a large scale 
continuity of the old elite, played a significant role in the later Communist election victory. 
However, the formation of the political party system and even the way in which intra-elite 
politics evolved in Moldova, including the large presence of the Communist nomenklatura 
in the new politics of Moldova, are a reflection of the existing socioeconomic and identity 
cleavages that the country inherited from the past.
In this regard, Igor Munteanu’s observations are more profound. He suggests that 
there were at least four constraints shaping the Moldovan political agenda: “(1) competing 
loci of identity; (2) dilemmas of modem state-building; (3) socio-economic cleavages; (4) 
vulnerabilities to external factors.” Munteanu also distinguishes other dimensions of 
Moldovan transition such as political, economic, social and a transition in culture and 
national values.376
Background
Before going into the details of Moldova’s transition to market and democracy, it is 
worth identifying those historical, socio-economic, and cultural factors that might have left 
their trace on Moldova’s transition, from the perspective of democratisation theories. One 
can identify several specific features that have had an impact on Moldova’s transition.
First, Moldova emerged from the former Soviet Union as a country lacking a clear 
state and national identity. In 1940, when Romania formally ceded Bessarabia to the Soviet 
Union, a new Moldovan SSR was formed. However, large parts of the province are 
currently incorporated into Romania and Ukraine. With the re-establishment of Soviet rule, 
as a part of its general Russification policy Cyrillic script was imposed on the Moldovan 
language, which is in fact the same as Romanian. Moldovans were separated and isolated 
from Romania. The immigration to Moldova of large groups of Russians and Ukrainians 
was encouraged. Thus, an artificial separate Moldovan national identity-building process
376 Igor Munteanu, “Reforms Against Disintegration of State in Moldova” in Gheorghe 
Cojocaru, David Darchiashvili, Guram Dumbadze, Igor Munteanu, and Tamara Pataria 
(eds.), Anthology o f Comparative Studies: Societies in Transition: Moldova and Georgia, 
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, Tbilisi, 2001, p.74.
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started after the country’s incorporation into the USSR. It is not surprising that even after 
a decade of independence, the issues of state-building and national identity are still 
prominent:
...in Moldova the survival of the state itself within its present boundaries 
must be considered uncertain. Most conspicuously, there is still no 
‘national idea,’ no body of beliefs that can unify a disparate society in place 
of the official ideology of the recent past.377
In addition, having been a relatively underdeveloped periphery in “greater
Romania” without a sense of a distinct national identity, Moldova did not have a political
culture of democratic politics and institutions. As Crowther noted:
Moldova had no pre-Soviet model of indigenous national-level democratic 
institutions to fall back on once the constraints of the Soviet system were 
removed. Although it had participated in Romanian political life during the 
interwar period, national-level politics were almost exclusively ‘Bucharest’ 
politics, and far removed from affairs in Moldova. Furthermore, democratic 
tendencies in Moldova itself were vigorously suppressed up to the very end 
of the Soviet period.378
Thus, with a weak national identity and a lack of state-level institutional memories, 
not to mention the absence of democratic experience, Moldova’s chances of building 
democracy were not very high, according to democratisation theories. Dankwart Rustow, 
the founder of the transition approach to democratisation, considers “national unity” the
*3 7Q
key premise for democratisation to succeed.
377 Stephen White, Margot Light, John Lowenhardt, “Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine: 
Looking East or Looking West?”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2001, 
2:2, pp. 289-304.
378 William Crowther, “The Politics of Democratisation in Post-communist Moldova” in 
Democratic Changes and Authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Moldova, edited by Karen Dawisha and Brice Parrott, Cambridge University Press, 1997,
p. 288.
379 See, Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, 
Comparative Politics 2, April 1970, pp. 337-363.
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Moldova’s weak economy has been the second important factor. During the Soviet 
period, it remained largely agricultural and noticeably backward even in comparison with 
other Soviet republics. Capital investment and industrial employment rates were below the 
Soviet national averages. In addition to economic underdevelopment, the republic was one 
of the most corrupt regions in the USSR. Thus, Moldova’s transition was doomed to 
failure from the perspective of modernisation theories as well.
Democratisation theories underscore the challenge that multiethnic states present 
for democratisation. Moldova’s ethnic diversity is the third specific feature which later 
presented a serious challenge to Moldova’s state-building and overall post-communist 
transition. Only 65 percent of the population are culturally Moldovan-Romanian. 
Ukrainians and Russians compose 14.2 percent and 13 percent respectively of the 
population; while the Turkic Christian Gagauz minority comprise 4 percent. Not only do 
large ethnic groups coexist in Moldova, but some of the groups (i.e., the Russians and 
Ukrainians) have powerful “motherlands” that back their fellow compatriots, thus fuelling 
the existing ethnic tensions.
Taking into consideration all the legacies that post-Soviet Moldova inherited, it is 
not surprising that Moldova’s post-communist transition became tightly intertwined with 
state- and nation-building and with a search for a national identity.
Horizontal Dimension
How did horizontal interaction take place among different policy goals, and how 
did policy choices and policy changes occur in Moldova? This section discusses the 
country’s transition policies in economic, political and security/state-building and their 
interplay in order to highlight the domestic factors that influenced the country’s overall 
transition path. The specific feature of Moldova’s transition is its immediate and vivid 
reflection in the country’s foreign policy dynamics. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, which did not 
have many foreign policy options to manoeuvre throughout its transition, Moldova’s 
transition path and its policy interactions were inextricably linked to the country’s foreign 
policy choices.
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Political Aspect
Moldova had taken some steps towards independence well before the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. In 1989 an umbrella national organisation, the Popular Front of 
Moldova, was formed around the idea of “Romanization.” Its formation had a mobilizing 
effect on the masses and intensified pro-independence pressure. The first move towards 
independence was the restoration of the Roman alphabet and the adoption of Romanian as 
the national language by the Communist government on August 31, 1989. Popular pressure 
eventually resulted in the dismissal in November 1989 of the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Moldavia (CPM), Semyon Grossu, and his replacement by an ethnic 
Moldovan, Petru Lucinschi. The Supreme Soviet (parliament) elections held in February 
1990 produced a fundamental change in the republic’s leadership. In the process of that 
election campaign a partial rapprochement was established between the reformist wing of 
the Communist Party and the Popular Front, and a substantial flow of reformist-minded 
Communists to the Popular Front took place.
In general, the transfer of power from the Communists to nationalists in Moldova 
was gradual and peaceful. Such a smooth transfer of power ensured a high degree of 
communist elite continuity in post-independence politics of Moldova. At that point, the 
Popular Front announced its official platform which called for full sovereignty, a return to 
the use of traditional national symbols, demilitarisation, private property and free market, 
and full political pluralism. In April 1990 the Supreme Soviet, with the support of the 
Popular Front, elected CPM member Mircea Snegur as its chairman. In the executive and 
legislative branches many positions became filled by members of the Popular Front. 
Mircea Drue, an economist and ardent pro-Romanian member of the Popular Front, was 
appointed prime minister in May 1990. Drue assembled a reform-minded cabinet and 
initiated a series of economic and political reforms. In parallel, the constitutional 
privileges enjoyed by the Communist Party of Moldova, which had ensured its leading 
position in politics, were abrogated. All these measures ensured the country’s transition to 
independent statehood and reform. Interestingly, both the Popular Front politicians as well
380 Crowther, 1997, p. 292.
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as the reformed Communists used ethnic issues to generate mass support. Mircea Snegur 
also associated himself with the Popular Front and its political programme.
The initial steps of political liberalisation in Moldova brought not just ideological 
cleavages to the surface, but also ethnic issues. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan, where ethnic 
minority issues and other intra-regional cleavages did not play a role in politics (perhaps 
with the exception of the Russian minority), in Moldova there was a strong politicisation of 
minority issues. The shift in political control to the ethnic Moldovan opposition was 
accompanied by increasingly serious interethnic confrontation. A series of provocative 
actions by the Popular Front legislators, acting under the influence of pro-Romanian 
extremists, fuelled minority concerns with regard to their future in a republic controlled by 
the titular nationality. As a result, even changes of the state symbols proved to be very 
divisive.
On August 31, the republic’s Supreme Soviet, passed the version of the state 
language law supported by the Popular Front. It was in this context that Moldova’s 
minorities -  Russian, Ukrainian, and Gagauz -  began to mobilise to advance their own 
interests in opposition to what they clearly perceived as threatening behaviour on the part 
of the Moldovan majority.381 It is obvious that at that time, in order to generate mass 
support, leaders of both the Moldovan and minority communities played the ethnic card 
heavily. On the Moldovan side, reformers seeking democratisation and an end to the 
command economy joined with nationalists in an effort to bring down the Soviet system. 
On the Russophone side of the divide, a link was forged between members of the minority 
communities, who felt threatened by the militant rhetoric of Moldovan nationalism, and 
local party/state leaders whose positions were threatened by the collapse of the Soviet 
political order. These competing coalitions were consolidated during and shortly after the 
legislative elections of 1990, which played a pivotal role in destabilizing ethnic accord.
In this period the alliance of reformist Communists and the Popular Front became critical 
for the future of Moldova. While in the new parliament about one-third of deputies were
381 Donald Dyer (ed.), Studies in Moldovan: The History, Culture, Language and 
Contemporary Politics o f  People o f  Moldova, East European Monographs, Boulder, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, p. 33.
382 Dyer, 1996, p. 34.
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selected from the reformist Communist list, the Popular Front had the support of the 
majority of deputies.
The ethnic breakdown of deputies elected to the 1990 Supreme Soviet did not 
reflect the multiethnic structure of Moldovan society. Ethnic Romanians comprised about 
69 percent of the entire legislature, and not surprisingly, all high-level positions in the 
legislature were held by them. The same was true in the executive branch, where eighteen 
of twenty positions were occupied by ethnic Romanians.
In 1991 the country declared its independence following the attempted coup against 
Gorbachev in August 1991. Romania was the first country to recognise the new state. 
Moreover, the Romanian Mare party, as well as other political parties in Romania, called 
for unification with Moldova, much to the alarm of the other ethnic groups that lived in 
Moldova.
As in all umbrella organisations in the former Soviet Union, political forces in the 
Popular Front very soon started to splinter, giving birth to radical nationalists and more 
moderates. Faced with what they considered a concerted effort by the Romanian 
nationalists to dominate the republic, and having little hope that their interests could be 
effectively pursued, conservatives and minority activists in the new parliament banded 
together and started to resist major initiatives. Represented most effectively in the Supreme 
Soviet by the Savetskaya Moldoviya faction, these forces became increasingly inflexible.
In May 1990, following street confrontations in the capital that were orchestrated 
by the radical Popular Front leaders, 100 Russophone deputies withdrew from the 
republican Supreme Soviet. Further complicating the political situation, local elections 
held simultaneously with those for the Supreme Soviet transferred a series of local 
governments to minority leaders. As confrontation grew in the parliament, local forces 
entered into the worsening interethnic conflict. In areas in which non-Moldovans formed a 
local majority, city and district authorities began to develop alternative representative 
institutions. In the minority regions, local governments actively resisted what they 
considered to be discriminatory legislation from Chisinau. In some areas there was even 
some violent resistance against the Popular Front’s actions.
383 Dyer, 1996, p. 36.
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Recognizing the growing unpopularity of the Popular Front, President Snegur 
started to distance himself from its extremist position. He soon consolidated his position as 
an independent political actor by successfully arguing for direct presidential elections, 
which he won in 1991 unopposed. With a drastic shift of political views in the executive, 
an ideological discord emerged between the legislative and executive branches of power. 
Meanwhile, discontent with the government for its inability to respond to the economic 
crisis and to find solutions to the interethnic conflicts in Transnistria and the Gagauz grew. 
These factors detracted from the legitimacy of the nationalists in the Popular Front and 
paved the way for more moderate forces of the Moldovan elite to come to power. The 
political situation in Moldova began to shift in a more positive direction. This occurred, at 
least in part, as a consequence of popular dissatisfaction with the conflict. The appointment 
of Moldova’s reformist Communist Party First Secretary, Petru Lucinschi, as ambassador 
to Russia, signalled a shift in the balance of political forces. It was also hoped that 
Lucinschi would use his Moscow ties to promote accommodation on the Transnistrian 
question. A second prominent reformer from the former Communist leadership, Andrei 
Sangheli, assumed the duties of Prime Minister.
The Sangheli government represented an obvious departure from the period of 
Popular Front dominance, as it promised a more efficient economic reform program and a 
more moderate approach to the nationality question. His government included substantial 
minority representation. While the conflict with Transnistria continued, the government 
distanced itself from the position of the Popular Front and pursued a strategy that was 
aimed to reduce both interethnic confrontation and conflict between former Communists 
and anti-Communists. By taking a more flexible approach, Sangheli’s government, in 
cooperation with an equally accomodationist President Snegur, was able to reduce 
significantly the level of ethnic hostility in the area controlled by Chisinau. This more 
flexible approach generated a positive attitude from the Russophone population in 
Bessarabia and helped to reduce the level of violence involved in the separatist dispute.
These new moderate policies provoked a strong resistance from pan-Romanian 
deputies in parliament, who accused the government of being pro-Moscow. Unable to 
influence the policymaking process anymore, the Popular Front deputies pursued a strategy 
of impeding any policy that might compromise their conception of the republic’s
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Romanian identity. Their behaviour de-legitimised the Popular Front further. In December 
1992, President Snegur, who clearly supported the more conciliatory course, provoked a 
political crisis by delivering a speech in parliament warning against the extremes of either 
unification with Romania or closer integration into the CIS. One can see the strong link 
between the country’s foreign policy orientation and the cohesion of the domestic society 
and the state, the cohesiveness of political elites. President Snegur’s pro-independence 
stance no doubt reflected public attitudes. It also further increased differences between 
moderates and more radical nationalists within the Moldovan elite and inside the Front 
itself, thus accelerating the course of decline of the party. While agrarians shaped 
themselves into an increasingly cohesive force, by early 1993 the Popular Front had further 
factionalised. Another blow to its prestige was the withdrawal of intellectuals from the 
party. They formed the “Congress of the Intellectuals” and started pursuing a more 
moderate nationalist agenda. In the same way, managerial elites, frustrated with the Front’s 
economic failures and in anticipation of its collapse, broke with the organisation. These 
events drastically reduced the once-dominant Popular Front’s parliamentary representation. 
In response to these events, the chairman of the parliament Alexandru Moshanu, 
representing the Popular Front, resigned in protest over policy differences and the 
increasing influence of former Communists. However, he could not rally public attention 
and support. Not only was his resignation accepted, but the legislature overwhelmingly 
voted to replace him with Petru Lucinschi, the head of former Communists.
Lucinschi’s election to the leading position in parliament marked a fundamental 
change in Moldovan politics and the possibility of a period of ethnic reconciliation. With 
the Popular Front in decline, power in the parliament shifted to the bloc of agrarian 
deputies. Having support from other moderate groups, Agrarians were able to play a 
dominant role in the legislature. While predominantly comprised of Moldovans, the new 
majority included a number of Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Russians in their ranks. While 
remaining a critical issue, ethnic politics stopped being the single preoccupying issue in 
Moldovan politics. This allowed the attention of the elite and the public to focus on issues 
of economic reform. It essentially weakened the hold of the more radical elements in the 
leadership of the minority communities, thus permitting a solution for at least one of the
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two major interethnic problems — Gagauz. Overall, these changes resulted in harmonizing 
elite politics with mass opinion, in many ways.384
It became apparent that the existing parliament was no longer legitimate, given the 
changed conditions in the republic. The parliament, dominated by moderate Agrarians, 
voted for the dissolution of the legislature. 1993-1994 were years of drastic political and 
economic changes. The country embarked on radical economic reforms.
A new election law enacted in 1993 proposed a proportional representation system. 
The parliamentary elections in 1994 resulted in drastic changes in the direction of the 
country’s foreign and domestic policies. First of all, the turnout was very high, comprising 
about 80 percent of all registered voters, which is an indication of how eager Moldovan 
society was to change the existing state of affairs. Second, within only two to three years 
after independence, the policy priorities had changed significantly to better reflect the 
changing environment of the country’s transition. The main issues during the election 
campaign were competing plans for the resolution of the separatist crisis, different 
economic reform strategies, and the question of Moldova’s international orientation. The 
range of ideological positions represented in the elections was quite broad. Reform 
Communists, represented primarily by the Socialist Party and the Agrarian Democratic 
Party, called for a slower transition to capitalism. They argued for participation in the CIS 
and taking a conciliatory approach to the minority issue and the separatist crisis. In 
contrast, the Popular Front and the National Christian Party campaigned for unification 
with Romania.385
Parties advocating ethnic reconciliation and accommodation, as well as 
strengthening Moldovan identity, came to replace the Popular Front and other political 
parties supporting the idea of “pan-Romanianism.” Legislative control was passed to the 
Agrarian Democratic Party with 56 of the 104 seats in the parliament. It favoured closer 
links with the CIS in order to prevent a Romanian takeover, rather than from a desire to
384 Dyer, 1996, p. 37.
385 Crowther, 1997, p. 311.
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restore the Soviet Union. The Socialist Bloc won 28 seats. The radical nationalist won very 
few seats.386
Thus, the 1994 parliamentary elections confirmed the new political direction the 
country was taking. The results of the election instantly resolved the prior ideological 
conflicts of pan-Romanians versus moderates between the legislative and executive 
branches. By forming a clear majority in the legislative branch, the moderates were able to 
consolidate their power. Sangheli remained as Prime Minister and Lucinschi as chairman 
of the parliament. Thus, the nationalist and pan-Romanianist policies of the Popular Front 
that had prevailed in the early years of transition proved to be ineffective or even 
destructive both domestically and internationally. In a very short period of time, these 
policies marginalised ethnic minorities, bringing the Moldovan state and society to the 
edge of disintegration. As a result, those policies de-legitimised the ruling political force 
and raised the necessity of either changing the government or changing the Popular Front’s 
policies. Naturally, the Popular Front was not able to change its policies, because this 
would further compromise its already eroded legitimacy, if not finally undermine it. As a 
result, more moderate and pragmatic Agrarian Democrats came to replace the nationalists. 
While the new government’s stance on issues of state-building was very different from the 
stance of the Popular Front, it continued the economic reforms already started by the 
Popular Front.
Within the new political environment, major problematic issues — such as the status 
of the Gagauz region and the new constitution — were resolved. Agreement was reached on 
local autonomy for Gagauz, thus putting an end to at least one of the country’s separatist 
problems, with positive implications for the other. The Agrarian party also fulfilled its pre­
election commitment to accelerate economic reforms, particularly the pace of privatisation. 
By the end of 1995 Moldova was already considered to be one of the ambitious reformers 
among the newly independent states. However, the continuation of radical reform was 
taking its toll. While being able to bring hyperinflation following price liberalisation under 
control, GDP fell by almost 31% in 1994, poverty levels increased, deepening the social
386 Source: BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts.
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and economic crisis in the country and leading to the withdrawal of domestic support for 
reforms.
The new Moldovan constitution adopted in 1994 reflected the national orientation 
of the new majority, the Agrarians.387. It established a semi-presidential republic, with both 
the president and parliament to be elected by popular vote. The Constitution prevented an 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president by creating a “semi- 
presidential” system, rather than the “presidential republic” that Snegur, then President, 
wished for.
The president, as the head of the executive, was to choose the prime minister- 
designate, who was then obliged to select members of a government from the parties 
present in the parliament. The principal function of the parliament lay in approving the 
government and its programme. The new constitution also included significant steps 
towards ethnic accommodation. It anticipated a special autonomous status for Transnistria 
and the Gagauz region. The Moldovan constitution failed to win over Transnistria. The 
region voted for its own charter, proclaiming Transnistria’s full independence, in 
December 1995.
However, the arrangement for forming governments clearly allowed a great deal of 
scope for conflict. Not surprisingly, both legislative and executive branches shared the 
opinion that the division of power made the executive weak and ineffective and made 
debates over policy issues prolonged and fruitless at the expense of the economy. The 
tension between the executive and legislative branches began to be reflected in all policy 
directions.
As in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere in the CIS, in Moldova the incumbent’s (Snegur) 
first reaction to the deteriorating social and economic situation and the resulting decline in 
domestic support was to tighten his grip on power by trying to amend the constitution. He 
argued for the formation of a “Presidential State” in which the directly elected executive 
would determine policy directions and carry out necessary reforms. Snegur also detached
387ITAR-TASS news agency, “New constitution adopted”, Moscow, 28 July, 1994.
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himself from his centre-left political base and, in a sharp reversal of his previous position, 
took a rightist pro-Romanian stance.388
In the context of Moldova’s recently prevailing trend of relative ethnic moderation, 
pro-Moscow stance and growing discontent from social and economic situation in the 
country that led to a decline in domestic support, both elite and public, it is not surprising 
that Snegur lost in free and fair presidential elections held in 1996 to more democratic- 
centrist political forces. In the two-round elections, Lucinschi emerged as a winner.
Lucinschi’s victory owed much to his programme of moderately paced reform, 
ethnic harmony, and a moderate orientation toward Russia. With this approach, as William 
Crowther observes, Lucinschi was able to capitalise on a widespread perception that he 
would be more able than Snegur to resolve the ongoing Transnistrian dispute and less 
likely to destabilise the republic by moving to an overtly pro-Romanian policy. At the 
same time, “Lucinschi’s reputation as a moderate pro-reformer promised change at a pace 
that was not threatening to an already economically strapped population.”389 Some results 
soon appeared. In May 1997 Moldova and Transnistria signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding.
President Lucinschi selected the outgoing prime minister, Ion Ciubuk, former 
Communist nomenklatura member, to form a new government. Ciubuk resigned after one 
year on the grounds that he was unable to consolidate the government because of the 
political diversity among its members.390 The negative influence of the Russian economic 
crisis of late 1998 also played a major role. A new government comprised of members of 
governing coalition, the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms was formed in March 1999, 
led by Prime Minister Ion Sturza.
Sturza’s government identified progress toward eventual membership of the EU as 
its principal foreign policy goal. With that in mind, it aimed to establish the country's 
image as a favourable location for investment. Domestically, it intended to press ahead
388 Crowther, 1997, p. 320.
389 Crowther, p. 320.
390 Reportedly, internal strife within the coalition made the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios and government offices a subject of political contention. However, critics also 
mentioned the prime minister’s own incompetence.
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with structural reforms, establish strict financial discipline, and improve the administration. 
In addition, and not surprisingly, it expressed its intention to stop social decline and secure 
the welfare of vulnerable sections of society. However, that was not possible at that stage 
of economic reforms. In fact, the reverse was the case: according to the EIU Moldova 
report, in 1997-98, in order to reduce its budget arrears, the government was forced to cut 
spending in such areas as education, health care, social benefits and agricultural
•  » O Q I  #subsidies. This decrease in social spending provoked mass protests and was successfully 
manipulated by the Communists who comprised the majority in the parliament.
Meanwhile, the mounting social costs of the economic reform gradually led to a 
further decline in domestic support for the centrist-reformer government and paved the 
way for a communist comeback in Moldova. During the local elections in 1999, the 
Communists increased their already significant representation at the local level, another 
strong indication of how domestic society’s support for the incumbent political forces and 
their policies had declined. These changes had implications at the elite level, increasing 
the tensions both among parliamentary factions and between the parliament and the 
president. Meanwhile, Lucinschi, as a result of the economic decline and unresolved 
security problems, began to lose the political support of the society and of the shaky 
political coalition in the legislative branch. Frustrated by the endless internal strife among 
his parliamentary partners and following the pattern of other former Soviet states, he 
started to campaign for constitutional reforms in Moldova. Both sides agreed that the 
division of power under the existing system had resulted in a weak executive and 
prolonged debates over policy, at the expense of the economy. However, they had 
contradictory views about how to handle the problem. Lucinschi strove to establish a 
presidential republic that would have given the president the authority to act decisively 
when futile parliamentary debates resulted in potential economic and political instability. 
Parliament responded with its own version, which envisaged a parliamentary system 
within a strong presidency. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission found the 
parliament’s draft more acceptable. The latter would strengthen the government’s 
executive powers without breaching Western democratic norms.
391 Economic Intelligence Unit, Belarus and Moldova: Country Report, 1998.
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Eventually, the legislative branch succeeded and in spring 2000 the new 
constitutional amendments were formally approved, transforming Moldova into a 
parliamentary republic.392 The new legislation on the mechanism for electing the president 
was passed by parliament in September. These changes, which meant that the President 
was to be elected by parliament rather than through a direct vote, were designed to 
strengthen parliament’s positions vis-a-vis Lucinschi.393 The changes were actively 
promoted by the Communist Party which was preparing advantageous conditions for its 
political victory..President Lucinschi at first refused to promulgate the law, but he 
capitulated after his initial veto was overturned. His initiative became another unfulfilled 
attempt to tighten the control of the executive over the country at the expense of 
democratic norms and procedures.
The choice between a fully parliamentary system and a fully presidential system 
occupied Moldovan politicians throughout 1999 and 2000. Yet the choice was in large 
measure a false one, driven more by political intrigues among Moldova’s political interests 
than by a dispassionate consideration of the country’s institutional problems. Why was the 
strengthening of the executive successful in Kyrgyzstan but not in Moldova? In 
Kyrgyzstan there was a strong and committed reformist leader. As a reaction to public and 
elite discontent, he was able to concentrate all powers in his hands, dominate the political 
landscape and continue costly reforms by suppressing political freedoms. Part of the reason 
why Akaev succeeded was that he did not have a strong and unified opposition and, more 
importantly, the Communists were not represented as a political force. As a result, there 
were no real political alternatives to Akaev’s regime. In Moldova the counter-elite was 
highly fragmented and it was not possible to consolidate them behind any national idea. At 
the same time, the reformed communists were politically active, organised and were 
viewed by domestic society, which was exhausted and disappointed from economic 
decline, as an alternative to the incumbent.
Moldovan parliament seizes power to elect president, Agence France Press, 21 July,
2000.
393 Nations in Transit 2002, Moldova Country Report, p. 286.
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No matter how progressive it was, Sturza’s government became the first victim of
the new situation. Reportedly, the energetic and reformist Prime Minister Ion Sturza
presented a political threat to Lucinschi. Although the government had a strong approval
rating by Western governments and international financial institutions, Lucinschi had
repeatedly criticised the Prime Minister. Therefore, Sturza’s ouster in November 1999 was
perceived by the West as a sign of regress. A no-confidence action initiated by Communist
deputies was also supported by the previously anti-Communist Christian Democratic
Popular Party and independent parliamentarians allied with Lucinschi himself. According
to the Nations in Transit 2001 country report for Moldova:
This strange alliance confirmed not only Lucinschi’s political debt to the 
Communists, but also revealed the deep divisions within the Alliance for 
Democracy and Reforms. As in earlier parliamentary confrontations, 
Sturza’s demise had less to do with disputes over policy than with internal 
rivalries within the governing coalition-especially between the leaders of 
the two rightist factions.394
Although the international lending agencies had generally praised Sturza, the 
International Monetary Fund suspended its programme in Moldova a week before the 
dismissal vote, when Sturza’s government was obviously already in danger. So did the 
World Bank, by postponing its structural adjustment credit agreement. This strong reaction 
came in response to the parliament’s failure to approve the programme of privatisation of 
the wine and tobacco industries. In other words, this meant withdrawing international 
support. Naturally, this further undermined the government’s legitimacy.
Although the Nations in Transit report does not see policy issues as a cause of the 
government ousting and ascribes the problem to internal rivalries only, I cannot agree with 
this interpretation. There seemed to be more serious underlying causes for Sturza’s 
dismissal. There was an essential change in the political environment which made the 
dismissal possible. First, Sturza’s government was strongly reformist and pro-Western and, 
as Communist takeovers at local-level elections indicated, it had lost the support of society 
due to its adoption of a radical reform strategy. This fact was acknowledged by Sturza 
himself: “Those politicians who took all the hard decisions for the economy during the
394 Nations in Transit 2001, Moldova Country Report, p. 275.
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transition had very short political lives... It took some years to appreciate what's been 
achieved. My main task is to insure that the process of democracy is irreversible."395
Second, Sturza’s government lost support at all three levels. It was not just 
domestic society and the international community that withdrew their support for 
economic reforms; the policy preferences of the governing elite changed drastically as 
well. With the evident strengthening of the Communists, cooperation with them was 
deemed to be imperative. Both parliamentary factions and President Lucinschi sought to 
co-opt and re-align with the Communists. Third, the sanctions applied by the international 
financial institutions further undermined the already troubled government of Prime 
Minister Sturza. This is, in fact, a vivid case of the international demand-support balance 
not taking the domestic political reality into account, thus contributing to, and even 
accelerating, the replacement of the reformist government. Overall, this marked the 
beginning of the left’s takeover, with respective domestic and foreign policy changes 
following it. Initially, the President and the right-wing parties adopted some 
accommodationist if not conformist policies, sacrificing the reformist government, and, in 
the next elections, they themselves were ousted by the CPM.
The fact that the fall of the Sturza government sparked such a serious crisis is more 
evidence that the increasing acrimony within and between the executive and the legislature 
had deeper structural explanations. Approval of a new technocratic government under 
Dumitru Braghis took place in December 1999, after two prime ministerial candidates had 
failed to get the parliament’s endorsement. Overall, between the 1998 election and May 
2000 there had been three governments, with the last one, led by Dumitru Braghis, 
periodically threatening to resign. However, Braghis remained in office until the prolonged 
struggle between President Petru Lucinschi and parliament over Moldova’s form of 
government came to an end.
After the third failed attempt to elect a President, President Lucinschi exercised his 
constitutional right to dismiss the parliament. In the early parliamentary elections, the 
Communists emerged as the winner. The Communist Party’s absolute majority in the 101-
Entrepreneur Prime Minister hopes to build prosperous Moldova, Economic 
Globalization is Ion Sturza's Recipe for Success, Special International Report Prepared by 
The Washington Times Advertising Department, published on April 22, 1999.
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seat Parliament made it the most powerful political entity since Moldova’s independence. 
The numerous international organisations that observed the elections said the vote was free 
and fair. Moldovans in Transnistria did not take part in the elections.
Parliament’s dissolution and the subsequent early elections revealed how deep 
Moldova’s political crisis was. One should note that from the old parliament, apart from 
the Communists, only the CDPP won seats in the new body. The Braghis Alliance was the 
only outside group to win seats, thanks to the efforts of acting Prime Minister Dumitru 
Braghis who, for example, decreased the arrears in pensions and salaries owed to public 
employees prior to the election.
Some observers believe that the total victory of Communists was a direct
consequence of the failure of the right-wing parties to form an anti-Communist coalition,
an electoral bloc that could defeat the Communists, as had been the case in the 1998
parliamentary elections. However, any re-grouping of the political forces is, after all, only
a surface reflection of underlying social, economic, and political processes. Not
surprisingly, many local and international analysts explained the election results, first of
all, by the changing attitudes in Moldovan society. According to the Nations in Transit's
2002 Moldova country report:
The Communist Party’s victory was not only a sign that many Moldovans 
long for the social benefits, free medical services, and better living 
conditions of the Soviet era, but also a firm voice against the reformists, 
who had largely failed to deliver on their promises of the past decade. The 
Communists’ winning message was that the governing parties were unable 
to deliver economic growth and, as a result of their economic 
mismanagement, most of the country’s population lives in poverty.
According to Igor Munteanu, the crisis of legitimacy of successive leaderships
became a crisis of legitimacy of the new Moldovan state.
For several reasons, the emerging new state in the Republic of Moldova 
failed to earn the trust of its citizens primarily because of the lack of 
effective policies... societal reformers often emerged more as ideological 
crusaders in favour of the hard-line version of liberalism, long forgotten in 
most developed, modem democracies, than as wise and considered agents 
of social change... Ordinary people feel themselves that they were the
396 Nations in Transit 2002, Moldova Country Report, p. 286.
232
victims rather than the beneficiaries of the transition to a market economy... 
Claiming with obstinacy that the state is supposed to take care of changes 
but having only poor if any result in securing the minimal needs and 
expectations of citizens, politicians in Moldova are blamed today for what 
they have incriminated several years ago to the Soviet partocracy.397
In my opinion, the Communist takeover was not surprising. There was, in fact, a 
high level of old elite continuity in Moldova, and the old nomenclature members had been 
running the country since it became independent. But since the Communist Party was 
suspended, the old nomenclature was scattered throughout different parties. Once the party 
was allowed to register and participate in the 1998 elections, the takeover occurred. 
Although it had been suspended for many years, the Communist Party still managed to 
remain the most organised party and it benefited considerably from its Soviet-era network 
of local branches and grassroots. The Communist Party campaigned aggressively, with the 
most populist slogans, generously promising people what they wanted to hear.
The return of Communists to power was almost unavoidable in the context of 
ethnic conflicts threatening the state’s integrity, mass impoverishment and endless and 
futile political struggles that the domestic society witnessed and experienced (given that 
political liberty still existed and free and fair elections were possible). However, 
immediately after the elections, contrary to the CPM’s electoral promises, the Communist 
leader, Vladimir Voronin, stated that his party would not revise Moldova’s privatisation 
programme and would cooperate with the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.398
Some analysts predicted such a u-tum in political attitudes, showing how
interconnected political, economic and state-building policies were in that period:
While the CPM has a monopoly on power, this could be undermined by 
continued economic decline, internal party splits and a nationalist backlash 
against its pro-Russian orientation. The CPM will seek allies in domestic
397 Munteanu, 2001, p. 78.
398 BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, “Communist leader pledges adherence to IMF 
agreements”, 28 March, 2001.
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politics, and will seek to find the external partner, whether Russia or the IFIs,
best able to assist in the long- term revival of the economy.399
Whether made to seek international legitimacy or out of his own policy 
convictions, Voronin’s statement deserves attention. It meant that the government decided 
to act against the will of those who had cast their ballots for anti-market policies. Was that 
possible within a democratic political system? Such a step contained the serious potential 
of authoritarian politics, of imposing further unpopular economic measures, even if 
understandably for the sake of the economic development of the country. Not surprisingly, 
the next elections in Moldova, the local elections of 2003, were assessed by international 
monitors as the worst elections since the country’s independence. And as we will see 
below, this was not the only violation of democracy. This leaves us with the same question 
as in the case of other CIS countries: was retreating from democratic principles to impose 
some authoritarian elements imperative to achieving approximately 6 percent positive 
economic growth in 2000 for the first time since independence, and 30 percent of 
economic growth from 2000 to 2004?
At the same time, Voronin reaffirmed that the CPM’s objectives included joining 
the proposed Russia-Belarus union and reintroducing Russian as an official language in 
Moldova, along with Romanian. Here once more we witness a foreign policy shift to better 
meet, as the Communist leaders believed, the country’s economic and security needs and 
expectations. The election results proved that there was a wide perception among the 
domestic society that the keys to restoring the economy and territorial integrity of the 
country were in the hands of the Communists, and that close ties with Russia and the CIS 
would help resolve these fundamental problems. The CPM also said that it would keep its 
promise to reverse administrative-territorial reforms, reverting to the Soviet system of 
counties called rayons. The Communist Party, though, had to form a government, and 
President Voronin and his team were unprepared to take on the full responsibility of 
governing. The Communists found themselves in a difficult situation when the time came 
to select people to work in the executive branch. Their solution was to establish a 
technocratic government. To avoid competition between the parliament and the presidency,
399 Oxford Analytica, Moldova: Communist Victory leaves much undecided, March 2001.
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Voronin selected the inexperienced and little known Eugenia Ostapciuc as the speaker of 
the parliament, as a compromise candidate.
Voronin captured 71 of the 89 votes cast by members of parliament, and as 
expected, was elected Moldova’s next President. Voronin nominated Vasile Tarlev, an 
ethnic Bulgarian who was the manager of the one of the few profitable state-run enterprises 
in Moldova, as the country’s Prime Minister. Tarlev’s team won the backing of 75 
members of parliament from the Communist Party and the Braghis Alliance. Thus, 
Moldova became the first and only former Soviet country where the Communists returned 
to power. Voronin, meanwhile, kept his post as First Secretary of the CPM’s Central 
Committee, thus uniquely and unprecedentedly positioning himself to control both the 
executive and the legislative branches. Thus, Communists created the first ever 
government in Moldova since its independence which was not only willing but also able to 
take full control.
Despite the fact that Moldova is a parliamentary republic, President Voronin 
continues to be the most influential figure in politics since 2001, having concentrated in his 
hands both legislative and the executive power. While many scholars consider 
parliamentarism as a proven path to democratic consolidation, this has not been the case in 
Moldova. As Lucan Way correctly noted: “...in contrast to what Juan Linz has assumed 
when writing about ‘perils of presidentialism,’ the establishment of a parliamentary system 
has not promoted democratic development in Moldova. If anything, the opposite has been 
the case.”400 Starting from 2001, the status of civil and political rights in the country started 
to deteriorate. The Nations in Transit 2003 Moldova country report quotes rapporteurs 
from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe who noted that, although the 
Communist Party came to power in a democratic way, “it changed overnight... democratic 
institutions and violated human rights.”401 The regime’s competitiveness also significantly 
decreased. Initially, as a result of the extraordinarily high 6 percent minimum required for 
any party to enter the legislature, several centre-right parties failed to qualify for seats. 
Ironically those were parties that had supported the Communist’s initiative for raising the
400 Way, 2002, p. 131.
401 Nations in Transit, 2003.
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threshold to 6 percent. Furthermore, Communist authorities took even tougher actions, 
temporarily banning a political party in January 2002 after it protested laws mandating the 
increased study of the Russian language in general-education schools.
However, the most noticeable problems have been with the press. In late November 
2001, the Economic Court ordered the closure of the stridently antigovemment weekly 
Kommersant Moldovy — the first such closure in the history of post-Soviet Moldova. State 
television and radio, the main source of news for much of the country, have been widely 
criticised for severely limiting access to members of the opposition. In the spring of 2002, 
journalists unsuccessfully went on strike as a protest against what they saw as undue 
pressure to stick to the party line. In mid-March the anchorman of the Russian-language 
newscast was fired after he aired information on the protest. A recent change in the media 
law, made in response to demands by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, has been widely criticised for leaving in place the most important mechanisms 
through which the government can control the media. The Communists also reduced 
judicial independence. They had replaced 70 percent of the heads of district and appellate 
courts.
As the Nations in Transit 2006 Moldova country report correctly concludes:
the government manipulates rather than violates the existing democratic 
framework, achieving a certain stability through co-optation of important 
societal, political, and economic actors rather than coercion of outright 
abuses of human rights.402
However, according to the same report, since the Communist Party came to power 
in 2001, Moldovan politics have been marked by increasing centralization and a tendency 
toward soft authoritarianism. Moldova’s scores on democracy, electoral practices, civil 
society, independence of the media, and independence of the judiciary have worsened.403 
In the same period, however, the Moldovan economy started to rise and already in 2002, 
Moldova registered economic growth of 6.4 percent. This provides vivid support for my 
assumption regarding the interconnectedness of different policies during transition, and my
402 Nations in Transit, 2006, p. 4.
403 Freedom in the World 2006, “Moldova Country Report”, p. 477.
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assertion that success in one dimension of transition often comes at the expense of another, 
unless there is serious international demand and support.
As one can see, throughout the Moldovan transition there was a persistent attempt 
by the executive, namely by all three presidents, to consolidate their hold on power. Both 
President Snegur and President Lucinschi argued for a stronger presidency as the solution 
to the political regime’s obvious ineffectiveness and declining legitimacy, and they tried to 
obtain this goal through constitution changes. Although Snegur managed to push through 
some constitutional changes, Lucinschi failed. The fact that they did not succeed does not 
necessarily mean that there was no structural necessity for consolidating executive power. 
After all, President Voronin also came to the same conviction and pursued the same goal, 
although in a different way. While keeping his post as First Secretary of the CPM’s Central 
Committee, even under the parliamentary system, he managed to concentrate both the 
executive and the legislative power in his hands in an unprecedented manner.
To sum up, the frequent turnover of political forces in power in Moldova showed 
that the process of pursuing political and economic reforms in parallel with state and 
nation- building proved to be costly for incumbent governments. Having more foreign 
policy choices than Kyrgyzstan, transition politics in Moldova were also accompanied by 
an intense yet unsuccessful search for a foreign policy orientation that would help Moldova 
gain international support for restoring the country’s territorial integrity and integrating the 
country economically and politically. Meanwhile, the domestic political support, which 
existed at the beginning of the transition, eroded as a result of radical economic reforms.
The rising social costs of economic reforms, inefficient policy making, futile 
foreign policy choices and inadequate international support left successive governments 
with limited choices: either to stop the reforms [or to undertake them selectively] or 
continue those radical reforms [that was the only way to receive vital foreign assistance 
and to save their declining legitimacy and power] despite the social and economic decline. 
Due to structural factors inherent in the country, tightening the grip over the country by the 
executive proved to be impossible until 2001, when the Communists came to power. But 
why did the early attempts to consolidate power fail in Moldova; what factors hampered 
the consolidation of power earlier? Authors, such as Lucan, have offered explanations 
which seem to be credible and which also support my approach. According to Lucan,
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tensions in Moldova over national identity “have been severe enough to undercut efforts by 
any single group to monopolise political power in the country. The basis for pluralism, in 
other words, has also been the basis for civil war...”404 And as mentioned above, the 
Moldovan elite has been split into three: nationalists, supporting unification with Romania; 
leftists, striving for closer ties to Russia; and centrists, seeking to preserve Moldova. The 
author finds that:
Moldovan presidents have had extremely weak nationalist backing and as a 
result have found themselves far more isolated in their power struggles with 
the legislature. Pro-Romanian nationalists have had little reason to 
compromise for the sake of national unity because they have wanted to join 
Romania in any case. 405
In this context, the higher level of political freedom and civil liberties in Moldova, 
free press and even free and fair elections in parallel to rapid economic liberalisation that 
occurred in Moldova in the period of 1991-2000 , were the result not of an elite pact to 
accept and exercise the rules of the game by the governing elites, but rather the 
“unintended consequences” of elite fragmentation. As Lucan Way correctly puts it, it was 
a period of “democracy by default.”
In other words, simultaneous political and economic reforms and lingering state- 
and nation-building problems exhausted the domestic support for further reform and 
contributed to further elite fragmentation. With weakened domestic support, a fragmented 
political elite and insufficient external support and demand from the West, the incumbents 
were not able to continue consistent reforms. The World Bank’s Country strategy correctly 
notes:
The political consensus backing the reformers was fragile and the 
government failed to develop broad pro-reform constituencies. Political 
infighting among coalition partners, popular discontent at falling living 
standards, and the slow and unsatisfactory outcomes of the reforms, 
combined with the growing and pervasive level of poverty, led to the 
decisive victory by the Communist Party of Moldova (CPM) in the 2001 
elections.406
404 Way, 2002, p. 137.
405 Way, 2002, p. 137.
406 World Bank, Moldova: Country Assistance Strategy, 2005-2008.
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The return of Communists and their ability to consolidate power was not surprising, 
since they had built their entire campaign on the economic mismanagement and failures of 
previous governments and had promised to alleviate poverty even at the expense of 
reversing some of the economic and political/administrative reforms. Their program 
mobilized critical domestic support.
After coming to power, however, Voronin did not reverse many of the reform 
polices that had led to the downfall of his predecessors. The key reason for this policy 
continuity, especially in economic reforms, was not a change in the beliefs of the 
communist government, but rather the political, economic and security situation that 
imposed structural constraints on their choice of policies. First of all, with limited political 
and economic resources, Voronin could not revive the economy or resolve the country’s 
main security challenge, the Transnistria problem, as he had promised, unless he had 
external support. That is why Voronin tried to reconcile his foreign policy choices and to 
improve Moldova’s relationship with Russia and the West simultaneously. In fact, 
especially at the beginning, the 2001-2003 period was a period of uneasy relations with the 
IFIs, when the IMF frequently had to temporarily suspend its financing of Moldova due to 
its divergence from promised reforms. As some analysts predicted, Vomonin’s policy 
choices: “the CPM will seek allies in domestic politics, and will seek to find the external 
partner, whether Russia or the IFIs, best able to assist in the long term economic 
revival.”407
Having the support of both the executive and the legislative branches, President 
Voronin easily concentrated all powers of government in his hands to pursue further 
economic reforms. Promoting economic reforms against domestic expectations, however, 
took its toll. Without sufficient external support to alleviate the social and political costs of 
those reforms, the government had to curtail political freedoms and civil liberties, impose 
restrictions on the media and falsify elections in order to compensate for its lost legitimacy 
and avoid losing its grip on power.
These developments demonstrate that, first, that there is a tangible horizontal 
interconnectedness among economic, political and security dimensions during the
407 Oxford Analytica, “Moldova: Communist Victory Leaves Much Undecided”, March
2001.
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transition process, and often progress in one dimension comes at the expense of another, 
unless there is effective and well-timed international demand and support. They also 
show the important role of vertical interaction and interplay, which will be discussed in a 
detail later in the chapter.
Economic Aspect
Moldova’s transition period has been very painful and difficult and has virtually 
brought the country to economic collapse. Several factors account for Moldova’s deeper 
economic crisis. First, Moldova did not have its own energy resources, and after the 
collapse of an integrated Soviet economy, it became fully dependent on neighbouring 
Russia and Ukraine for energy supplies. For instance, Russia’s demand from Moldova to 
pay in hard currency for oil and gas alone contributed to a drastic decrease in GDP of 21 
percent in 1992.
Second, Transnistria’s secession in 1992 deprived Moldova of its core industrial 
capacities, and the conflict has been a continued drain on resources. With only 17 percent 
of the population of Moldova, Transnistria accounted for more than a third of the total 
industrial output before independence. About 90 percent of electricity was generated in 
that region as well.408 Third, the country lacks key natural resources and depends heavily 
on agriculture, both in production and export. The high dependence on agriculture makes 
the country vulnerable to changes in the weather, which is very inconsistent in the region.
The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant a disruption of existing trade links and 
distribution channels for Moldova. According to the data, while in 1989, 95 percent of its 
"exports” were to other Soviet republics, in 1998, the former Soviet republics comprised 
only 26.4 percent of its exports. 409
Despite these inauspicious starting conditions, Moldova initiated radical economic 
reforms in 1992. As part of those reforms, Moldova embarked on price liberalisation,
408 Nina Orlova and Per Ronnas, “The Crippling Cost of an Incomplete Transformation: 
The Case of Moldova”, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 11, no. 3,1999, pp. 373-397, p. 
395.
409 EU Tacis, Economic Trends: Moldova\999.
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opening of internal markets, mass privatisation, developing foreign trade and attracting 
investments, introducing foreign currency, and the formation of a new banking system. 
The new Moldovan currency, the leu, was introduced in November 1993 and it has 
generally been maintained at relatively stable exchange rates against Western currencies. 
Moldova also shared the experience, common to many of the transition economies, of 
initial hyperinflation following the liberalisation of prices: annual inflation reached 1,200 
percent in 1992. Inflation was brought under control, with the annual rate falling to 105 
percent in 1994, 30 percent in 1995, and then down to a manageable 3 percent in 
subsequent years.410
During the decade of Moldova’s economic crisis, the country experienced a 
significant decrease in GDP (table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Growth in Real GDP in Moldova, 1991-2005 (percentage change)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
-1.2 -30.9 -1.4 -5.9 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 6.1 7.8 6.6 7.3 6.5
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2006.
In 1994, the lowest point of Moldova’s economic and social crisis, GDP was only 
34 percent, industrial output 32 percent, and agriculture 50 percent of the 1989 level. As a 
result of this drastically plummeting GDP, mass impoverishment and an increase in 
unemployment occurred, causing extensive migration of the economically active 
population.
During this period when the domestic economic situation was worsening, the 
Moldovan leadership was continuing political and economic reforms.411 Moldova was, by 
any standard, ranked among the best achievers among the CIS countries, with regard to 
macroeconomic policies, institutional and economic reform, and democratisation. The 
Western media acknowledged that “Moldova has surprisingly emerged as one of the 
economic success stories of the former Soviet Union.”412
410 Ronald J. Hill, “Moldova”, in Patrick Heenan and Monique Lamontagne (eds.), The CIS 
Handbook, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, London, Chicago, 1999, p. 119.
411 EBRD, Transition report, 2000, p. 21.
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Not surprisingly, in these circumstances the level of illegal or semi-legal economic 
activity was very high. The Moldovan underground economy was believed to amount to 
about 50 to 70 percent of gross domestic product during the first decade of 
independence.413 The official unemployment rate, which was less than 3 percent in 1998, 
was outweighed several times by the numbers of workers engaged in part-time 
employment, officially "on leave," or affected by seasonal fluctuations in agricultural 
work. By the end of 1998, the average income per capita was approximately US$30 a 
month. Russia’s financial crisis in August 1998 was disastrous for Moldova, and 
subsequently, the economy deteriorated further. Prices rose rapidly, as did the budget 
deficit, exports declined swiftly, and the value of the leu against the U.S. dollar fell almost 
twice before mid-1999. This economic crisis was accompanied by political struggle 
between the legislative and executive branches for power. The “scapegoat” in between the 
deepening economic crisis and power struggle became the government of Sturza, a pro- 
western radical reformer.
After independence, Moldova began to face arbitrary trade policies from its 
neighbours. For a collapsing economy of such a small and landlocked country such 
obstacles proved to be extremely devastating. For instance, in early 1997 Ukraine 
arbitrarily began to require foreign currency deposits for goods in transit. Although Kiev 
has since lifted the levy, Moldovan exports to its crucial Russian market in the meantime 
were badly damaged.414
Moldova’s trade balance has steadily been in deficit. Moldova is an export-oriented 
country with exports amounting to more than half of GDP in the 2000s. Moldova’s trade 
turnover decreased dramatically throughout the 1990s, and it was additionally hit by the 
Russian financial crisis in 1998. The country lacked the ability to develop products for sale 
in Western markets and was unable to sell into the distressed traditional economies of 
Russia and Ukraine. The reorientation of the economy towards exporting to the West, 
however desirable and necessary, required massive investment and marketing efforts. The
412Financial Times, 15 March 1995, p. 3.
413 Nations in Transit 2002, “Moldova country report.”
414 Economist Intelligence Unit 1998, “Moldova Country Profile”, p. 17.
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opening of new markets in the West, although never at an adequate speed and volume, was 
an attempt to compensate for the loss of markets in the East.
Another economic concern with serious political implications has been the growing 
socio-economic discrepancy between the centre and the periphery of Moldova. Regional 
economies remain backward and capital accumulation has occurred only in the capital city. 
The regions of Moldova heavily rely on subsidies from the state budget in order to finance 
current expenditures. Poverty remained an acute problem. The 2002 household survey 
indicated that in Moldova about 40 percent of population live in absolute poverty. 
Furthermore, food poverty is 60 percent higher in the rural population than in urban 
areas.415 The country’s political division complicated its economic recovery and remained 
a source of potential tension. Efforts to project a distinct image of a reliable and 
responsible trade and investment partner turned out to be problematic without a credible 
and stable government that is based on a clear country image or national identity. 
Perceptions of political instability owing to continuing disputes with Transnistria were not 
mitigated because of the inability of the political elite to function with responsibility and 
compromise. Until 2000, the endless struggle for division of power and the country’s 
orientation further tarnished the already poor image of Moldova.
Not surprisingly, Moldova’s rapidly deteriorating socio-economic situation was
reflected in the political scene, gradually shifting the attention of political forces and the
population from the issues of conflict and nationalism to socio-economic concerns and this
paved the way for a leftist turn. During the 2001 parliamentary elections, especially, all
parties hotly debated the country’s economic difficulties. This situation is correctly
described by Igor Munteanu:
Due to a general scarcity of resources, multiple social conflicts and 
instability of the political and economic systems create the perception that 
the most recent evolutions of the country have ruined the social cohesion of 
the population and thus deprived the people from their sense of obligation 
for their destiny. As a result, the key phrase which is commonly used to 
describe the politics of transition in Moldova is largely defined as a general 
“attitude of despair and helplessness” among ordinary people and through a 
cynical arrogance among top-ranked officials of the state. The explanation
415 EBRD, 2003, p. 173.
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is that the ordinary people feel themselves more insecure today than they 
felt to be long before the Soviet disintegration.. .416
Public attitudes towards economic reform have changed as well, with many starting 
to withdraw their support for them. A poll organised by the Institute for Public Policy in 
August 2000, revealed the depth of public discontent. Some 82 percent of the population 
felt that the country was headed in a “mistaken” direction. Sixty percent named poverty as 
their greatest fear, and over a third named hunger. Over half said that they expected 
“conditions either to remain the same or to worsen over the next year.”417 The mass 
impoverishment -  in fact, about 80 percent of Moldovans lived on less than one U.S. dollar 
per day — and disillusionment with the incumbent government paved the way for the 
Communists’ takeover in 2001.
Not surprisingly, the CPM’s main pledges during the election campaign were to 
increase salaries and pensions and reduce the price of bread. The electorate was less 
receptive to the Communists’ competitors, who had more sophisticated messages regarding 
market reforms that would improve the standard of living over time. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Communists did not reverse the market economy path of the country and 
expressed their support for the liberal economic policy that the previous governments had 
taken. With the Communists in power, Moldova registered its first positive economic 
growth of around 6 percent in 2001, which continued during subsequent years, allowing 
the government to maintain relative economic and political stability. In the same way, 
foreign trade in 2001 grew by 16 percent from the previous year. This pattern maintained 
substantial continuity in following years. In addition, the national currency, the leu, 
remained relatively stable. In 2001 alone, the average salary rose by 29 percent to $37.8, 
while real earnings rose by 17 percent.418 The Communist-dominated parliament reduced 
income taxes for businesses from 28 to 25 percent. The legal system protects and facilitates 
the acquisition and disposition of property. Moldova has adopted laws on property and on
416 Munteanu, 2001, p. 90.
417 Nations in Transit, “Moldova Report”, 2001, p. 281.
418 Nations in Transit, “Moldova Report”, 2002, p. 294.
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mortgages. During the 2000s, due to the re-intensification of foreign trade (primarily with 
Russia), increasing domestic demand facilitated by money inflows from labour migrants, 
and curbing inflation, Moldova experienced an apparent economic revival and growth. 
Economic growth accelerated beginning in 2001, reaching 6 to 7 percent annually. Increase 
in GDP per capita from US$321 in 1999 to US$766 in 2004 led to a gradual decline in the 
segment of society living below the poverty line. Positive employment growth was 
registered in 2003.
Economic growth and an increase of domestic consumer demand were to a large 
extent caused by inflows from labour migration abroad. According to the Moldovan 
official estimates, more than half a million, or 35 to 40 percent, of economically active 
people have left the country to become labour migrants. In 2004, remittances from abroad 
reached more than $700 million and accounted for 27 percent of GDP. The negative side of 
this development pertains to the tendency of losing increasing numbers of economically 
active people, with the share of young people prospectively rising.
Thus, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova has experienced the 
difficulties of simultaneous nation building, state-building and fundamental socio­
economic and political transformation. As elsewhere in transition states -- especially those 
formerly within the Soviet Union -- Moldova could not escape a massive economic decline 
during the first phase of transition. This was typical for all post-Soviet economies; 
however, it was further exacerbated by the administrative and organisational disorder and 
the inability of the Moldovan government to produce any comprehensive reform policy. 
Although ethnic conflict overshadowed everything else, the power struggle evolved in an 
environment of escalating social crisis.
Moldova was viewed as an early and successful reformer. Macroeconomic 
stabilization was achieved relatively quickly and a number of important first generation 
reforms were undertaken, such as trade, price, and exchange rate liberalization. The 
momentum behind these initial reform efforts, nevertheless, was not maintained and 
Moldova’s reform experience has since followed a decidedly stop-and-go pattern.
The reason why Moldova’s reform tempo was changed lies in the inability of its 
successive governments to cope with high social costs of economic reforms alone. They 
were voted out by the domestic society frequently, however, without making any serious
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policy change or success domestically. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova’s successive 
governments were not able to centralize and maintain power until 2001, when the 
Communist Party of Moldova came to power. The substantial growth in the economy after 
2001 came at the expense of political freedoms.
Security Aspect
As mentioned earlier, Moldova’s state-building efforts were inextricably linked to 
its search of national identity and nation building. The post-communist Moldovan state 
has been relatively weak, with little of the experience necessary for effective policymaking 
and the exercise of state authority and few of the mechanisms needed for administering an 
effective tax regime. However, the most important internal security challenge that 
Moldova faced was how to accommodate its two large ethnic minorities and their 
resistance to Moldovan sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Independence in Moldova was accompanied by ethnic mobilisation of the 
Romanian speaking population. It was, however, also the beginning of ethnic 
discrimination in the multinational country. The early period of radical nationalism headed 
by the Popular Front, created a greater sense of uncertainty and insecurity for ethnic 
minorities who comprised about one million of the republic’s four million population. For 
the first time in modem history, Moldova’s interethnic confrontation became a serious 
problem. Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals were dismissed from positions they had held 
for decades. Transnistria came to rely on the protection of the Russian 14th Army.419 The 
anti-Gorbachev coup in 1991 accelerated this division. In contrast to Chisinau, which 
immediately denounced the coup and declared independence, Transnistria first supported it 
and later asserted its independence from Moldova. Thus the newly independent Moldova 
started its journey with its sovereignty seriously damaged, its state and society actually 
disintegrating, and its government essentially dominated by pan-Romanian nationalists 
who, in fact, had serious hesitations about Moldova’s independent development path.
This cycle of extreme nationalism came to an end very early. In May 1991 the pro- 
Romanian Prime Minister, Mircea Dmc, was dismissed from his post and was replaced by
419 Crowther, 1997, p. 294.
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the more moderate Valeriu Muravschi. Drue’s dismissal did not provoke any protests. This 
was the first critical step towards a new, more moderate politics. In this respect, Crowther 
correctly notes that “probably the most remarkable single aspect of Moldova’s post­
communist transition is the success of efforts to break the cycle of ethnic mobilization and 
recast political discourse along cross-communal lines.”420
A poll conducted in the summer of 1992 revealed how the Moldovan society was 
divided only a year after getting its independence. There were significant differences 
among members of different ethnic groups in their attitudes to the country's orientation, 
whether toward Romania, Russia and the CIS, or in favour of national independence. 
Russians and Ukrainians were particularly wary of both pro-Romanian moves and national 
independence. Socio-economic issues, however, were cross-cutting issues for all, even 
minorities. On issues of everyday economics and politics, however, there was remarkable 
unity, and personal animosity against members of other ethnic communities was not 
high.421 Less than 10 percent of ethnic Moldovan/Romanians supported unification with 
Romania in the short or long term, and 87 percent of Moldovan/Romanians preferred 
Moldovan ethnic identity.422 This attitude was reflected in the referendum on unification 
with Romania held on March 6, 1994. About 95 percent of voters voted for independent 
statehood and against unification with Romania.423 Interestingly, an opinion poll conducted 
in Romania in May 1992 had indicated that less than one-fifth of Romanians wanted early 
unification with Moldova anyway.424
420 Crowther, 1997, pp. 300-301.
421 Hill, 1999, pp. 112-121, p. 114.
422 Charles King, “Moldovan Identity and Politics of Pan-Romanianism”, Slavic Review 
53, No. 2, 1994, pp. 345-368, pp. 356-357.
423 See The Report No. 4/94 of the OSCE Mission in Moldova. The text of the question 
proposed by the Moldovan government on 6 March 1994 was as follows: “Are you for the 
Republic of Moldova to develop as an independent and integral undivided state within the 
borders recognized on the day when the sovereignty of Moldova was proclaimed, to 
promote a policy of neutrality, maintain mutually advantageous economic relations with all 
countries of the world and to guarantee all citizens equal rights, according to the norms of 
international law?”
424 Hill, 1999, p. 114.
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The intolerance towards ethnic minorities in the early years of transition took its 
toll. Not only Transnistria with its large Russian minority, that had powerful backing from 
Russia, but also Gagauz, were provoked into defensive actions. In contrast to Transnistria, 
the conflict with Gagauzi was eventually resolved peacefully. Gagauz-Veri in the South, 
which had a similar aim of resisting Romanianisation, successfully negotiated the 
establishment of autonomous status in March 1992. The Gagauzi separatists did not resort 
to force, and from the outset, their representatives held extensive discussions with 
Moldovan leaders about the future of the region.
The February 1994 Moldovan elections marked the turning point in relations 
between Chisinau and the Gagauz capital, Komrat. In addition to abolishing the 1989 
language law — a particularly important issue for the Gagauzi, the majority of whom are 
not fluent in Romanian/Moldovan — the Moldovan parliament that year ratified the 
region’s “special status.” Under the law, Gagauz remains part of Moldovan territory and 
Chisinau determines its budget. The major concessions were the designation of 
Moldovan/Romanian, Gagauz, and Russian as the three official languages and the setting 
up of a locally elected Popular Assembly, with a governor and executive committee acting 
as the local government.
A framework similar to that accepted by the Gagauzi negotiators in early 1993 was 
offered to the Transnistrians, but the authorities in Tiraspol have persistently refused to 
negotiate an agreement. The justification for the revolt centred initially on Moldova's 
attitude towards Romania. However, currently the Tiraspol government's position is that 
the territory has never been part of the Romanian state. Around 48 percent of its population 
are Ukrainians and Russians; the Moldovans are less than 40 percent. The region’s 
economic, political, and trade orientation has always been toward Ukraine and Russia 
rather than to Romania.
The Transnistria problem proved to be costly for both Moldovan politics and 
economy. The region contained a significant part of Moldova’s industrial base and losing it 
has made Moldova even more dependent on agricultural production and imported energy. 
Another economic consequence of Transnistria’s secession was the creation of “fractured
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customs space with important implications for smuggling and tax revenue mobilization.”425 
The existence of two separate financial systems, the absence of a single currency, 
substantial differences in the legislative framework and lack of coordination of economic 
and social reforms have therefore contributed to the country’s deepening economic crisis. It 
should be noted that the negative consequences on social, economic and political issues 
have affected the population of Transnistria more than the people living in the rest of 
Moldova.426
Alongside declining economic conditions, the ethnic minority issue and, especially, 
Transnistria, was an important cause of the frequent political turnover in the country and 
frequent changes in the foreign policy orientation of the political elite. The unresolved 
Transnistrian problem is also a major stability concern for foreign investors. Many 
observers deemed Moldova a failed state, with severe implications for Moldova’s economy 
and international engagement.
Vertical Dimension
Without a doubt, Moldova has more foreign policy choices and alternatives than 
Kyrgyzstan. And, although it had very similar starting conditions, Moldova’s proximity to 
Western democracies puts the country in a more advantageous position to utilise better its 
vertical linkages for promoting its transition to democracy and market economy, provided 
that was the intention of the country’s elite. How effective was the engagement of 
international and regional actors in Moldova’s transition and development? To what extent 
have Moldova’s reform policies been demanded, supported, compensated, or 
complemented by the international community in order to help the domestic society 
sustain its support for reforms and to prevent the divergence of the government and the 
society from the democratic path of transition?
425 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for Moldova:2005-2008.
426 UNDP, Moldova: National Human Development Report: State-building and National 
Integration o f  Society, UNDP, 1996.
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Political Aspect
Moldova’s early foreign policy stance was very pro-Romanian. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the CIS, Moldova declined to 
become a member of the new organisation until 1993. Customs offices were set up on the 
border with Ukraine and the demand was made that the Soviet military should leave the 
republic. Moldova's independence was soon recognised by the international community. 
The country became a member of a number of international organisations, such as the UN, 
the OSCE, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Moldova became a full member of the CIS in the 
autumn of 1993, although the agreement was ratified by its parliament only a year later. In 
1994, President Snegur signed NATO's Partnership for Peace agreement and a Cooperation 
and Partnership Agreement with the EU.
Moldova’s relations with the CIS have been uneasy and have caused considerable 
domestic debate, as well as political and economic instability. In the face of considerable 
domestic opposition, Moldova signed the Alma-Alta Agreement establishing the wider 
CIS, in December 1991. Disappointed about the pro-Romanian political forces’ failures on 
the economic and security front, domestic attitudes very quickly became more moderate 
and pro-CIS. The parliamentary elections in February 1994 were called with a view to 
resolving once and for all Moldova's relations with the CIS. As expected, pro-CIS parties 
won a majority, and in April 1994 parliament ratified CIS membership.
President Voronin’s statements about joining the Russia-Belarus Union have never 
been translated into action. However, Moldova became an observer to the Euro-Asian 
Economic Council.
Moldova joined the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1992. 
Throughout the entire period of transition, the OSCE has promoted its traditional agenda of 
security, human rights and democratisation. Understandably, the resolution of the 
Transnistrian conflict has occupied a high place in the OSCE’s agenda. The OSCE has 
tried to assist the activities of Moldova’s civil society and the development of civil society 
in Transnistria, with monitoring of elections. As we have seen in chapter 2, the methods 
that the OSCE uses to promote democratisation and human rights can be characterised as 
socialisation based on persuasion and norm promotion rather than on incentives.
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The Council of Europe (CoE) has used very similar socialisation method to 
promote democratisation and human rights in Moldova: teaching and persuading domestic 
elites to adopt the democratic norms and procedures advocated by the CoE, by providing 
training, knowledge and expertise. In contrast with the way the CoE treated some other 
CIS countries, there was no membership conditionality for Moldova. However, especially 
during Voronin’s early years in office, when violation of human rights and media freedom 
became chronic, the CoE went beyond persuasion and used such instruments as exposing 
by reporting, providing deadlines for action, threatening negative consequences if  action 
was not taken, etc.
The EU played a very limited role in Moldova throughout the 1990s and Moldova 
was far down the list of EU priorities. The EU-Moldova relationship in the 1990s focused 
on establishing bilateral relations, targeted at the negotiation and signing of a Partnership 
and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) in 1994 similar to those signed with other newly 
independent countries. The ten year Agreement only entered into force in 1998. It 
represents the legal framework for the Republic of Moldova-European Union relationship 
and provides the basis for Moldova’s cooperation with the EU in the political, commercial, 
economic, legal, cultural and scientific areas.
The enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004 brought a historical shift 
for the Union in political, geographic and economic terms, further reinforcing the political 
and economic interdependence between the EU and Moldova.
President Voronin, especially after his re-election in March 2005, turned towards 
the West, intensively seeking closer relations with the EU and NATO. It may seem that by 
turning towards the West and ignoring his pledges to ally with Russia and avoid any 
cooperation with the West, Voronin deeply disappointed his electorate. However, that is 
not the case. Virtually all political actors in Moldova publicly support EU integration as 
the best route to stability and prosperity. In reality, drastic shifts in attitudes occurred not 
only at the elite but also at the society level after the Communists first came to power in 
2001. In 2001 there were mass protests against Voronin’s attempt to make Russian a 
second official language. In this regard, Voronin’s foreign policy reorientation was not 
surprising, and its explanation can be found in Moldovan society. A nationally 
representative survey conducted in 2000 reveals that although about 91 percent of
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Moldovans think that maintaining good relations with Russia is important, compared to 
neighbouring Ukraine and Belarus, Moldovans have higher expectations from the EU. 
Interestingly those expectations are not only related to economic prosperity but also to the 
political stability that EU membership may bring (see table 6.2). Disappointed with 
Russia’s position on the issue of Transnistria as well as Russia’s arbitrary trade policies, 
Moldova’s public has turned to the West and the previously pro-Russian government 
started seeking closer ties with the EU and NATO.
This drastic shift in public attitudes and in Voronin’s foreign policy supports my 
key argument about the essential link between a country’s foreign and domestic policies. A 
shift towards the West took place as a result of unfulfilled expectations from the previous 
eastward-looking policy. The pro-Russia policy was perceived neither to contribute to the 
stability and national integration of Moldova, nor to address their economic concerns.
Table 6.2 Perceived benefits of EU Membership (percentage)427
Perceived effect on...
Economic development 69
Political stability 64
Consumer prices 49
Personal Incomes 47
Unemployment 47
The European integration policy of the Republic of Moldova is based on two main 
pillars: (i) implementation of the Moldova -  EU Action Plan and (ii) using the possibilities 
of the Republic of Moldova deriving from participation in all the regional initiatives for 
South Eastern Europe, such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, South Eastern 
European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA). These two directions towards the European integration of the Republic of 
Moldova often overlap and complement each other.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the European Union sets ambitious 
objectives based on commitments to shared values and effective implementation of 
political, economic and institutional reforms. Moldova is invited to enter into intensified 
political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced cross border co­
427 The table is from Stephen White, Margot Light, and John Lowenhardt, p. 295.
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operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. One of 
the key objectives of this action plan is to further support a viable solution to the 
Transnistria conflict. The EU-Moldova Action Plan is a first step in this process.428 
However, the ENP falls short of offering Moldova even a remote prospect for European 
Union membership. Instead, the European Union acknowledges Moldova’s European 
aspirations. The asymmetric interdependence in power between the EU and Moldova, as 
noted in chapter 4, means that the Commission is the one setting the terms of partnership. 
As Michael Smith and Mark Webber point out, however, “EU leverage in setting these 
terms is diluted somewhat by the lack of membership perspective within ENP”429. Smith 
and Webber also find that “The EU’s political dialogue arrangements, whether in ENP or 
elsewhere, are largely a case of missed opportunities and unrealized potential.”430 Maier 
and Schimmelfenning are of the same opinion, arguing that “a credible membership 
perspective has been a necessary condition for an effective EU impact on domestic 
change”. They conclude, therefore, that “ENP will not have a significant impact on 
democracy and human rights in the ENP participants.”431
428 The EU Moldova Action Plan is a political document laying out the strategic objectives 
of the cooperation between Moldova and the EU. Its implementation will help fulfill the 
provisions in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and will encourage and 
support Moldova’s objective of further integration into European economic and social 
structures. Implementation of the Action Plan will significantly advance the approximation 
of Moldovan legislation, norms and standards to those of the European Union. In this 
context, it will build solid foundations for further economic integration based on the 
adoption and implementation of economic and trade-related rules and regulations with the 
potential to enhance trade, investment and growth. It will furthermore help to devise and 
implement policies and measures to promote democratic reforms, economic growth and 
social cohesion, to reduce poverty and to protect the environment, thereby contributing to 
the long-term objective of sustainable development.
See http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova for details.
429 Smith and Webber, in Weber, Smith and Baun, 2008.
430 Smith and Webber, in Weber, Smith and Baun, 2008.
431 Sylvia Maier and Frank Schimmelfenning, “Shared Values: Democracy and Human 
rights”, in Weber, Smith and Baun, 2008.
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On the other hand, Mcdonagh is optimistic about the EU’s role as a potential 
promoter of democratization in Moldova, even without membership perspective. She finds 
that since Moldova is a recipient country, the EU is a major donor (the EU is in the third 
place in providing official development assistance (ODA) to Moldova), and democratic 
progress and respect for human rights are preconditions for any EU assistance, the EU has 
some leverage432. March and Herd go further, arguing that although “the Action Plan 
significantly lacks the incentive of guaranteed accession, Moldova’s dependence on 
outside assistance might be enough to provide the EU with active leverage” 433
It is hard to agree with these optimistic views for a number of reasons. First, no 
matter how desperately Moldova needs external assistance, the EU is not the only nor the 
major donor. Second, foreign assistance is important, but foreign markets are even more 
vital for Moldova’s transition. In that sense, Anders Aslund’s observation is to the point:
Clearly, Moldova and Ukraine have fallen victim to EU protectionism. 
Worst off is Moldova, whose wine and fruit the EU has all but prohibited.
As a result, the country has tumbled below Albania to become the poorest 
in Europe.434
Although the involvement of these organisations was far from being full fledged, 
their role was still important. There were instances when regional organisations’ 
interventions prevented further deterioration of the political situation. For instance, 
according to some experts, the political and economic crises that emerged in 2002 were 
successfully resolved by the mediation of regional and international organisations. On the 
one hand, there were mass protests in response to Voronin’s decision to make Russian a 
second language. On the other hand, the country faced a peak in debt repayment “at a time
432 Ecaterina Mcdonagh, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective in Moldova? The Impact of 
European Institutions on Development of Civil and Political Rights in Moldova”, 
Democratization V ol. 15, No. 1, 143-161, p. 150.
433 Luke March and Graeme Herd, “Moldova between Moldova and Russia: Inoculating 
Against the Colored Contagion?”, Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 22, No.4, 2006, pp. 349-379, p. 
369.
434 Anders Aslund, “Looking Eastwards to Bridge the Trade Divide”, Financial Times, 
January 17, 2003.
254
when there was a growing popular pressure for the CPM to deliver on its campaign
promise to raise living standards”:435
The efforts of the Council of Europe on the political front, and the IMF and 
World Bank on the economic front helped to resolve the crisis. Multi-party 
talks in Strasburg ended the protests, and the government was able to 
concentrate on the debt issue.436
In sum, with all the shortcomings in their democratisation instruments, these
regional and international organisations have been successful in some cases, if not in
advancing democracy, in keeping Moldova on the democratic path. According to the 2006
Nations in Transit report:
The most obvious attempts to centralise power have been traditionally 
reversed under pressure from the EU, United States, OSCE, and Council of 
Europe. Moldovan government’s commitment to democracy stems not from 
convictions but from a quest for international legitimacy, mainly with the 
EU and the United States, whose support Moldova badly needs 43
Economic Aspect
The involvement of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in Moldova has 
not been even and can be divided into two periods. In the first period, 1992-1998, the IFI’s 
support was substantial but not well monitored and not accompanied with necessary 
conditionality. In the second period, 1998-2006, after the Communists came to power, 
international economic assistance was more conditional on the country’s progress in 
economic reforms, which at this time demonstrated, as the World Bank pointed out, “a 
decidedly stop-and-go pattern.” In the latter period, the IMF suspended and resumed its 
program several times, trying to bring the country back on track to continue its market 
reforms.
However, the relative generosity of the assistance to economic reforms was only 
one side of the coin. The assistance was not well planned, well targeted or well-timed. The
435 Oxford Analytica, “Moldova: Default and Political Crisis Loom Large”, March 2002.
436 Oxford Analytica, “Moldova: IMF and World Bank Resume Funding, December 2002.
437 Nations in Transit, 2006, p. 4.
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collapse of the government of Sturza, discussed in detail in previous sections of this 
chapter, is the best case to illustrate the point.
External debt
Throughout the 1990s, in order to compensate for budget deficits, Moldova’s 
government relied substantially on external borrowing. Moldova’s primary creditors have 
been the World Bank, IMF, EBRD, as well as Russia.
Until 1997 Moldova was not eligible for soft loans and development assistance in 
general. According to some experts, it was the international financial institutions rigid 
policy that should be blamed for that.438 Until 1997 the credits that were given were short 
term and with high commercial interest rates because Moldova did not qualify for 
concessionary loans until then. The reason was the refusal of the World Bank to scale 
down its GDP estimates for Moldova to a realistic level, despite ample evidence that its 
estimates were absurdly high. In 1993 the World Bank estimated Moldova’s GDP per 
capita as $1060, while the domestic estimate was three times lower, at $323.439 This state 
of affairs was not corrected until 1997. However, the change of Moldova’s status had little 
impact on the country’s fiscal situation because the country already had accumulated a 
large amount of external debt. The IMF suspended all lending to Moldova as a sign of 
dissatisfaction with the pace of reform and the growing budget deficit, thus forcing the 
country to borrow expensive commercial credits “to maintain basic public functions and 
services in the face of the near-collapse of domestic revenue base and, increasingly, to 
service the expensive loans received earlier, amongst others, from the IMF and the World 
bank.”440 The country’s foreign debt in 2000 reached $1,721 billion, or about 134 percent 
of gross domestic product, making it difficult to service the debt, let alone accumulate the 
necessary capital for domestic investments, including in the social sector and the
438 Moldova’s Transition to Destitution, by Per Ronnas and Nina Orlova, Sida Studies, 
No.l Stockholm, Sida, 2000, p. 48.
439 Ronnas and Orlova, 2000, p. 48.
440 Ronnas and Orlova, 2001, p. 395.
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development of economy. To service the foreign debt, Moldova had to pay $180 million in 
2002 or else reschedule a portion of the debt. In the absence of an IMF programme, no 
progress has been achieved on restructuring the Paris Club debt until 2006. In addition to 
this, the government was also in constant negotiation with Russia’s Gazprom over 
Moldova’s energy arrears.441 The only other way for Moldova to be able to relieve its 
heavy debt burden is through rapid and sustained economic growth. On the other hand, the 
heavy debt-serving burden drains the economy and serves as an effective obstacle to 
economic recovery. It is obvious that Moldova is caught in a vicious cycle which it cannot 
come out from by itself. As Joseph Stiglitz noted in 2002, “This year Moldova, already 
desperately poor, will spend about 75 percent of its government income on debt 
repayments.”442 The external debt stock continues to be high and stood at US$1.92 billion 
(74 percent of GDP) at the end of 2004 (see table 6.3).
Table 6.3 External Debt of Moldova as a percentage of GDP, 1994-2005
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
35 39.7 42.5 60.9 75.9 127.6 133.6 113.1 109.2 97.2 74.2 NA
Source: EBRD ransition Report 2006.
Moldova's external debt in 2006 stood at US$2.5 billion. The country is primarily 
indebted to IFIs, but Russia and other Paris Club members are also important creditors. In 
2006, after signing an arrangement of US$118.2 million with the IMF under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility, the Republic of Moldova was able to negotiate a US$150 
million debt rescheduling with the Paris Club creditors. Although debt rescheduling has 
eased fiscal pressures, the Republic of Moldova's huge debt continues to loom over the 
national economy.
The statement by Ronnas and Orlova best describes the level and quality of the
international support and demand to Moldova:
Moldova is currently paying a heavy price for what could be argued was a 
prevalence of prestige over reason and fairness. Lending was not
441 EBRD, Transition report, 2003, p. 172.
442 Joseph Stiglitz, Financial Times, 23 September 2002, p. 23.
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accompanied for a long time by any meaningful technical assistance... Nor 
was lending for several years accompanied by much control or conditions 
with regard to its use. Excessive attention was paid to successful macro- 
economic stabilisation, mainly inflation control, while little attention was 
paid to the poor record of reform of the real economy. Most of the credits 
were extended to the Sangheli Government, which had little interest in 
genuine reform and which was rife with corruption. By contrast, the 
election of a more reform-minded Parliament and Government in 1997 
coincided with a sharp curtailment in lending... The detrimental impact of 
this policy on Moldova can hardly be overstated... The blame for the heavy 
burden lies as much with the lenders as with the borrowers.443
In sum, the bilateral and multilateral support that Moldova has received since 1994 
in the form of direct foreign financial assistance and loans has been substantial, yet 
ineffective, and there have been serious flaws in policy design and implementation from 
both sides. It seems that most of the pro-reformist governments received international 
support to various degrees in pursuing economic reforms, while the communists faced far 
stricter demand-support from the international economic community. However, the failure 
of correct designing and timing of international support and demand no doubt contributed 
to the de-legitimation and eventual downfall of pro-reformist forces. The International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank suspended their programmes in Moldova when 
Sturza’s government was obviously already in danger. We have already discussed why 
Sturza’s government failed and what its failure meant for the country. What is obvious is 
that the steps taken by the international community, rather than supporting reforms and the 
reformers, further undermined the reformist government’s legitimacy
Trade access
Moldova still maintains some of its traditional trade links, mostly with Ukraine and 
Russia, which can be explained both by the similarity in consumer tastes with those 
countries as well as Moldova’s restricted access to the EU marketplace. In 2005, for 
instance, only 7 percent of food and beverage exports went to the EU, compared with 
almost 90 percent to the CIS.
443 Ronnas and Orlova, 2000, p. 49.
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Agricultural products constitute almost two-thirds of all exports, and wine alone 
accounts for one-third of total exports. This reveals the heavy reliance of Moldova’s export 
trade on agricultural products and also points to the agrarian structure of the economy and 
trade, which may become a constraint for Moldova’s speedy and effective economic 
transformation and growth.
The industrial sector's reliance on agricultural inputs, combined with a lack of 
production and export diversification, has left the Moldovan economy very vulnerable to 
external shocks. The heavy and increasing dependence on a single country for exports 
made Moldovan trade highly vulnerable, as subsequent events have shown. The regional 
financial crisis in the late 1990s that hit Russia and the rest of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States proved highly destabilizing for Moldova, causing a sharp decline in 
industrial production. The crisis forced Moldovan exporters to look for new markets, 
which reduced Russia's share in Moldova's export trade from more than 50 percent in the 
mid-1990s to around 35 percent in 2004. Increasingly, the EU is also becoming a major 
trading partner of Moldova.
However, there still is a high export dependency on Russia, and Russia reportedly 
tends to use that for political ends. In 2005 and 2006, Russia imposed bans on imports of 
meat and vegetable products and alcoholic drinks on sanitary grounds. These actions had a 
devastating effect on Moldova’s export revenue, since more than 70 percent of wine export 
went to Russia.
Domestic growth and an improvement in the external trading environment 
gradually contributed to an intensification of Moldova’s foreign trade. Moldova has been a 
WTO member since 2001. However, as leading experts note, the experience of Moldova, 
as well as of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, shows that “WTO membership on its own does not 
guarantee unhindered access to international and regional markets, or the removal of key 
trade barriers.”444 Rather the opposite, WTO membership puts additional pressures on the 
country’s vulnerable economy, in this case without the adequate reward of facilitating 
foreign trade. As the EBRD Transition Report suggests, “At the same time, international
444EBRD Transition Report 2003, p. 21.
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integration places significant demands on a country’s economic, political, and social 
institutions.”445
Losing its traditional trade partners, Moldova has struggled to penetrate EU 
markets. However, the country’s access to those markets remains very limited. The EU’s 
share of Moldovan exports has increased over the years, to 30 percent in 2004 and 2005, 
compared with just over 20 percent in the late 1990s. Imports from the EU constitute 28 
percent of Moldova’s total imports. Moldova's comparatively low wages enable it to retain 
a competitive advantage against other central European countries. The few exceptions 
include dried fruits and vegetables.
The EU included Moldova in its new Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
Plus scheme as of 2006, but the extended list of exports eligible for duty-free status still 
excludes essential items such as wine, tobacco, and sugar.446
Foreign Direct Investment
During the first decade of transition, accumulation of fixed capital and capital 
investment in general was low. Investment has been predominantly concentrated in only a 
few sectors of the economy, such as agricultural products processing, energy, gas, and 
water supply, and communication. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Moldova has been 
relatively low by regional standards. In addition, two international rating agencies, Fitch 
IBCA and Moody’s, lowered Moldova’s credit ratings in 2001, thus damaging further 
Moldova’s fragile standing. Moldova has considerably lagged behind in per capita terms 
($220 annually from 1989 to 2004) in comparison to the Eastern and Central- European 
countries ($2235) and countries of South-East Europe ($821).447 However, from 2000 on 
this indicator has started growing and even provides the bulk of the financing required for 
covering the current-account deficit. Moreover, as a result of the growing economy and 
increased interest from investors, particularly Russian companies, net FDI rose sharply in
445 EBRD Transition Report 2003, p. 73.
446 Special GSP + Trade preferences offered to fifteen vulnerable nations, European Report, 
23 December, 2005.
447 EBRD Transition Report 2006, p. 55.
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2005, to US$120 million or 7.7 percent of GDP (see table 6.4). FDI inflows in 2005 alone 
covered almost 80 percent of the current-account deficit. Although FDI had risen 
significantly after 2001, cumulative FDI still only amounted to around US$862 million at 
the end of 2005, according to the same source. Russia is the single largest investor, 
accounting for 21 percent of FDI capital as of the end of 2005, followed by Spain with 15 
percent and the Netherlands and the United States with 8 percent each.448
The unresolved Transnistrian problem continued taking its serious economic and 
investment toll of course. However, as a result of its consistent economic policies and the 
resulting incremental economic growth, Voronin’s government has managed to improve 
Moldova’s image as a politically and economically stable, investor friendly country to 
some extent. However, as predicted, growth in investments and gross domestic product 
have come at some expense of democratic freedoms in Moldova.
Table 6.4 Foreign Direct Investment in Moldova, 1993-2005 (net/in US $ million)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
14 12 25 23 78 75 38 127 102 132 71 148 120
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2006
Thus, Moldova has achieved partial stabilization and economic growth which 
provides impetus for further socio-economic development. In the economic sphere, 
Moldova has achieved significant results in terms of establishing the basic institutions of a 
capitalist economy, adopting laws and regulations to ensure economic liberalisation and 
open the country for integration into the world economy. These achievements are reflected 
in the Index of Economic Freedom (see table 6.5).
448 Economist Intelligence Unit, Moldova Country Report, 2006.
261
Table 6.5 Index of Economic Freedom in Moldova, 1995-2006449
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
4.10 3.45 3.60 3.43 3.44 3.30 3.70 3.25 3.13 3.09 3.11 3.10
To conclude, the international support and demand in the economic sphere was not 
adequate. The bilateral and multilateral support that Moldova has received since 1994 in 
the form of direct foreign financial assistance and loans has been substantial, yet not 
effective, and there have been serious flaws in policy design and implementation from both 
sides. As a result, the country’s fiscal situation remains complicated, with external debt 
exceeding the country’s GDP.
Security Aspect
Moldova’s relations with Russia have centred on the extent of Russian support for 
Transnistria’s recalcitrance and the related presence of Russian troops on its soil. Officially 
Russia does not recognise Transnistria’s independence, but this has not stopped nationalist 
and Communist deputies from the Russian Duma paying quasi-official visits to the region 
or inviting President Smirnov to address the Duma. Towards the end of 1995, Yeltsin’s 
stance shifted in deference to the strong showing by Communists and nationalists in the 
December 1995 parliamentary election. In December 1995, Moscow announced that it 
wanted to open a consulate in Tiraspol, ostensibly to assist local residents wanting to 
become Russian citizens. Russia’s attitude towards the presence of its troops on Moldovan 
soil has been unclear. The withdrawal treaty signed in July 1995 became effective only 
three years after ratification by both parliaments.
Reunification with Romania was never an attractive option. Nevertheless, it became 
a goal made widely moot among the pro-Romanian intelligentsia after the Romanian 
revolution in 1989 and Moldova's independence in 1991. However, the negative 
implications that it has had for Moldova’s security and territorial integrity is difficult to
449 Source: Economic Freedom o f the World 2006 Annual Report in
www.freetheworld.com Lower score means higher degree of economic freedom.
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exaggerate. Later, the poor showing by the pro-Romanian parties in the February 1994 
elections effectively pushed reunification off the agenda.
Unlike Romania and Russia, Ukraine maintained a low profile throughout the 
Transnistria crisis, although Ukrainians constitute the second largest ethnic group in the 
Transnistria region after Moldovans, and its troops are part of the peacekeeping contingent. 
After the election of Leonid Kuchma as president in July 1994, Ukraine adopted a more 
confident foreign policy. Ukraine and Moldova share common concerns with regard to 
Russia. They are both members of GUUAM, an alternative organisation to the CIS.450
NATO’s relations with the Republic of Moldova date back to 1992, when the 
country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council in 1997). Relations expanded when Moldova joined the Partnership 
for Peace program in 1994. There have been positive developments in the relationship 
between Moldova and the NATO since 2006, when Moldova’s first Individual Partnership 
Action Plan was agreed with NATO. The implementation of the Individual Plan of Action 
for Partnership (IPAP) is aimed to strengthen the political dialogue and deepen the 
cooperation between Moldova and the allied- and partner-states. Key areas of cooperation 
include the consolidation of full democratic control of the armed forces, defence reform, 
planning, and budgeting. Another key objective of NATO’s cooperation is to develop 
compatible Moldovan forces to work together with forces from NATO countries, 
especially in crisis management and peacekeeping operations.
On security issues, Moldova has maintained a strictly neutral stance. Because of its 
neutral status, Moldova does not pursue NATO membership through its IPAP 
implementation. However, although the president and the government have regularly stated 
that Moldova will not apply to join NATO, when signing the IPAP in June 2005, high- 
level Moldovan officials did not exclude the possibility that Moldova might seek even 
closer ties with the alliance.451 It should be noted that Moldova’s benefits from cooperation
450 GUUAM stands for Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova.
451 ITAR-TASS News Agency, “Moldova lists European integration, ties with NATO as 
priorities”, 23 June, 2005.
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with NATO remain largely political, since this cooperation does not provide security for 
Moldova, and nor does it help to restore the country’s territorial integrity.
As we have seen, one of the main commitments of the EU under the ENP was 
“Continuing strong EU commitment to support the settlement of the Transnistria conflict, 
drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close consultation with the 
OSCE”452. In 2005, the EU appointed a special representative on Moldova whose main 
mandate has been to contribute to a settlement of the conflict. The EU has also launched a 
Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine with the mandate of strengthening the 
border management between the two states and reducing smuggling through Transnistria. 
The EU and the United States have also become involved as observers in the international 
effort to negotiate a solution to the Transnistria conflict.
One can see how intense the rapprochement has been with the West, especially in 
EU-Moldova relations. However, how long this foreign policy direction will be maintained 
depends largely on progress in resolving security issues, particularly, the Transnistrian 
problem. And this is not only because Moldova’s prime interest in foreign policy has been 
the resolution of the conflict, but also because the EU may see the resolution of the conflict 
as a precondition for Moldova’s further integration into European structures.
Since its adherence, the Republic of Moldova has benefited from the permanent 
support of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is the 
principal international collective actor fully involved in the Transnistrian conflict 
settlement process. Apart from assisting with Moldova’s democratization agenda, the 
OSCE plays the mediator role in the Transnistrian conflict settlement process. It offers a 
broad framework for discussions of the Transnistrian conflict issue with international 
partners. It also informs the international community regarding developments in the 
process. So far, the OSCE has not been successful in finding a political solution to the 
problem. “The history of Moldova’s relations with the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe is a history of failed initiatives. Originally looked upon with hope,
452 EU-Moldova Action Plan, February 2005, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova.
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the OSCE has come to be regarded as incapable of meeting the expectations placed upon 
it.” 453 AsFreireobserves:
Chisinau has criticised the OSCE mission for its unsuccessful action in regard 
to withdrawal of Russian troops and has demanded that it take a harder line 
on separatism. Transnistria, for its part, sees the mission as a vehicle for
internationalising its cause and for creating a link between the parties, for
encouraging dialogue and for putting forward proposals.454
Meanwhile, Transnistrians have complained about what they describe as the pro-
Moldovan stance of the OSCE, as the OSCE mission has criticized Transnistria’s lack of
cooperation. Under these circumstances, and with diverging interests of its powerful
members, the OSCE hasn’t been able to accomplish the task.
The conflict settlement efforts have gradually been moving into an EU-Moldova-
Ukraine framework, in which Russia no longer plays the main role in negotiations on the
status of Transnistria. On various occasions, Russia has stopped Moldovan exports of
meat, vegetables, and wine to Russia and announced its intention to raise gas prices in
2006. Transnistria was excluded from these measures. Reportedly, Russia had tried to
support Transnistria while increasing pressure on Moldova. In this context, President
Voronin declared in an interview with the BBC in October 2005 that
Moldova can survive without exporting wine to Russia. It will be difficult 
but we are ready to live in cold, to freeze without Russian gas, but we will 
not cede. Moldova will not sacrifice its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and 
freedom, irrespective of the price we will have to pay.455
Today Moldova continues to remain divided, with its secessionist region of 
Transnistria maintaining its de facto independence.
453 Adrian Severin, “Moldova and the OSCE: a History of Failed Initiatives”, in The EU & 
Moldova: On a Fault-line o f  Europe Ann Lewis (ed.), The Federal Trust, 2004, p. 161.
454 Maria Raquel Sousa Freire, Crisis Management: The OSCE in the Republic o f  Moldova, 
Conflict, Security & Development, 2:2, 2002, pp. 70-89, p. 81.
455Nation in Transit, 2003.
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Conclusion: Interaction
In this chapter I have demonstrated first, how the interplay among the 
government’s economic, political and security policies affected Moldova’s transition and 
what structural factors constrained its progress. Second, I have demonstrated how crucial 
international support and demand were for the successes and failures not only in each of 
the policy dimensions, but for the overall transition path. I have also tried to demonstrate 
the essential linkages between domestic and foreign policy dynamics in the process of 
transition. I have tried to show that the major policy shifts that Moldova experienced 
during about fifteen years of independence are not merely subjective elite preferences. 
Those policies and subsequent changes also reflect the structural constraints inherent to the 
country, and the changing demands and supports of the domestic society and the 
international community. And it is within the framework of that demand and support that 
the government pursued its key domestic and foreign policies, meanwhile striving to 
increase, or at least preserve, its legitimacy.
In Moldova, as in many countries of the same region, due to unfavourable starting 
conditions, the specific structure of the economy, and the existence of a secessionist 
conflict, successfully implemented radical reforms did not lead to quick economic 
recovery. On the contrary, they led to a sharp decline in socio-economic conditions and 
they undermined domestic political support. Public discontent from mass impoverishment 
was also fuelled by the leadership’s failure first to prevent and then to resolve severe state- 
building and security problems.
In the security dimension, early years of radical nationalism and pro-Romanian 
orientation led to the marginalisation of major ethnic minorities in the country, thus 
threatening Moldova’s independent statehood and territorial integrity. Ethnic politics 
became an indispensible part of Moldovan politics, contributing to the severe 
fragmentation of the political elite. The political and economic costs of the Transnistrian 
conflict were high, turning the conflict into a serious obstacle to the country’s transition.
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These tremendous economic and security challenges were reflected on the political 
front. The high social and political costs of reforms and state-building rapidly de­
legitimised the incumbents. The relatively high degree of political liberalisation that was 
present in that period allowed a frequent turnover of governments, often changing the 
country’s foreign policy direction, however, leaving domestic economic policies more or 
less the same. Regardless of their political orientation and foreign policy attitudes, these 
political forces continued the radical liberalisation of the economy until 2000. As a result, 
the economy went on deteriorating, security declined, while unprecedentedly,, economic 
and political liberalisation continued. This irrational situation endured for almost a decade 
until, frustrated with the reforms and sunk into dire poverty, domestic society brought the 
CPM to power through democratic elections.
As I argued in Chapter 3, it is unlikely that any government would be able to 
conduct such a complex, systemic and simultaneous transformation as the transition with a 
limited political resource alone, unless it has a sufficient level of external demand and 
support. The explanation of Moldova’s seemingly different pattern in this regard, when 
political and economic reforms continued to proceed equally successfully (according to the 
table 4.2. in Chapter 4) for a number of years, is not that Moldova had adapted to the new 
rules of the game, nor is it the socialisation effect of Western values, nor the adequacy of 
international support and demand, or the skilful timing and sequencing of reform policies. 
The weakness of the Moldovan state and the existence of strong but ideologically very 
polarized and fragmented elites were the two intermediate structural and contingent factors 
that did not permit a concentration of power for almost a decade and allowed considerable 
political liberalisation.
The return of the Communists marked a drastic change in the existing situation. 
With limited resources and insufficient external demand and support, the Communist 
government was not able to conduct equally profound reforms in all directions. They had 
to make critical choices based on structural necessities and within the framework of the 
demands and supports of domestic society and international community as well as its own 
legitimacy needs. That choice was to prioritise the economic reform (although more 
gradual) in order to achieve a more sustainable economic growth and to improve the 
economic situation in the country.
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Chart 6.1 Dynamics of Political Rights and Civil liberties and Economic Liberalisation in 
Moldova, 1991-20051
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'Economic liberalisation: higher score means increase in economic liberalisation;
Political Rights and Civil liberties: higher score means decline in human rights.
According to the EBRD Transition Report 2006, the EBRD index of small-scale 
privatisation improved to 3.7 in 2005 from 3.3 in 1999. The index for large-scale 
privatisation and the index for enterprise reform in general have remained at the same 
level. The EBRD indices of price liberalisation and competition policy have remained at 
the same level, while the index of foreign export and trade liberalisation has improved 
from 4.00 in 2000 to 4.3 in 2005. The EBRD index of banking sector reform in the same 
period grew from 2.3 to 2.7. One can conclude that Voronin’s government appeared to be 
more reformist than previous governments: in some areas it has managed to register 
unprecedented economic reform scores, while in others, it has kept the pre-existing level of 
reform tempo.
These successes however, have been accompanied by a concentration of power and 
a decline in the level of democratisation in Moldova. Beginning in 2001, Moldova’s 
democratic performance started worsening in all parameters put forward by the Nations in
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Transit Report produced by Freedom House. The indicator for Electoral Process worsened 
by 0.75, from 3.25 in 2001 to 4.00 in 2005. The indicator for Civil Society went from 3.75 
in 2001 to 4.00 in 2005. The Democratic Governance indicator changed from 4.50 to 5.75 
in 2006. The Independent Media score has decreased from 4.25 in 2001 to 5.00 in 2006. 
The Judicial Framework and Independence score during the same period changed from 
4.25 to 4.50. Thus, overall, the Democracy score has declined noticeably, to 5.07 in 2005 
from 4.29 in 2001.456 As one can see, political rights and civil liberties started to decline in 
Moldova in 2001(see Chart 6.1). Voronin’s tenure has generated serious criticism from the 
international community for its undemocratic practices. In sum, all these simultaneous 
developments in domestic politics in Moldova demonstrate the interconnectedness and 
horizontal interaction among the government’s economic, political and security policies 
during the transition.
How effective was the engagement of international and regional actors in 
Moldova’s transition and development? To what extent were Moldova’s reform policies 
demanded, supported, compensated, or complemented by the international community in 
order to help the domestic society sustain its support for reforms and to prevent the 
government and the society from diverging from the democratic path of transition?
As in Kyrgyzstan, the costs of conducting radical reforms in Moldova were higher 
than many expected. At the same time, as in Kyrgyzstan, the external support and demand 
for democratisation in Moldova was neither sufficient nor consistent enough to ameliorate 
the accumulating social and political costs.
Although close to the West, Moldova could not generate sufficient external 
support to alleviate the social and economic costs of transition and state-building. In the 
economic dimension, the bilateral and multilateral support that Moldova has received since 
1994 in the form of direct foreign financial assistance and loans has been substantial, yet 
not effective, and there have been serious flaws in policy design and implementation on 
both sides. The accumulated external debt was extremely high and exceeded the country’s 
GDP. Especially in the early years of economic reform, the allocation of foreign assistance 
was not well targeted and well monitored by the IFIs, and the government mismanaged 
those funds.
456 Nations in Transit, “Moldova Country Report”, 2005, 2006.
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Despite high domestic expectations, WTO membership, while putting additional 
pressures on the country’s vulnerable economy, did not guarantee access to international 
and regional markets. Neither did proximity to the EU help, because of the EU’s 
protectionist trade policies. Foreign direct investment has been relatively low by regional 
standards due to chronic political instability, continuing economic decline and the 
unresolved Transnistrian problem. The involvement of international and regional political 
organisations, such as OSCE and the Council of Europe, has not been effective in 
Moldova. Their role and their resources were limited, and they were not able to extend 
substantial support and demand to the country’s political leadership.
EU-Moldova relations improved after 2005, after Moldova turned to the West, 
intensively seeking closer relations with the EU and NATO. The ENP offered Moldova 
new opportunities of political, economic and security cooperation. However, the lack of 
membership perspective does not provide the EU with active leverage and its socialisation 
impact has not been significant.
The involvement of international and regional organisations in the resolution of 
Moldova’s security problems has also not been fruitful and has not met domestic 
expectations. In other words, these organisations have not alleviated the burden of security 
related political, social and economic costs by helping the country to settle its security 
issues. As a result, the government was forced to revert to its internal resources to bear the 
costs of state- building.
According to my second hypothesis, such an uneven distribution of international 
demand and support leads to a scenario when, in a democratic environment, unsatisfied 
domestic demand may lead to policy change, or to a change in the government, with the 
new government trying or not trying to continue the same reform policies. The lack of 
resources necessary for restructuring the national economy, reviving trade and attracting 
foreign investments, in other words, for making the economy viable, made Moldova seek 
cooperation with the Western financing institutions, in other words, meet the international 
demands and to continue painful reforms. There was no other real alternative to those 
institutions. In other words, Moldova’s transition experience before the return of the 
Communists supports the validity of the scenario envisaged by my second hypothesis. 
After 2001, one can see other dynamics in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. The
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Communist government continued painful economic reforms without sufficient external 
support and against the will of the voters, thus giving up or compromising its 
democratization agenda. These dynamics demonstrate how the interplay between the 
domestic, state and the international levels occurred in Moldova, and the way the 
allocation of transition costs across levels affected the transition process in Moldova, thus 
supporting my second assumption.
The interaction of the horizontal and vertical dimensions in Moldova, was reflected 
in the domestic and foreign policy relationship. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
Kyrgyzstan did not have many foreign policy choices and those that they had proved to be 
ineffective in helping to bear the transition costs, leading to democratic limitations and 
setbacks in domestic reform policies. In Moldova throughout the first decade of transition, 
we witnessed rather different dynamics in domestic and foreign policy relationship. While 
the economy and security were deteriorating, political liberties were still in place, thus 
leading to government change, or a change in the government’s policy (either foreign or 
domestic). Since Moldova had more foreign policy choices than Kyrgyzstan, the 
continuing decline in the domestic economic and security situation was reflected 
immediately in the country’s foreign policy. The availability of more foreign policy 
choices, however, did not provide the necessary resources for achieving its transition goals 
and overcoming its transition and state-building difficulties. Of course, in the same way, 
changes in foreign policy direction led to changes in international support and demand, 
which subsequently affected the transition process within the country. While domestic 
policies remained almost unchanged until 2001 (except for the adoption of a more 
conciliatory policy towards ethnic minorities after the pro-Romanians were ousted), 
foreign policies changed rather often. Those foreign policy changes were aimed at seeking 
support for resolving the country’s urgent political, economic and security issues that 
surfaced during the democratisation process. Not surprisingly, in the first fifteen years of 
its transition Moldova had more than ten governments, ranging from radical nationalists 
and right-wing liberals to left-wing socialists. One leader’s policy goals could vary from 
membership of the Russia-Belarus Union to membership of the EU. Starting from a pro- 
Romanian orientation, then balancing to a more independent, complementary one, they 
moved to a more pro-Russian or pro-CIS orientation, before, very recently, turning to pro-
2 7 1
European, pro-EU foreign policies. These developments in domestic and foreign policies 
support my argument that there is a critical and direct link and interplay between domestic 
and foreign policy dynamics in Moldova during transition
Of course, the historical, cultural, security and economic factors inherent to 
Moldova, which I identified at the beginning of this chapter, played an essential role in 
Moldova’s transition. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, the process of complex 
interaction and interplay of different issue policies within the transition state (horizontal) 
and among three different levels -  domestic, state and international (vertical) -  and the 
interaction between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions, played an important role in 
shaping the dynamics of transition and its outcomes in Moldova.
The evidence in this chapter also demonstrates that Moldova’s transition path does 
not diverge from the second group of countries and its transition does not present a unique 
case.
272
CONCLUSION
In my thesis I have argued that transition can be better understood if it is viewed as 
a political process of complex interaction and interplay of different issue policies within 
the transition state (horizontal) and among three different levels -  domestic, state and 
international (vertical). Such an approach can better explain the dynamics and various 
outcomes we currently witness in the countries of post-communist transition.
To construct my main hypotheses and to set out the theoretical framework that can 
help to test them, I first explored what accounts for successful democratisation and what 
the key domestic factors are that are crucial for the survival and sustainability of 
democracy, according to democratisation theories. In this respect, the theories of 
democratisation identify a number of different factors, ranging from social and economic 
prerequisites and political culture, elite choices and institutions.
The analysis of transition showed that structural and other domestic factors vary 
significantly across the transition space and, understandably, transition countries had 
different starting points. Yet domestic factors are not sufficient for explaining the overall 
transition dynamics. Each of the schools in democratic transition theory has an important 
role in explaining the post-communist transition. However, neither of them provides an 
exhaustive explanation as to why, for example, post-communist countries took different 
transition paths and achieved different results.
The review of IR theories showed that their applicability to post-communist 
transition is limited. The lack of attention paid to the concept of linkage, the role of 
domestic actors and the learning process, which are extremely important for analysing and 
explaining the complex process of the domestic transformation and international 
integration of transition countries, limits the applicability of the theory of complex 
interdependence to post-communist transition studies. International regime theories also, 
because of their weakness in covering domestic processes, can have only limited 
applicability for the study of post-communist transition. Studies of the international 
dimension in post-communist transition focus on the role of conditionality as a foreign 
policy instrument to promote democracy and liberal market reforms. However, they do not 
go further to explore how conditionality works at the domestic level, and why some types 
of international conditionality are more effective than others.
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Socialisation theories do, to some extent, fill the gap that exists in explaining how 
international regimes and international organisations transfer international norms to 
domestic societies and domestic actors. However, overall they still tend to be about top- 
down processes of the internalisation of international norms, rather than about the dynamic 
interaction among domestic, state and international levels. I concluded that socialisation 
based on a rational choice approach, or socialisation by reinforcement, is more applicable 
for post-communist transition studies than other types of socialisation because it leaves 
more room for taking domestic actors’ strategic calculations and consequent actions into 
account.
To test my hypotheses, I also reviewed the IR theories that analyse various aspects 
of domestic and foreign policy relationships and tried to identify the concepts that can be 
useful in analysing the multi-issue and multilevel dynamics of post-communist transition. 
The numerous theories and concepts on domestic-foreign policy relationship (such as 
Putnam’s two-level game concept, Clark’s brokerage state, theories of adaptation, 
integration, intervention and adjustment, etc.) that I discussed are either discrete, static or 
largely remain theories of a state’s, or rather of a statesman’s, behaviour under given 
circumstances. As such, they do not provide a unified approach that can incorporate 
domestic level variables in a systematic and consistent manner. Therefore, their 
applicability to analysing the multi-issue and multilevel dynamics of post-communist 
transition is very limited. Certainly, there is a need for a new model.
In sum, the theories and approaches mentioned above have a legitimate place in 
explaining transition dynamics. However, they do not account for the process of political 
interaction and interplay during the transition, both internal and external, within which 
each government is moving towards its transition goals -  domestic transformation and 
international integration. My approach aimed to fill that gap by suggesting a more 
dynamic framework for analysing transition. My framework views transition as a political 
process of complex interaction and interplay of different issue policies within the transition 
state (horizontal) and among three different levels-domestic, state and international 
(vertical).
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While incorporating some aspects of those theories, my approach differs in the 
following aspects:
• None of those theories treats the transition as a dynamic process of 
interaction across domestic, state, and international levels on the one hand, and a 
trade-off between values and policy goals, priorities within the transition states, on 
the other. This is what my thesis aimed to do, and it is this that takes my argument 
beyond the framework of existing democratisation theories and makes the task of 
analysis an interdisciplinary one.
• I adopted a holistic and integrative approach. In my suggested framework, I 
do not oppose structural (i.e. modernization theory) theories to the genetic 
approach. While accepting the role of elites and leaders in making choices, I 
understand that those choices are limited to the ones made possible by structures. 
On the other hand, one should not underestimate the role of leaders and elites in 
shaping different policy responses in similar structural circumstances. In addition, 
elite choices may have a bigger impact during the transition process on shaping the 
same structures than after democratic consolidation. In other words, I assume that 
the role of agents is important in democratic transition; however, their choices are 
structurally constrained by economic development and the economic situation. The 
latter is important but not sufficient for the existence and consolidation of a 
democratic regime.
• I suggested that not only the economic situation, but also political and 
security conditions matter if democratisation and marketisation are to make 
progress.
• I suggested the category of legitimacy, the political resource, for exploring 
the linkages existing among different policies and different levels. In addition, the 
degree of a government’s legitimacy is an important resource for each stage of 
transition reforms. With regard to the importance of timing, sequencing and pace in 
post-communist transition, my approach differs as well. I viewed them as an 
important way of making the politics of reforms more effective, which means 
making the reform process socially less costly and saving the political resource of 
the government. At the same time, the pace, timing and sequencing of each new
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cycle of reforms in the economic, political, and security spheres will, to a large 
extent, depend upon the amount of the political resource that the reformist 
government acquires after the preceding cycle of reforms.
• I emphasized not the technicalities and the tactical side of timing and
sequencing, but rather the political side of the issue, focusing on relations among 
different policies: economic, political and security.
• I stressed the importance of the timing and sequencing of not only
horizontal but also vertical policy interactions and interplay.
• I also concluded that the timing, sequencing and pace of reforms did not
make a decisive difference to the transition outcomes. Hungary has pursued slow 
but consistent and fundamental reforms (gradual reforms) throughout the entire 
transition process. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, which started with very radical 
and ambitious political and economic reforms, and was deemed to be a success in 
the early years of transition, ended up by continuously reproducing itself as a semi­
authoritarian and semi-market system.
• I suggested concrete meanings and criteria, defined concrete indicators for
the international, state, and domestic mutual demand and support during the 
transition process.
• The model that I suggested in this thesis takes into account 1) the initial 
socio-economic, political and security conditions and changes in those conditions 
resulting from government policies and their interaction, 2) based on those 
conditions, elite choices and government policies and their interaction, and 3) 
initial domestic and external demands and supports, their interplay and change, 
resulting from government policies. As one can see, there are complex interactions 
between these components of the transition, which could be analysed in a dynamic 
framework.
My model allows one to follow the developments while they are taking 
place, to trace the direction and dynamics of the change within each policy area and 
at each level in the early stages, and their impact on the overall transition process, 
to predict and explain the subsequent foreign and domestic policy changes.
276
In contrast with the concepts of conflict, compatibility, and reconciliation 
among policy goals described by Huntington, which define the relationship among 
policy goals as either that of merely conflict, or compatibility, or reconciliation, we 
witness all scenarios developing in parallel during the first decade of post­
communist transition. My model does not exclude but rather explains the existence 
of all scenarios.
Based on this framework, I investigated the validity of my three assumptions on the 
comparative analysis of twenty-five post-communist countries. Kyrgyzstan and Moldova 
seemed to deviate from the overall pattern and to contradict my key assumptions and I 
therefore subjected them to more analysis.
My assumptions aimed to capture the nuances of horizontal linkages, vertical 
linkages and their interplay in the overall transition process. In particular, I demonstrated 
that:
1) There is a strong interconnectedness among economic, political and security 
policies during transition, and success in one dimension often comes at the expense of 
success in another. It is difficult to achieve progress in all dimensions, unless there is 
sufficient external support.
2) Besides the link between economic, political and security policies, there is also 
an essential link and interplay among different levels -  domestic, state and international -  
within the overall transition process. In order for transition to succeed, it is important that 
the resources and respective costs of transition have been effectively, that is reasonably, 
distributed in a timely manner among those levels.
3) The interaction of horizontal and vertical dimensions is reflected in the domestic 
and foreign policy relationship, thus, creating an essential and direct link and interplay 
between domestic and foreign policy dynamics during the transition.
The comparative analysis of the liberalisation and democratisation scores for the 
twenty-five post-communist transition countries predominantly supported my first 
assumption that there is strong interconnectedness among reform policies, and that the 
governments of the transition countries have had a limited resource for pursuing these 
policies. As a result, most often they ended up pursuing one goal at the expense of the
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other. The analysis also showed that the transition countries could not deal with such a 
systemic multi-issue transformation as transition by themselves, without sufficient external 
support and demand.
To discuss the horizontal interaction between different reform policies in these 
countries, I focused on the two main pillars of transition, economic and political. The 
comparative survey showed that after about 15 years of transition, three distinct groups of 
countries could be distinguished: The first group contains the countries that successfully 
managed to pursue all transition goals in parallel.457 These countries, mostly in Central and 
Eastern Europe, drastically liberalised their economies and still managed to keep their 
democratic records more or less clean for the same period, in the sense that they conducted 
better, free and fair elections, promoted the rule of law, etc. What distinguished the first, 
successful group of countries from the second group was the presence of the consistent and 
adequate external support that they received in the framework of their accession to 
European Union.
Countries in the second group progressed in one sphere but lagged behind in the 
other. Geographically, they coincide roughly with the Western CIS and the Caucasus. This 
pattern supports my assumption that progress in one policy comes at the expense of the 
other, unless there is sufficient external support and demand. The governments in this 
group of countries initially embarked on full-fledged democratisation, yet they were unable 
to continue reform policies in both areas with the same depth and tempo since insufficient 
external support and demand were available to reinvigorate their reform efforts.
In the third group are the countries in which the tempo and depth of reforms was 
not sufficient in either the political or the economic sphere. These countries failed to 
reform and chose a path that was not democratic. These are countries in which there was 
neither significant and persistent domestic and international support/demand for reforms, 
nor a reformist government.
Even with an untrained eye, one can observe a striking difference in the 
security/state-building challenges that different regional groups of countries faced. A 
comparison of available security indicators shows that countries of the same regional 
group had similar security/state-building levels, suggesting that the link of security issues
457 The full list of these countries is given in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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to political and economic reforms has also been strong.458 The less pressing security and 
state-building problems are, the more likely it is that incumbents will be able devote more 
resources to other critical spheres, and the more likely it is that the country will progress in 
the economic and political spheres.
The examination of vertical interaction and the analysis of aggregate data revealed 
a large variation in how the resources and respective costs of transition have been 
distributed in these three groups of countries. The overview of lending by the international 
financial institutions showed an imbalance in the support extended by these organisations 
to the states in transition. A simple comparison already indicated that there has been little 
correlation between the amount of IFI funding, foreign economic assistance and foreign 
direct investment and a given country’s liberalisation achievements.
In the first group of countries, domestic societies retained substantial support for 
EU membership throughout the entire pre-accession phase. Through its conditionality, the 
EU extended the necessary demand and support to the governments in aspirant countries to 
build genuine democracy and a market economy. The EU and NATO also embarked on an 
intensive international socialization effort in the societies of aspirant countries. By giving 
access to its trade and investment market, the EU enhanced the position of pro-reform 
economic groups. The EU provided sizable financial assistance and foreign investment to 
the governments for meeting its requirements. It is evident that the EU provided all the 
necessary political resource in a timely manner for successful and comprehensive reforms 
to the governments and societies of the first group of countries.
While the second group of countries, which coincides with the Western CIS and the 
Caucasus, obtained considerable financial assistance from the international financial 
institutions, there was little real effort to facilitate trade and investment. There was also 
little significant international socialisation effort with the societies of these countries, 
which might have helped to shape strong market and democratic convictions and 
encourage continual support and demand for the market and democracy within these 
societies. International actors did not adopt consistent policies towards illiberal 
governments and policies in this region, of the type that they adopted in the CEECs. As for 
conditionality, for the second group of countries and for the case studies in my thesis, the
458 See table 4.3 in Chapter 4.
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only type of international conditionality that has been available is the democratic 
conditionality, which has had limited impact.
The comparative overview of the dynamics and divergence in the evolution of 
security problems in the post-communist space demonstrated that the international demand 
and support for dealing with serious security issues varied across the different country 
groups. The EU’s tremendous efforts in the CEECs were complemented by those of 
NATO. Any attempt to violate these norms came into open conflict with those countries’ 
goal of attaining EU and NATO membership. The major international support/demand for 
the resolution of some of the open and violent conflicts in the CIS has come from the 
OSCE. However, due to the nature of the organisation, its role has been limited to 
facilitating peace talks.
In sum, one can see that the resources and costs of transition are not equally and 
effectively distributed among the levels, especially if it is assumed that the interest in 
integration is equal at all levels. The evidence shows that there is indeed an imbalance 
between the supports and demands for reform in the transition countries of the CIS. In my 
opinion, this largely explains the poor performance of the countries of the second group 
during the transition process. It also supports my second hypothesis, which suggested that 
there is an essential link and interplay not only among different policy areas -  economic, 
political, security -  but also an essential link and trade-off among different levels -  
domestic, state and international -  within the overall transition process. In order for 
transition to succeed, it is important that the resources and respective costs of transition 
have been effectively, that is, reasonably and in a timely manner, allocated among different 
levels.
In the third hypothesis, I argued that the interaction of horizontal and vertical 
dimensions is reflected in the domestic and foreign policy relationship, thus, creating an 
essential and direct link and interplay between domestic and foreign policy dynamics 
during transition.
I suggested and demonstrated on the case studies that a variety of scenarios of 
interplay is possible. For example, in a given country where the economy and security are 
deteriorating but political liberties are in place, one should expect the government’s policy 
(either foreign or domestic) to change. If the country’s foreign policy is not able to secure
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the necessary international support for domestic reform policies, the foreign policy will be 
changed to do so. If that is not possible, we may see a government’s domestic policy 
change or a government change. However, government change by itself does not resolve 
this dilemma. Conversely, if the economy deteriorates, security threats grow, and there is 
no change in the government’s domestic or foreign policy, then one should look at the 
status of political liberties. Most probably, in that country the society will be deprived of 
the means of democratic self-expression. The interconnection is more obvious between the 
economy and security. To increase security, the government primarily needs finances, 
which only a well functioning economy can provide. Therefore, in the face of deteriorating 
security, if a government does not have the economic resources to improve its defence 
capabilities, it will be forced to change its domestic or foreign policy either to improve the 
financial situation or to eliminate the security threat. Alternatively, if the state uses existing 
scarce resources to arm itself, it will have no choice but to suppress democracy 
domestically. In that case, the state propaganda machine may be activated to try to 
compensate the society, for example, by feeding it with nationalistic ideology and 
increased propaganda.
The democratisation process may lead to a rise of ethnic or religious problems and 
conflicts, thus creating real security concerns. The country’s foreign policy direction may 
not be able to secure the necessary international support to prevent deepening internal 
division or even the breakup of the country. This may lead to a change in foreign policy 
direction (i.e. a change in geostrategic orientation: joining new international/regional 
security regimes, organisations; seeking new ties or reinforcing or halting existing bilateral 
ties). Alternatively, it may slow down or suspend the democratisation process.
In a transition country where market reforms have led to economic decline, the 
foreign policy will aim to seek international support in the form of economic assistance, 
investments, trade access, etc. If this does not succeed, under democratic conditions the 
foreign policy direction will be changed. Otherwise, the democratic reforms may be 
abandoned or the government may be changed.
In the first group of countries, foreign policy did not change because there was 
sufficient international support in the form of EU-membership. Therefore, domestic 
reforms continued. Because of inconsistent international support and demand, the countries
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in the second group faced the dilemmas described above. As for the third group, as we 
have seen, there have been no real democratisation and liberalisation efforts in those 
countries.
Despite appearing as outliers, the analysis of the transition process in Moldova and 
Kyrgyzstan also confirmed my hypotheses. In Kyrgyzstan, in the economic dimension, 
market reforms failed to bring economic prosperity. Radical reforms engendered a high 
level of unemployment and mass impoverishment. This extreme poverty increased the 
social as well as the regional disparities and the north-south divide in the country. It 
brought about public discontent with the economic situation, threatening political stability 
in the country. Domestic society essentially withdrew its support for the government’s 
reform policy. Continuing vital economic measures was no longer possible without going 
against the will of people. The eroding economic situation had a negative impact not only 
on the political but also on the security sphere.
Economic hardship and the weakness of the central state made it difficult for the 
government to protect its borders and this instigated numerous security problems. 
Addressing some of these security concerns has, however, meant violating the basic “rules 
of the game” of democracy. All the problems stemming from the deteriorating economic 
situation and numerous security challenges resulted in a deep legitimacy crisis in the 
country. In order to compensate for his lost domestic support and to maintain the stability 
and integrity of the state and his regime, Akaev began curbing civil liberties and political 
freedoms, while continuing economic liberalisation. Not surprisingly, these developments 
created a vicious cycle. Partial and arbitrary reforms in the political sphere and repressions 
against political opponents had further direct and indirect consequences for the economy, 
the security and the government’s overall legitimacy. Consequently, it shattered the 
government’s credibility in the eyes of the international community.
The analysis of the political, economic, and security dimensions and their 
interrelation in post-communist Kyrgyzstan showed that the growing authoritarianism of 
Akaev was a reaction to compensate for his declining legitimacy and maintain the stability 
which had been eroding as a result of intermingled political, economic, and security 
cleavages. The explanation for such an “evolutionary” or gradual shift to authoritarianism 
lies not only in those domestic political, economic, and security cleavages and Akaev’s
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attempts to address them with the least possible damage to his legitimacy, but also in the 
interaction among domestic, state and international levels. Due to its poor starting 
conditions, geographical isolation, scarce resources, tremendous security concerns, and 
societal divisions, the political and social costs of democratisation in Kyrgyzstan were 
extremely high. The country’s leadership was unable to cope alone with the costs in a 
satisfactory manner. Although Kyrgyzstan did get foreign economic aid, whether for 
objective or subjective reasons there has not been an adequate volume of foreign 
investment and risk insurance, debt restructuring, or trade access, on the one hand, and 
strict political conditionality on the other. Nor did Kyrgyzstan benefit from the 
international socialization available to transition countries closer to the European Union.
Without sufficient economic and political support-demand from the international 
community, the relatively liberal government of Akaev quickly exhausted its legitimacy 
resource and started moving towards authoritarianism, and there was insufficient 
international engagement to stop him from doing that. The involvement of regional and 
international political organisations in Kyrgyzstan has been limited and rather formal and 
has not led to an alleviation of the country’s immense economic and security problems. In 
other words, with respect to the resources and respective costs of transition, it was obvious 
that the resources and respective costs of transition have not been distributed reasonably 
and in a timely manner and that contributed significantly to the slow down and even 
reversal in Kyrgyzstan’s transition trajectory. Kyrgyzstan did not have many foreign policy 
choices. Despite some failed attempts, Kyrgyzstan was not able to resolve its political, 
economic and security problems within the foreign policy it initially adopted. There were 
some unsuccessful attempts to combine different foreign policy directions. However, 
overall there has not been any foreign policy shift. Its limited foreign policy choices made 
the government address its problems mostly by revising and adjusting its domestic policy 
choices, as my model predicted. In sum, the analysis of the transition process in 
Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the validity of my assumptions..
Moldova’s starting conditions were almost as adverse as those of Kyrgyzstan. Due 
to unfavourable starting conditions, the specific structure of the economy, and the 
existence of a secessionist conflict, economic reforms were successfully started but they 
did not lead to quick economic recovery. On the contrary, they led to a sharp decline in
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socio-economic conditions, rapidly de-legitimised the incumbent government and 
undermined domestic political support. Public discontent was also fuelled by the 
leadership’s failure first to prevent and then to resolve severe state-building and security 
problems. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan, where the first reaction to the withdrawal of public 
support was the tightening of power by Akaev, in Moldova the withdrawal of public 
support resulted in frequent government changes by free and fair elections and frequent 
foreign policy changes. The endurance of political liberties in Moldova and the failure of 
almost all successive presidents to tighten their grip on power was due to two intermediate 
structural and contingent factors: the weakness of the Moldovan state and the presence of 
ideologically very polarized and fragmented elites. With vast disappointment from the 
liberal governments’ economic policies and failures on the security and political fronts, 
and with the Communists’ return to power and their ability to concentrate power, 
Moldova’s transition process started to follow the transition pattern typical for the second 
group of countries.
With limited resource and insufficient external demand and support, the 
Communist government had to make critical choices based on structural necessities and 
within the framework of the demands and supports of domestic society and international 
community, as well as its own legitimacy needs. That choice was to prioritise the 
economic reform in order to improve the country’s economic situation. The improvement 
of the economic situation was the primary domestic expectation and therefore the best way 
to increase the government’s legitimacy. However, as suggested in my first hypothesis, 
that was possible only at the expense of political freedoms, since domestic society had 
withdrawn its support for economic reforms. While the economy started recovering, the 
recovery came at the expense of democratic freedoms.
Although close to the West, Moldova could not generate sufficient and consistent 
external support to alleviate the social and economic costs of transition and state-building. 
There were failures in the design and timing of international support and demand in the 
economic sphere. Political conditionality, although present, was not sufficient to socialize 
the elites. The involvement of international and regional organisations in the resolution of 
Moldova’s security problems has also not been fruitful and has not met domestic 
expectations. To conclude, the demand and support from the international community to
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Moldova’s transition was limited in the spheres of political reform and state-building, and 
were inadequate in the sphere of economic reform. These developments support my 
second hypothesis.
In contrast to Kyrgyzstan, where the government changed its domestic policies to 
adjust to the new realities resulting from its initial reform polices and in the framework of 
changed domestic and international support, in Moldova those changes were reflected first 
of all in foreign policy. As demonstrated in chapter 6, such frequent foreign policy changes 
were not just subjective choices but were made under certain structural constraints and 
changing domestic and international support and demand, and were aimed at seeking 
support for resolving the country’s urgent political, economic, and security problems. In 
sum, Moldova’s transition path also does not diverge from the second group of countries 
and its transition does not present a unique case.
The comparative analysis of the transition process in the post-communist countries, 
and particularly in Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, demonstrates that the interaction and 
interplay between a country’s key issue policies within the state and among three different 
levels -  domestic, state and international -  can help further explain the current state of 
affairs, variations in the dynamics and the differing outcomes in post-communist transition.
Transition as a dynamic process can be advanced if there is consistent and adequate 
international demand and support, which takes into account domestic political realities. 
The existing practice of international support, reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that aid -  or 
in my terminology, support -  from the international community is channelled to those 
countries where it appears to get the maximum reward. However, countries that objectively 
have more difficulties domestically and a slow pace of transition need more support 
internationally, and naturally, are not in the list of successful transitions. This analysis has 
led me to the conclusion that a different approach can and should be applied both in theory 
and in practice for understanding and promoting post-communist transition processes. The 
new approach should not only pay equal attention to the impact of domestic and 
international factors on a state in transition, but it should also study these two domains in 
their interaction. The new approach should refrain from imposing unilateral single-issue 
conditionality, bearing in mind that transition is a political process and there is an essential 
interdependence among different issue policies. In addition, it should treat transition as a
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political process, which puts the state in the domestic-state-intemational continuum. This 
would mean balancing demands and supports for a particular policy process during the 
transition. In countries of the second and third groups (depending on starting conditions, 
historical and cultural differences, and political processes), the costs of transition are 
objectively higher than they are in the countries of the first group. Therefore, there must be 
greater international demand-support for these countries’ transition.
To summarise, the policy recommendation that stems from this thesis is that since a 
government’s economic, security, and political policies are interrelated and interdependent, 
the support and demand from the international community should address all spheres 
equally and take into consideration the mutual impact of, and consequences for, policies on 
each other. Another conclusion is that there should be greater international support and 
demand for those countries where the costs of transition are objectively high. Finally, it is 
not quick results but the country’s long-term commitment to reform that should be the 
criterion for continuing international engagement.
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